Roland-Billecart's decision to resign was a consequence of the resolution from the Ministers of Transport of Air Afrique's owner states to separate the functions of chairman and managing director by modifying the statutes of the company.
The result of this change was that Roland-Billecart would be deprived of the full powers to conduct the airline's rescue plan, since the owner states ruled in favour of a new management team. It is clear Roland-Billecart did not yield to pressure from the unions. The fact is that he plans to leave office only after allowing the new managing director - who is due to be appointed by October - to familiarise himself with the airline's situation.
The article talks about 'the decline of Air Afrique', which is truly unfair. Since 1989 Air Afrique has registered a constant traffic increase and it now carries more than 800,000 passengers a year. The airline's technical capabilities have been modernised and its fleet entirely renewed. Its cash flow situation has been improved. Air Afrique is severely undercapitalised, but the funds required to keep it afloat are 20-50 billion CFA francs (US$40-100 million), not 200 billion CFA francs as your article stated.
As regards social relations at Air Afrique, the situation at the beginning of 1989 called for a centralised style of management built around a downsized and tight-knit management team. That is the reason why a small number of expatriates were called in to hold managerial positions, most of which were assigned to Africans from 1991.
Consultation with the unions has always been a chief concern for Roland-Billecart, who painstakingly elaborated a status for personnel, and established a tradition of dialogue with the unions. It is the financial crisis which has prevailed since 1993, not management methods, which explains the outbreak of social conflict at Air Afrique.
In explaining the financial crisis, Air Afrique has been penalised by a 'closet' deregulation policy implemented in the multinational zone which has enabled competition from both scheduled and charter carriers to be stronger. Undercapitalisation gradually began to show its inconvenience, especially with Air Afrique's inability to bear the heavy load of its debt servicing deriving from the purchase of the Airbus A310s. In this sense, the 1994 recapitalisation proved effective as it brought in some 30 billion CFA francs.
Air Afrique's cash flow situation is healthier now, not only because of the fleet modernisation, but also because of the restructuring of the network. This alone has brought traffic on domestic routes (which accounted for the airline's greatest losses) to a breakeven point.
Air Afrique and Air France have enjoyed mutual advantage from a 35 year partnership, by which both airlines carry passengers from France to the 11 owner states of Air Afrique. Yet closer cooperation between the two airlines is more desirable for Air Afrique than for its traditional partner. So it is unfair to state that 'Roland-Billecart's policies are aimed at helping Air France' at the expense of Air Afrique.
Airlines often resort to temporary or long term leasing of aircraft as a means of modernising their fleets or adjusting their capacity to changing demand. It is not surprising then that Air Afrique has inclined towards the A300-600, which offers passenger capacity comparable to the DC-10 - withdrawn from the fleet - and lower operating costs. If Air Afrique had kept the DC-10, 1994 losses would have increased by 15 billion CFA francs.
Marc Amoussou Adeble
Communications Dept
Air Afrique
Abidjan
Côte d'Ivoire.
Source: Airline Business
