Tim Ripley/Vicenza
Recent events in Bosnia, with the signing of the US-brokered ceasefire agreement and the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, lend some weight to the view that NATO air power has at last had a significant influence on the course of the three-year-old conflict in the former Yugoslav republic.
NATO officers have little doubt that the use of air power has been a deciding factor. One senior air commander, describing the effect of the alliance's air strikes in Bosnia in September, says: "We opened the eyes of the warring factions to the fact that air power is a highly lethal, disciplined, military force capable of achieving political objectives." A top British commander describes the two-week-long strike effort as a "...clinical, very precise, use of air power".
US Air Force Brig Gen. Dave Sawyer, deputy director of NATO's Combined Air Operations Centre, (CAOC) at Dal Molin AFB, Vicenza, Italy, says: "The events of September demonstrated that air power used to its potential can influence events. Our objective was to warn the Serbs not to threaten safe areas. Air power can eliminate that threat, eliminate things of value. What we did was a mere demonstration of air power. We blew up ammunition dumps and communications facilities."
Although NATO's 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) has been patrolling the skies of Bosnia since April 1993, when it began Operation Deny Flight to enforce the United Nations No Fly Zone. It was not until the London Conference that Alliance and UN military commanders were given a wide degree of latitude to respond to Bosnia Serb Army (BSA) attacks on the so-called UN "safe areas" of Sarajevo, Gorazde and Tuzla, with a "disproportionate" use of air power.
"The London Conference sent us a clear message that a line had been drawn in the sand," says General Sawyer. "At that moment, we knew something would happen unless the BSA changed their behaviour - previous warnings had not modified their behaviour. So we prepared a number of options."
The death of 37 civilians in a BSA mortar attack on Sarajevo on 28 August proved the trigger which unleashed NATO air power, with some 3,000 sorties being flown, including 750 strike missions against some 56 targets.
DEAD-EYE SOUTH-EAST
In the early hours of 30 August, Deliberate Force kicked off with a suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) strike aimed at neutralising the BSA's integrated air-defence network in eastern Bosnia. Under the code name "Dead-Eye South East" 17 US Navy McDonnell Douglas F-18C Hornets and Grumman EA-6B Prowlers from the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt struck at surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, command posts, radar sites and communications links to the north, east and south of the Bosnian capital, with Texas Instruments AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMS) and laser-guided bombs (LGBs).
This opened the way for other NATO aircraft to strike at Serb ammunition dumps around Sarajevo, creating massive secondary explosions, which were seen on television worldwide. "The Dead-Eye campaign had to happen," says Sawyer. "It would have been foolish to send our guys in hitting ammunition sites without taking down the defences. There was a lot of utility in having a lot of noise around Sarajevo - to send a message to the world that the UN and NATO were acting together."
After the first strike around Sarajevo, 5 ATAF then began a rolling programme of strikes spreading out from Sarajevo, eventually hitting targets in western Bosnia. A daily pattern of five strike packages, each of 12 to 20 strike aircraft supported by eight to 12 SEAD and fighter aircraft, was sent over Bosnia. The packages were almost always made up of a mix of aircraft from all of the eight NATO air forces participating. "We didn't know how long we would be allowed to continue by our political authorities so we wanted to get as much from the first attacks as possible," says Sawyer. "We went after the integrated air defence system [IADS], communications, bridges, blowing up ammunition that could be used by the BSA to shell Sarajevo."
To allow the Bosnian Serbs a chance to pull their heavy weapons away from Sarajevo, a bombing pause was announced three days into NATO bombing offensive. "The BSA remained defiant, their commander [Gen Ratko] Mladic said he would never give up, so our campaign needed to continue. We had targets of value in northwest Bosnia, important radar warning, ammunition storage and communications facilities that were replacing the role somewhat of the ones we had knocked out in the east. We used [Hughes] Tomahawk land-attack missiles [TALM] and other stand-off munitions [McDonnell Douglas SLAMs and Rockwell GBUs] to take down the IADS in the west so we could hit those targets."
Sawyer says that the use of the 13 TALMs was a "military decision" rather than a political escalation of the campaign. "The TALM is the most precise, fearless, weapon to hit distinct sites - electronic-warfare and communications sites - to minimise the threat to NATO aircrews. The next thing we would have used was the [Lockheed Martin] F-117. We had barely started hitting targets in the west before we had to stop [on 14 September]." Grp Capt. Richard Thomas, the RAF contingent commander in Italy praises the Tomahawk, saying it is a "very effective" way of softening up defences without losing aircraft.
SEAD SUCCESS
"I think the BSA got the message very quick. Their radars did not radiate very much to our campaign. We took out, destroyed and degraded, the IADS capability," says Sawyer. "We did not take down every SA-6 SAM system they owned. Their fixed IADS received tremendous damage. They have worked hard to replace damage and recover from NATO attacks, but the IADS is not as integrated now by any stretch of the imagination. By using 'work throughs' it is now integrated with a small 'i'."
The success of the NATO SEAD effort is evident by the lack of any losses to radar-guided SAMs during the operation, with only a French Dassault Mirage 2000 falling victim to shoulder-launched heat-seeking SAM or anti-aircraft artillery. Sawyer says that heat seeking threats were a "real challenge", with on-board countermeasures systems being the main defence against them.
A major force of SEAD aircraft was deployed to support the operation, including USN and US Marine Corps EA-6Bs and F-18C/D Hornets, German Panavia Tornado ECRs, Spanish EF-18As, USAF F-16Cs with the HARM Targeting System (HTS), Grumman EF-111A Ravens and Lockheed Martin EC-130 Compass Calls. It is understood that the USAF fired eight HARMs in the first combat use of the HTS.
Sawyer and his SEAD crews say that the Serbs shut down their radar network rather than engage the attacking NATO aircraft, with apparently no "classic Wild Weasel" engagements taking place where "HARM shooters" fired anti-radar missiles to take out radar guiding SAMs towards NATO aircraft.
ACCURACY ESSENTIAL
A major feature of Deliberate Force was the heavy reliance on precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to avoid politically unacceptable collateral damage to civilian areas, with some 600 "smart" weapons being used, along with around 400 unguided or "dumb" bombs. Political observers in Washington DC have hailed the performance of PGMs as "...better than in the Gulf War", but Sawyer refuses to make such sweeping comments. Thomas says that there were no glaring areas of collateral damage, commenting that "...the Serbs would have jumped on any bad publicity".
USAF F-16Cs and McDonnell Douglas F-15Es used LGBs exclusively on strike missions, using the Lockheed Martin LANTIRN forward-looking infra-red (FLIR) targeting system. Three squadrons of these night-capable aircraft based at Aviano AFB, Italy, alone dropped 344 GBU-10 900kg LGBs, 109 Texas Instruments GBU-12 220kg LGBs and nine electro-optically guided GBU-15s, the latter being dropped exclusively by F-15Es.
Some 21 Hughes Maverick missiles, were fired by USAF Fairchild A-10s. USMC, USN and Spanish Hornets used the Loral AAS-38A FLIR targeting system to guide a variety of LGBs. USN Hornets also "buddy lased" for LGBs carried on Grumman F-14 Tomcats, dropped at least three GBU-24 "bunker- buster" penetrator LGBs and fired three AGM-84E SLAM long-range stand-off weapons.
French Mirage 2000K-2/Ds used Thomson-CSF ATLIS pods to guide Aerospatiale AS30 laser-guided missiles, while French Sepecat Jaguars delivered Matra 1,000kg LGBs and US-made Texas Instruments Paveway GBU-12LGBs for the first time in combat. RAF Sepecat Jaguar GR1Bs "buddy lased" for RAF British Aerospace Harrier GR7s carrying 450kg Paveway LGBs.
"PGMs performed very well," says Sawyer, attributing their success to various factors. "Now, a greater percentage of aircraft are able to use PGMs, just in terms of sheer numbers. The systems themselves are better." He adds, however: "PGMs are not the be-all and end-all of putting ordnance on a target."
"I hate the term 'dumb' bomb. Unguided bombs dropped from F-16s and Jaguars can be very accurate," says Sawyer. "There were many targets attacked by Dutch air force F-16s with unguided bombs which did better than anything in the history of air warfare." Because of on-board computers and sighting systems, Sawyer, who during Operation Desert Storm commanded an A-10 wing, says: "There are now no dumb aeroplanes and dumb bombs. The A-10 in the Gulf War, before it got the LASTE (low-altitude safety and targeting enhancement) upgrade, was the last of the dumb bombers."
The commander of the French contingent taking part in the operation, Brig Gen. Gal Guevel, says that the use of PGMs contributed to the light NATO casualties by reducing the number of sorties, which had to be flown to destroy individual targets.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
Much of the focus of Operation Deliberate Force was around Sarajevo, so effective air-to-ground co-operation had to be established, with the UN Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) positioned on Mount Igman, overlooking the city. Some 13 close air support (CAS) attacks, were made by NATO aircraft, against Serb artillery or heavy weapons engaging UN troops.
USAF EC-130 Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Centre and NATO Boeing E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft crews worked hand in hand with tactical-air-control parties on the ground to ensure that CAS aircraft were overhead when required by the UN. They also played a key part in clearing "windows" of airspace over Sarajevo to allow RRF artillery to open fire. Artillery windows were often pre-planned to coincide with RRF fire plans, but on occasion, they had to be created suddenly in response to developing situations on the ground.
RRF artillery also helped NATO air operations, by putting down suppressing fire on any Serb heat seeking SAM teams who took shots at strike aircraft. "This was really neat to see. It was true CAS," says Sawyer. "We got the targets we wanted to go after. If it had been multiple areas it would have been a challenge, but it worked beautifully - a piece of cake."
USAF A-10As and AC-130H gun ships carried out the bulk of CAS missions with AGM-65 Maverick missiles and guns, firing more than 10,000 rounds of 30mm, 40mm and 105mm ammunition. LGBs were used by USMC Hornets for one CAS mission against Serb artillery firing on Tuzla in the later phase of the operation.
LESSONS LEARNED
According to Sawyer and other CAOC personnel, a major effort is under way to analyse the effectiveness of NATO operations during the bombing effort. Particular effort is being put into upgrading communications and procedures at the CAOC. "We have to recognise the historic nature of these events so that in the event we have to do this again, NATO forces will not have to relearn those lessons.
For example, during Deliberate Force we had strike packages of aircraft heading to targets. If the first aircraft was successful, there would be no point in the rest continuing. The first forces would report back and then we could divert the rest to a secondary target," says Sawyer. "If you have crackly radios or confusion about what needs to be done, you have inefficiencies or do something dangerous. I never thought we sent our forces into any extraordinarily dangerous situations."
In the first weeks of October, international diplomats announced major successes in the peace process, with large numbers of US and NATO ground troops possibly being sent to police any future peace deal. NATO aircraft remained on patrol over Bosnia, chasing Serb aircraft flying out of Banja Luka in northern Bosnia, silencing Serb artillery firing on refugee camps near Tuzla and firing HARMs at hostile radars. NATO commanders and air crews are sure that their services will be called upon again in the near future.
Source: Flight International
