Airbus chief Jean Pierson's recent hint that not all is proceeding smoothly within the Future Large Aircraft (FLA) consortium seems to be borne out by confirmation that the UK and Germany are locked in a desperate battle over the wing for Europe's proposed military transport. On the surface, such competition might seem to be good for the FLA project, leading as it might to a better, cheaper, product - but, in the tangled web of European aerospace politics, it might lead to exactly the opposite.
The FLA project is - on paper at least - now under the wing of Airbus Industrie, where - in theory at least - it can benefit from Airbus' sound history of commercial and technical management. That should augur well for the FLA. Traditionally, the workshare arrangements on Airbus products have been worked out case-by-case, with most decisions made on financial/commercial grounds. How much work a partner gets has been governed largely by the launch money it brings to the Toulouse table.
The implication from the competition between Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DASA) and British Aerospace for the FLA wing contract, however, is that work allocations on this project are going to be made on technical as well as financial grounds. In the ideal aerospace world that is, of course, how decisions should be made: as the result of the competition, the FLA should get the best possible wing on the best financial terms. Who could lose from that? The answer is, alas, just about everybody.
As has been proven countless times, competitions for major military projects do not necessarily produce the best result out of the box. The winner at the paper or prototype stage can easily prove to be a loser in final development, production or service. Even if the end product turns out to be a fine aircraft, the cost of getting there can be enormous, as the UK found with projects such as the Shorts Tucano and the USA found with the Rockwell B-1.
Equally, competition can unnecessarily bleed contractors of funds to no good end, leaving them unable to support the work they do eventually win, or to compete for the next contract. Witness the UK's attack-helicopter competition, on which the four contenders are estimated to have already spent over £80 million. The winner will emerge with £2billion-worth of business, but each of the other three will have effectively lost up to £20 million in profit or investment opportunity as a result of having taken part. If the FLA wing does go to a serious competition, is the winner going to so damage itself by the spending in that competition that it will not be able to afford (or justify) investment in other parts of the project?
While DASA needs significant involvement in the FLA project - and the German Government is willing to help DASA achieve that presence - BAe is more vulnerable. In effect, BAe will only get serious FLA work if the UK Government sticks with its stated intent to buy up to 50 FLAs - and vice versa. If the UK loses the FLA wing battle, the FLA may lose the UK.
In those circumstances, a triumph for Germany over the wing may scuttle (or at least seriously damage) the FLA project. The economics of building a large transport make it vital that such a large potential customer as the UK is kept on board. Without those 50 aircraft, the cost structure of the FLA project looks shaky.
None of that means that BAe has the right in perpetuity to build the wing for any Airbus-managed project at any price, any more than Aerospatiale could claim pre-A321 an unchallenged right to final assembly. What it does mean, however, is that Airbus has to consider very carefully the ramifications of contests such as these.
Until now, it has succeeded, at least partly, because its projects have been to the mutual benefits of its constituent partners. Allowing one partner's expansionist aims to deflect it from that path could do much more than create internal strife. Anyone can design a better mousetrap - but not everybody can afford to buy one.
Source: Flight International
