Graham Warwick/WASHINGTON DC
The USA may be rushing to meet a deadline that no longer applies, in its efforts to develop and deploy ballistic missile defences.
The US Administration wants to deploy the National Missile Defence (NMD) system by the end of 2005 because its intelligence suggests North Korea could, by then, be able to launch long-range missiles against the USA.
To achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) by then, consisting of 20 ground-based interceptors, the US President has to decide on deployment of the system by the end of this year, to allow time for construction of a tracking radar site on the Alaskan island of Shemya.
But following the recent successful summit between the leaders of divided Korea, the USA has elevated the status of the communist North from "rogue nation" to "state of concern". And US Congressional backers of NMD have indicated they would accept a delay in the deployment decision until after the new US President takes office early next year.
These two developments could change the complexion of a programme which has struggled since the outset against unrealistic schedule expectations, in the face of high technical risks.
The NMD programme has been rescheduled once, in 1998, when IOC was delayed from 2003 to 2005 at the recommendation of an independent review team led by retired USAir Force Gen Larry Welch. The restructuring introduced phased programme decisions tied to the successful completion of key flight tests.
Since then, delays have pushed the critical tests up against the decision deadlines, leaving little room for failure. Less than a month now separates the crucial next flight test and the Deployment Readiness Review (DRR), at which the US Department of Defense (DoD) must decide whether to recommend to President Clinton that fielding the NMD by 2005 is technically feasible.
The DoD has one of the two successful intercepts required for a positive DRR in the bag. But January's failure, and the investigation and correction of a cooling problem in the kill vehicle's sensors, has delayed the next integrated flight test to 7 July - just weeks before the DRR at the end of July.
Even if the flight succeeds, and the DoD is able to recommend deployment, the schedule pressure will not ease. The next milestone is a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting in the fourth quarter of next year, to approve the purchase of radars and authorise long-lead funding for interceptors.
A positive outcome requires a successful intercept using the new C1 booster planned for production, but development of the booster is running eight months behind schedule, delaying the integrated flight test to June next year, just weeks before the planned DAB.
The third and final milestone en route to NMD deployment is a DAB meeting in the second quarter of 2003 to approve production of 100 interceptors. This requires a successful intercept using the production-standard booster and kill vehicle, but delays have slipped the crucial integrated flight test to just before the DAB.
Although the already compressed schedule is being further stressed by delays, a second review of the programme by the Welch panel has concluded there is "no technical reason" to change the schedule. But other recommendations by the independent review team, and external events, could lead to another restructuring.
Responding to critics, the Welch panel has recommended the DoD looks for ways to make flight testing more realistic. Safety concerns are limiting tests, which involve firing interceptors from Kwajalein in the Pacific against missile targets launched from California, to ranges and closing speeds well below those in a real engagement.
The DoD is looking for ways to conduct tests over longer, more realistic ranges, but admits this could impact on the programme.
The programme could also be affected by calls for the NMD system to handle more sophisticated countermeasures. The initial system is being designed to meet a strictly limited threat, which US intelligence expects to consist of a handful of missiles each carrying a single warhead and simple decoys. This is the "target complex" being used for flight testing.
Critics argue it will be relatively easy for an enemy to develop more sophisticated countermeasures. While the DoD doubts that the primary states of concern - North Korea, Iran and Iraq - will be able to deploy more advanced decoys in the near term, it believes the NMD system can be evolved by around 2010 to handle more sophisticated countermeasures. The Welch panel has urged the DoD to begin work now on improving the system's target/decoy discrimination capability. This could affect the programme's cost and schedule.
Any move to improve the NMD's capability, however, is likely to increase opposition from Russia and China, as well as from the USA's NATO allies, who fear the threat of mutually assured destruction - which has maintained the balance of nuclear power for decades - could be weakened.
This is likely to be the biggest issue faced by the US President - Clinton or his successor - as he deliberates on NMD deployment. Downgrading the North Korean threat could let the USA delay a decision, providing more time for negotiation and for testing.
Source: Flight International