THE FIRST TWO months of 1996 have proved bleak for the Royal Air Force. It has lost more combat aircraft so far this year than it did in the whole of 1995. A total of nine aircraft have crashed: two Panavia Tornado F3s, two Tornado GR1s, one Sepecat Jaguar GR1, one British Aerospace Hawk T1, two BAe Sea Harriers, and one BAe Harrier GR7.
This on its own is not necessarily a cause for panic. Accident statistics are notoriously fickle, and what may at first glance look like a dangerous trend can quickly prove to be no more than chance. Among these RAF losses there is certainly no obvious connecting thread.
What makes the losses worrying, however, are the details, now coming to light, of one particular crash - that of the Hawk at RAF Valley in North Wales. It reveals a tragic and disturbing litany of human error. Taken on its own, this fatal crash should sharply re-focus minds on how to improve safety. Placed in the context of a series of losses, it raises nagging doubts that this is not simply a single, avoidable incident but early warning of a more widespread malaise in the service.
The RAF is a "can-do" service. It prides itself on taking on the tasks set by its political masters and carrying them out with the utmost dedication and professionalism. For this it is justly admired worldwide as a touchstone against which other air forces are to be judged. As such it is a prize to the nation.
In recent years its political masters have tasked it to do a great deal: United Nations and NATO peace-keeping and combat operations have drawn heavily on the RAF's resources in places such as Bosnia and the Gulf. At the same time, these very same resources have been in the budgetary firing line, as the Government reins in defence expenditure. Base closures, squadron and personnel cuts, and funding re-allocations have taken their toll. Some £800 million ($1.3 billion) earmarked for spares, for instance was diverted to support other programmes. Taken collectively, there is the danger that these politically driven changes, implemented at speed, have begun to damage the very fabric of the RAF.
Of course, there is no clear identifiable single factor in any of the crashes where the finger could be pointed - there is no simple causal link between the cuts, the reductions, the sapping of morale and the loss of these aircraft. That, however, does not mean that there is no link.
The out-of-area operations, for instance, have inevitably drawn heavily on RAF personnel, which inevitably means a diminution of experience available at the home bases.
The clearest indicator of the RAF's state of health is in its personnel. There is concern, about the cumulative effects of the demands being placed upon them by their political task masters, while at the same time, the demand is that they cut their cloth more sparingly. It is no mere platitude that the nation asks these people to go in harm's way in time of conflict. They therefore have the right to demand and to receive the best that the state can affordably provide. Those in government responsible for the RAF have a duty to maintain the quality of the service for the nation.
In the face of the losses, the service has understandably closed ranks, at least in public, to avoid any suggestion that could be construed as a criticism of the Government funding policy towards the service.
On an internal level, senior RAF officers must resist the temptation not to rock the boat. The service is being asked to balance an increasingly unmanageable equation of doing more, or at least the same, with considerably less resource. The point is being reached where politicians will have to re-examine the demands it places upon the junior service. The aircraft losses in the general and the Hawk crash in particular, should be a wake up call to all those involved.
Source: Flight International
