Pilots need go-around practice Flightcrew error was cited as the primary cause of the Bombardier CRJ100 accident at Brest (Flight International, 18-24 January), with the French air accident investigation office the BEA recommending CRJ pilots be given additional training in handling go-arounds from a low-energy flight condition. This recommendation should apply not only to CRJ pilots, but to pilots of all transport aircraft. A hand-flown go-around at the flare at night or under instrument meteorological conditions is a critical low-energy manoeuvre, rarely carried out in the simulator, where training sessions too often become box-ticking exercises designed to meet regulatory requirements, rather than opportunities to increase basic piloting skills. If, as reported, the CRJ captain was slow to initiate the low-altitude go-around, perhaps he had lacked practice at this in the simulator? The BEA report suggests this. Typical simulator sessions may include radar-vectored engine-out instrument landing systems and VOR approaches, emergencies and a visual circuit. While use of flight director and automatics are encouraged even in the circuit, these do little to test true handling skills. Rarely does one see a manually flown 35kt (65km/h) crosswind landing in the simulator, or repeats until competent. The same with black hole approaches, despite their contribution to many controlled flight into terrain accidents. Often these sequences are viewed as irrelevant to flying modern airliners. No wonder accidents in jets can be often attributed to lack of practice at basic flying skills John Laming Melbourne, Australia
Missing the point David Connolly's letter, "An assumption too far?" (Flight International, 25-31 January) is appropriately titled, for he is guilty of unjustified assumption himself. It seems to me that all those who would jump on the anti-Airbus bandwagon with respect to this accident miss one fundamental point. If the first officer's inputs were large and forceful enough it would have made no difference what aircraft he was flying - the outcome would in all probability have been the same. The US National Transportation Safety Board report states that the flying pilot had on a previous occasion been reported as making aggressive, full rudder inputs on a Boeing 727 on final approach. If this were the case during this wake turbulence encounter, then it is likely that his actions would have had the same effect on almost all the aircraft types listed in the report. The A300-600 directional control system may be the subject of justified criticism, but I fail to see how Mr Connolly can confidently state "had flight AA587 been operated by a Boeing 767.....disaster would certainly not have happened". Murray Colquhoun Boscombe Down, Wiltshire, UK
Sloppy terms The UK Civil Aviation Authority's warning on offset-track flying (Flight International, 4-10 January) is good advice for an industrial new year resolution. Strategic lateral offset procedures (SLOP) shows a bureaucracy being unable to see when it is setting itself up for ridicule. I've always known this as offset track procedures (OTP) or lateral offset procedures (LOP). To call it strategic suggests it is planned well in advance, which is usually not the case, so it would be more correct to call it tactical offset track procedures.
David Connolly Brussels, Belgium
Too harsh? Your article "Airframers urged to share data" (Flight International, 23-29 November 2004) correctly suggests aircraft evacuation models have much to contribute to the design and certification of safer aircraft. You are also correct in saying the aviation industry lags the maritime and construction industries in the use of modelling as part of the evacuation certification process. However, your condemnation of airframers as not being forthcoming with essential evacuation data is harsh. My experience in the development of the air EXODUS aircraft evacuation model has been that airframers, particularly Airbus and Boeing, have made much of their detailed data from previous certification trials available for analysis. Such data, which is considered proprietary by airframers and therefore generally difficult to access, is essential to the development of evacuation models capable of the reliable prediction of certification evacuation performance. Professor Ed Galea University of Greenwich, London, UK
Subsidising rail Mr Taylor (Flight International, 18-24 January) is correct that any cash flow is better than none - but a fare must exceed the marginal cost. When a rail route is fully utilised, the fare should never be less than 60% of the average cost. On the London-Glasgow, for instance, the lowest rail fare is £12.50 ($24). I estimate Virgin Trains' cost is about 18p per passenger kilometre. The subsidy alone has risen from 1.9p to 12.1p per passenger kilometre in the last four years. I believe the lowest rail fares are less than the marginal cost, and this has contributed to subsidy growth. Low-cost airline competition has led the Americans to conclude that "long-haul railroad passenger transport is no longer viable". A J Lucking London, UK
Source: Flight International
