GRAHAM WARWICK / WASHINGTON DC
The centre of gravity of the aircraft manufacturing industry, in the USA for much of the first 100 years of aviation, is on the move
Although the Wright brothers pioneered aircraft manufacturing, 100 years later their name is almost absent from the industry - as are many of the great names from the first years of aviation. Their name lives on in Curtiss-Wright, a successful multi-industry supplier, but was last attached to an aircraft in the mid-1960s. As for the other companies that still carry names from those pioneering years - much has changed.
As the first century of flight has shown, there is no guarantee of survival and the only certainty is that the industry a century from now will look very different. It is changing even as now, as companies strive to stay competitive. Time after time over the first 100 years great aircraft manufacturing enterprises have fallen because they failed to stay competitive, and it could happen again.
Curtiss was one of first great names in aircraft manufacturing, and one of the first to fall. At the opening of the Second World War, Curtiss was the leading US producer of fighters, but became so focused on producing P-40s that it failed to keep pace with technology and fell into rapid decline with the end of the war. The aircraft division closed its doors in 1951 - an object lesson in the importance of staying competitive.
Curtiss lost its fighter franchise to newcomer North American Aviation, which produced the successful P-51 Mustang, F-86 Sabre and F-100 Super Sabre but entered its own decline after failing to sell the F-107 fighter-bomber and suffering cancellation of the F-108 long-range interceptor and B-70 supersonic bomber.
Instead of closing its doors, North American turned to space, merged with Rockwell, then won the contract to build the B-1 bomber. But aircraft production ended with the last B-1B in 1988, and in 1996 the business become part of Boeing.
Another once-illustrious name now gone is Republic, which produced a successful series of fighters from the P-47 Thunderbolt through the F-84 line to the F-105 Thunderchief. Fairchild acquired Republic in 1965, and went on to build the A-10, but ended aircraft production in 1987 after cancellation of the troubled T-46 trainer. Vought's long line of naval combat aircraft ended in 1982, although the company continues as an aerostructures supplier.
For other famous names, survival came though merger or acquisition. Convair's legacy became part of Lockheed's in 1993 with its purchase of General Dynamics' fighter division. A year later Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta, which had focused on missiles and space since Martin ended aircraft production in 1961. Also in 1994, Northrop merged with Grumman, which had turned to defence electronics when its long line of naval fighters ended in 1992 with the last F-14 Tomcat. Northrop itself had not produced an aircraft since the last B-2 stealth bomber in 1989.
McDonnell Aircraft, formed only in 1939, went on the become the foremost post-war US producer of fighters. Douglas Aircraft, meanwhile, emerged from the war as the largest US manufacturer, but struggled to stay competitive in both commercial and military aircraft with Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell. In 1967, financially ailing Douglas merged with McDonnell and, 30 years later, a struggling McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing, creating the world's largest aerospace company.
Dramatic consolidation
Today, only Boeing and Lockheed Martin are producing manned combat aircraft in the USA, although Northrop Grumman still has the capability. The consolidation has been even more dramatic in commercial aircraft, with only Boeing remaining from a long list that once included Convair, Curtiss, Douglas, Lockheed and Martin. And if competitive pressures have shaped the US aerospace industry over the years, European industry has been shaped and reshaped by national and political issues.
The casualties among European aircraft manufacturers are too many to list. The losses have been heaviest in the UK, where industry never achieved its post-war potential because of a series of disastrous political and policy decisions. Today, only BAE Systems retains the capability to produce combat aircraft, and airliner production in the UK ended with BAE's 2001 decision to cancel the Avro RJX regional jet.
On the continent, the survivors have regrouped in the French/German/Spanish EADS and Italian Finmeccanica camps. France's Dassault and Sweden's Saab remain the only independent producers of combat aircraft, but because of national imperatives that are no longer relevant. Commercial aircraft manufacturing is focused on one entity - Airbus - and it is almost impossible to believe that any of the European companies will ever again produce a military aircraft on their own.
Outside Europe and the USA, aircraft manufacturers remain an elite group. There has not been the wholesale shift of manufacturing to lower-cost countries seen in other industries, largely because of restrictions such as airworthiness regulations and export controls that make it hard for manufacturers to move production to locales where labour costs are lower. Instead, aircraft manufacturers have grown in situ, often nurtured by their governments.
After Airbus and Boeing, Canada's Bombardier and Brazil's Embraer are the leading manufacturers of civil aircraft. Both are relative newcomers: Embraer was formed in 1969 and Bombardier entered aerospace when it acquired Canadair from the government in 1986. Both have ridden the wave of regional jets growth. But while the Canadian manufacturer took a derivative route, turning its Challenger business jet into the successful CRJ, its Brazilian rival developed two all-new families.
Japan is a risk-sharing partner in civil aircraft programmes and a license-manufacturer of military aircraft. While it has ambitions to do more, Japanese industry would have to change dramatically to become a globally competitive player. South Korea's aerospace industry, similarly, struggles to compete internationally. India, meanwhile, is making slow progress in developing both its civil and military aircraft manufacturing capability.
It is almost impossible to predict what lies ahead for Chinese and Russian aircraft manufacturers. It is hard to believe that Russian industry, with its long history, low cost base and local market potential, will not emerge eventually as a major international player. But there is so much rationalisation and restructuring to be achieved first that it could be years before Russian manufacturers can be a competitive force. And China is decades behind Russia.
As the second century of flight opens, further change in the shape of the aircraft manufacturing sector seems inevitable. While Airbus is developing the A380 to complete its product line, Boeing looks set to launch the 7E7 airliner and begin a renewal of its commercial aircraft line-up that could see a reversal of its declining market share. More than half of the 7E7 will be produced outside the USA by risk-sharing partners, and US industry's share of global commercial aircraft manufacturing looks set to continue its downward trend.
Stealing the lead
Europe, meanwhile, has set out an ambitious agenda for commercial aviation research and development with the outspoken goal of wresting industry leadership from the USA. This pan-European effort contrasts with NASA's declining budget for aeronautics research, and is being tailored to support advanced aircraft concepts under study by Airbus. NASA's funding, meanwhile, has to stretch to support research into aircraft as diverse as personal air vehicles and supersonic business jets.
Increasing US defence spending would seem to be good news, except that much of the funding is earmarked for weapons and networks. It is still vastly more than manufacturers can hope for from European defence budgets, but despite the scale of US spending there are dire predictions that its industry will lose its design capability within a decade without another major manned combat aircraft programme.
Such predictions would seem like scare-mongering were it not for the lessons of the last 100 years. Time after time companies that have been unable to keep their design teams busy have quickly become uncompetitive. If the problem is becoming a concern for the USA, as a recent Rand study suggests, then it must be critical for the Europeans. A new generation of European combat aircraft is still at least 10 years away, and could by then be unmanned.
US military interest is growing in a new long-range supersonic strike aircraft, although it is unclear where the billions of dollars required would come from. Such a programme might sustain the design capability of two of the three surviving US combat-aircraft primes, Rand believes. But it is unlikely the USA would welcome international participation in such an aircraft, as it has on the Joint Strike Fighter, so its industrial impact would be localised.
The pressures on aircraft manufacturing are probably at their most intense for years, and the shape of the industry in the second century of flight could be decided sooner rather than later. It seems inevitable there will be more casualties.
Source: Flight International
