The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has called on the Federal Aviation Administration to implement 11 safety recommendations in the wake of the October 2004 Pinnacle Airlines Bombardier CRJ200 crash.
In that accident, two pilots on a non-revenue repositioning flight stalled their aircraft at 41,000ft (12,500m) and could not restart the engines after a dual flameout and core lock. The crash that followed killed both pilots and destroyed the aircraft.
The NTSB determined the probable cause to be the pilots' “unprofessional behaviour, deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship, which resulted in an in-flight emergency from which they were unable to recover, in part because of the pilots' inadequate training".
Corrective actions the NTSB expects the FAA to take include:
- Enhancing the training syllabuses for pilots conducting high altitude operations in regional jet airplanes.
- Requiring air carriers to provide their pilots with opportunities to practice and recover from high altitude stall recovery techniques.
- Convening a multidisciplinary panel of operational, training and human factors specialists to study methods to improve flight crew familiarity with and response to stick pusher systems and, if needed, establishing training requirements for stick pusher-equipped airplanes.
- Verifying that all Bombardier regional jet operators incorporate guidance in their double-engine failure checklist that clearly states the airspeeds required during the procedure and requiring the operators to provide pilots with simulator training on executing this checklist.
- Requiring Part 121 regional air carriers to provide specific guidance on expectations for professional conduct for pilots who operating non-revenue flights.
- Reviewing flight data recorder information from non-revenue flights to verify
that the flights are being conducted according to standard operating procedures. - Working with pilot associations to develop a specific programme of education for air carrier pilots that addresses professional standards and their role in ensuring safety of flight.
- Requiring that all airlines incorporate periodic Line Operations Safety Audit observations and methods to address and correct findings resulting from these
observations. - Requiring that all Part 121 operators establish Safety Management System programs.
- “Strongly encouraging” and assisting all Part 121 regional air carriers to implement an approved Aviation Safety Action Programme and an approved Flight Operational Quality Assurance programme.
Source: FlightGlobal.com
