Discovery launched from Kennedy Space Center launch complex 39b exactly 907 days after the loss of Columbia on 1 February 2003. The 30 months since that fateful day when seven astronauts died saw the announcement of a new Presidential space vision, the departure of a NASA administrator and numerous return to flight launch delays.
Immediately after the accident, NASA administrator Sean O’Keefe created the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). By 4 February the CAIB chairman, retired US Navy Adm Hal Gehman, was touring the recovery area, where Columbia debris was being collected. He was to be aided by 12 board members, including former astronaut Dr Sally Ride, Maj Gen Kenneth Hess from the Air Force Safety Center and Dr James Hallock, the US Department of Transportation aviation safety chief.
On 26 August 2003 the CAIB released its report, confirming that a reinforced carbon-carbon panel on the leading edge of Columbia’s port wing had been damaged by external tank (ET) foam and ice debris during lift off. During re-entry, that damage had allowed plasma to burn its way into the wing causing a catastrophic failure.
The CAIB report also gave 15 recommendations to NASA to ensure a safe to return to flight (RTF). Five weeks prior to its publication O’Keefe had set up the NASA Return to Flight Task Group (RTFTG) on 18 July. Led by Shuttle flight veteran Richard Covey and Apollo 10 commander Thomas Stafford, it would monitor the space agency’s implementation of the CAIB’s 15 recommendations. The Columbia disaster also led to a complete re-evaluation of US space policy towards manned flight.
Almost a year after the Columbia disaster, on 14 January 2004, President George Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration. A part of this was the RTF, the continued assembly of the International Space Station using the Shuttles, and the retirement of the orbiters in 2010. While greater detail was added to this vision in 2004 and 2005, the RTFTG’s regular reports kept casting doubt on NASA’s ability to meet the CAIB recommendations.
RTFTG reports in January and May 2004 showed NASA far from completing the task. Launch dates slipped regularly in 2004.The RTFTG report in January 2005 again showed that NASA was nowhere near meeting the recommendations, with eight outstanding. Then O’Keefe quit NASA in February.
But on 14 April former NASA chief engineer Michael Griffin became the agency’s head. With only a few weeks between his arrival and the launch of STS 114 on 15 May, NASA’s leadership decided to take more time. Discovery was sent back to the vehicle assembly building to swap external tanks with Atlantis because it had an extra ET anti-ice heater.
When the RTFTG’s final report executive summary (the complete report is expected after Discovery’s return) was published on 28 June, NASA had not met all 15, and had failed to close three. The agency was preparing to fly without proving it had reduced substantially tank debris, that it had hardened the orbiter to strikes, or that it had an on-orbit tile repair technique. This was still the case when Discovery was rolled out for a 13 July launch. Finally, after a liquid hydrogen tank sensor glitch ended the 13 July hopes, Discovery blasted off on 26 July.
Source: Flight International
