The US Air Force has raised the stakes in its battle with Congress overproduction funding for the advanced air superiority fighter, the Boeing/Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, by hitching its future fate to that of the Joint Strike Fighter. Without the F-22, USAF says, it would have to rethink its requirement for the multirole JSF, potentially delaying the international, 3,000-aircraft, $150 billion programme while the design is reworked to fulfil some of the F-22's mission.

For the air force and US industry the cancellation of the US-only, 339 aircraft, $60-billion F-22 programme would be devastating. The consequences would reverberate for years, with few parallels other than perhaps the scrapping of Canada's CF-105 Arrow fighter and the UK's TSR2 strike aircraft in the 1950s and 60s.

Without the F-22, all JSF bets and assumptions are off, warns the USAF. Its willingness to offer the far larger JSF programme as a sacrificial lamb is indicative of the importance the USAF attaches to its "golden bullet" programme. The service would be left to soldier on with ageing Boeing F-15s and Lockheed Martin F-16s. In the USAF's mind there is simply nothing else in the pipeline to replace the F-15 but the F-22, other than perhaps the unlikely choice of the US Navy's Boeing F/A-18E/F or the unthinkable alternative of buying the European Typhoon.

The F-22 is as expensive as the JSF will be cheap, and the USAF sees no obligation to take one without the other. In fact, it sees no way to have the JSF without the F-22. At $30 million a copy, the JSF will be an affordable attack aircraft because it does not have to perform the F-22's stealthy air-superiority mission, the service argues. To reduce costs, the JSF will also be heavily reliant on sensor data from external sources, of which the F-22 will form an integral element.

Then there is the technology argument. The low development risks that are implicit in the low production cost estimates for JSF are predicated on much of the technology that has been proven on the F-22 programme. Without the F-22, the USAF says, JSF risks - and costs - must be expected to increase exponentially.

While the USAF may be prepared to scrap the JSF in the hope of getting something better, and with the USN clearly able to sail on for now with the new F/A-18E/F, the major loser in all this would be the US Marine Corps. With a requirement to replace its Boeing AV-8Bs and F/A-18s, and unable or unwilling to afford the upgraded F/A-18E/F, the future of Marine Corps aviation would rest precariously on a possible Harrier III.

The UK is also relying on the JSF to replace its Harriers, although it would have more fall-back options, including a carrier version of the Eurofighter, naval Dassault Rafale, F/A-18E/F or a Harrier III.

The other casualty of an F-22 cancellation and USAF change of direction on JSF would be the US aerospace industry. While there no doubt would be short-term consolations in the form of additional F-15 and F-16 orders, robbed of the F-22 and JSF, Boeing and Lockheed Martin would be left with nothing downstream. The international fighter market would be left wide open to European manufacturers. The likes of the Netherlands, Singapore and Turkey would be justified in asking for a refund of down payments for participation in the JSF, and could be expected to look to the Rafale and Typhoon to meet their future fighter requirements.

The USAF has been a victim of its own successes in the skies over Iraq and Yugoslavia. Overwhelming air superiority has not just kept enemy fighters on the ground, but led politicians on Capital Hill to openly question the need for a $100 million stealth fighter when, at the quarter of the price, the F-16 would appear to suffice.

Whether potential adversaries in 10-20 years time will be similarly cowed into submission by 1970s-era fighters is open to debate. Would Saddam or Milosevic have reacted in the same manner if confronted with an armada of Vietnam-era F-4s and A-4s? Unfortunately, it would be US pilots left to put the theory to the test, not Congressmen grandstanding on appropriation committees or voting in the interests of pork-barrel politics.

Source: Flight International