Consider if, for argument's sake, the al-Qaeda terrorist who fired a shoulder-launched, infrared-guided missile against an Israeli airliner leaving Mombasa airport in Kenya late last month had been better trained, the SA-7 had been newer, or that the sun's glint on the wing had not confused the weapon's heat-seeking sensor. Then imagine that, instead of Israelis, the aircraft had been full of British or German tourists (citizens of any US ally holidaying or working abroad are legitimate targets under al-Qaeda's warped and brutal logic). Would politicians be urgently appropriating millions of dollars to equip their airline fleets with anti-missile protection and demanding why - if the technology is available to military aircraft - it had never been fitted to civil airliners?
Probably yes. The aftermath of 11 September has shown that it is easier to react to a terrorist outrage by taking expensive steps to stop it happening again - as US and other governments have done with reinforced cockpit doors, sky marshals and security checks at airports - than second guess the terrorists' next likely move. But the fact that no country, apart from Israel, appears to be taking this specific threat more seriously is hardly surprising.
Because the missiles missed in Mombasa the story barely made the world's newspapers and was overshadowed by the bombing of the Paradise Hotel. Kenya's tourist industry will take a clobbering and long-suffering Israelis will be increasingly nervous about taking vacations abroad. But as far as making people in general more wary about travelling on an aircraft, the events in Mombasa will scarcely matter.
That is how it should be if we are in the civilised world to retain our sanity. For Israel, it makes sense to equip its fleet of barely 50 airliners with countermeasures. The country has, by necessity, a siege infrastructure, from its compulsory military service to its highly developed defence industry. Its manufacturers have developed missile protection technology for its military aircraft and are keen to market it abroad. There are almost weekly suicide bombing attacks on its civilians. And there is a very real risk of an airliner being targeted by a surface-to-air missile (SAM) in the future.
But for the USA and its allies, the price-tag for fitting missile protection to airliners is enormous - at possibly more than $1 million a time, the bill for the taxpayer could run into billions. This has to be weighed against the cost of all sorts of other, arguably more effective, anti-terrorism measures, including intelligence- gathering, recruiting police officers to guard prominent buildings and funding inoculation programmes against biological attack.
There is also a huge question mark over the technology's effectiveness. Using flares to divert a missile is the cheapest and simplest method, and the one most commonly used by military aircraft over hostile terrain. However, even coupled with an on-board missile warning system, to ensure flares are only activated when the aircraft is in danger, the method is a non-starter. No certification authority is going to give the green light to the prospect of a fireworks display over a busy airport after a false alarm. Infrared countermeasures (IRCM) which jam the missile's seeker are more practical, and already in limited use in VIP air transport throughout the world. But they are effective only against earlier-generation SAMs, not more modern Raytheon Stingers, several of which may be in terrorist hands after the USA supplied Afghan rebels in the 1980s. The only defence against these is so-called directional IRCMs or DIRCMs, but this is expensive, complicated, cutting-edge technology and only now finding its way onto frontline military aircraft.
US senators have promised to look at the feasibility of missile countermeasures on passenger aircraft next year, but the lack of any clarion calls for the technology to be accelerated shows that politicians are both wary of committing further funds to anti-terror measures and confused by the constant stream of threats that seem to arrive each week.
The missile attack in Mombasa will have given security chiefs something else to think about. Expect more vigilance by police around airports and by customs officials checking for dismantled SAMs at borders and ports. But the truth is that there are threats from all sorts of directions. Short of turning our societies into police states or bankrupting our economies, we cannot eliminate the risk of a surface-to-air missile attack on a passenger aircraft any more than we can ensure our safety against a fertiliser-packed truck exploding outside an office block or the suicide bomber in the shopping mall.
Source: Flight International
