With seven nations committed to buying the A400M, the programme appears to have shaken off the doubts that have dogged it
The A400M is finally a real programme, on schedule and on cost. That is the message from Adolfo Revuelta, head of the biggest multinational military aircraft development programme ever launched.
With seven nations acting together, not only is the A400M the largest joint procurement programme of its kind, but it is also the first military procurement contract on anything like this scale to be drafted on a commercial basis.
Although only 16 months into a six-and-a-half year contract, a palpable sense of urgency pervades the Toulouse offices of the Airbus Military Company (AMC), which is developing the turboprop-powered airlifter. "We have had to move quickly because we have to fulfil our commitments to our customers," says Revuelta, who adds: "In terms of schedule and reliability this is one of the most ambitious military procurements ever made."
Part of the challenge is building credibility in a programme with which phrases such as "move quickly" are not readily associated. The airlifter effort is no stranger to adversity, having emerged into full-scale development after overcoming almost two decades of uncertainty and several "near-death" experiences. Another reason for urgency is that, despite the formation of AMC in 1999, Revuelta acknowledges that the real effort to get the A400M developed could not begin until the formal industrial launch on 31 May 2003. This came a few days after the seven European customers - Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Turkey, Luxembourg and the UK - signed for 180 aircraft. "We were never 100% sure it would happen before that, but since May 2003 the team has been put in place very quickly, and the resources have ramped up with the same speed."
Perhaps surprisingly, the aircraft that will enter service in 2009 is not so different from initial concepts studied in the early 1980s. But although overall size, capacity, range and speed have remained steady, the technology to deliver this promised capacity and performance has advanced radically, an indirect benefit of the prolonged gestation.
Cutting the risk
From the technical perspective, the A400M is very much a 21st century aircraft, but without the inherent risks of a pioneering design. The 2003 start date enabled AMC to take advantage of the tried-and-tested technology of the A380, which begins flight tests early in 2005. Where the technology goes further, such as the first use of a predominantly composite primary wing structure, or in a different direction, such as the advanced turboprops, the programme is supported by a robust platform of tests modelled on the Airbus methodology.
From a programme perspective, time has allowed AMC to not only clone itself around the organisation of the A380, but has also enabled it to operate under the basis of a totally commercial approach - something that would have been impossible under the original timescale.
Time may also play into its hands from a marketing position. Geopolitically, the A400M is being prepared for a far different world to that of the 1980s. The European need for military self-sufficiency, particularly in airlift, has been highlighted by a range of crises from Kosovo to Iraq. The political transatlantic rift that developed over the latter conflict further reinforced this trend. The A400M provides what many see within Europe as the perfect home-grown remedy to the airlift/force projection conundrum and, with it, the distinct chance of gaining valuable penetration into the US-dominated military export market.
Ironically, it was a desire for closer transatlantic collaboration that launched studies into the distant predecessor of the A400M, the Future International Military Airlifter (FIMA). This was a study group set up in December 1982 by Aerospatiale, British Aerospace, Lockheed and MBB to look at a late-1990s replacement for the Lockheed C-130 and Transall C160. The new airlifter would carry more, go further and cost less than either existing aircraft and would have a cargo hold at least 4m (13ft) wide and a rear loading ramp.
Market requirement
The total market requirement was established at 700-1,000 for the four member nations, which planned separate production lines in the USA and Europe. Full-scale development was provisionally set to begin in 1993, with first deliveries in 1999. Early artists' impressions show a preference for a high-wing, four-engined, T-tail design.
In June 1985 FIMA received a boost when defence ministers of the 13-nation Independent European Project Group (IEPG) met in London and agreed to extend the study of a "Future Transport Aircraft" to include several roles such as air-to-air refuelling. The IEPG provided a solid platform on which FIMA could prosper, but proved a double-edged sword.
Ultimately, it embroiled FIMA in a tangled web of diverse European political and military requirements, leading to inevitable delay. Secondly, it progressively alienated Lockheed, which announced its departure from the FIMA group in 1989, citing "uncertainty over the timescale of the US Department of Defense requirements" but, at the same time, leaving it to refocus on an extensively modernised Hercules, the C-130J Hercules II.
From this point, the project entered a rollercoaster ride of ups and downs. Within months of Lockheed's departure, the UK government bailed out of the parallel IEPG study, but retained "observer" status. FIMA was, meanwhile, bolstered by the addition of Alenia and CASA, and regrouped under the title Euroflag, or European Future Large Aircraft Group.
BAe remained a Euroflag member, despite its government's departure on the grounds of funding difficulties and the preference of the Royal Air Force for an "off-the-shelf" solution to its perceived future tactical transport needs. In addition, under its Options for Change defence review, it decided that no C-130 replacement would be sought before 2005, which at the time effectively ruled out the UK as a potential launch customer.
In mid-1991 the European Outline Staff Target for a future large aircraft (FLA) was agreed by the participating nations, which had by now swelled to six with the inclusion of Belgium and Turkey. The staff target set a series of baseline requirements that cleared the way for a pre-feasibility study by the Euroflag companies. In the end it took longer than expected for all to agree, a European Staff Target emerging in 1993 and a finalised European Staff Requirement (ESR) ultimately appearing in 1996.
A foundation agreement between the companies was meanwhile signed at the 1991 Paris air show, covering the setting up of a limited liability company based in Rome. Initial operating capability was expected in 2003, and the previously turboprop-powered aircraft had now sprouted turbofans.
By mid-1992 Euroflag began pre-feasibility studies that included links with newly established collaborative companies Sabca and Sonaca of Belgium, OGMA of Portugal and TAI of Turkey. Definition work on what by now was the 23rd study concept revealed targets that included a 30% overall improvement over the C-130 in terms of payload, speed and range.
This put it between the C-130 and the C-17, a highly capable but costly airlifter under development by McDonnell Douglas. Cost, or really the fear of it, was also starting to dog the embryonic FLA. In response, three of the Euroflag members, Aerospatiale, BAe and Deutsche Aerospace, began pushing the idea of starting a military division of Airbus under which the FLA could be developed.
The move would not only take advantage of an existing structure, but it could potentially bring the UK back into the fold - a vital consideration given the number of aircraft it would add to the guaranteed orderbook. Placing FLA in the hands of Airbus was specified by the then UK defence secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, as a major condition if the UK was to consider such a move. Rifkind argued that running the project along commercial lines was the only way to drive down costs.
At the 1993 Paris air show, Aerospatiale president Louis Gallois also backed the idea, saying it would help beat off US competition: "It would be a catastrophe if the requirement was met by a US aircraft." BAe chief executive Dick Evans said an Airbus-led FLA represented "an ideal opportunity for much greater integration than we have seen to date", and offered perhaps "the first opportunity for Airbus to use its skills in the home military market. As Europeans we must get our strategy together. In my view we are not currently making sufficient progress, either far enough or fast enough, for our own good."
Too little, too late
The warnings were accurate. A month after the show, Belgium abandoned FLA because of defence cuts. Reacting swiftly in October 1993, Euroflag was in negotiations to place the aircraft project within Airbus. The following month the remaining four FLA governments gave the go-ahead for the feasibility study, amid fears that the action was too little, too late.
However, with the looming RAF C-130 replacement competition at the forefront, BAe and the FLA team decided on a bold publicity stunt - the erection of a full size wooden mock-up at the 1994 Farnborough air show. The move succeeded in raising the profile of the FLA and was judged a success despite the inevitable "Wooden wonder" headlines, and the subsequent decision of the RAF to become launch customer for the C-130J. In placing the order, however, the UK government also signalled its intent to opt back into FLA with talk of eventually ordering up to "40 or 50" aircraft to replace its second tranche of C-130Ks.
Talks on the Airbus option, meanwhile, faltered over the complexities of integrating non-Airbus full partners such as Alenia. Pressure on the UK government to commit to rejoining also mounted from the French and German governments, which sought to firm up the funding stream. It was these same worries over rising costs that triggered the abandonment of the turbofan-powered option, although the decision was not finalised until the following year.
UK pressure
BAe also renewed its pressure on the UK government to return to FLA on the grounds that without full participation the UK manufacturer's position as wing maker for Airbus could be threatened. In the event, early 1995 saw a "fly-off" between rival wing designs produced by BAe and DASA, with UK participation largely contingent on a win for the British company. DASA was in favour of an advanced composite wing, while BAe argued for a conventional design, saying the move was not necessary in terms of either capability or cost. Ultimately a joint design was chosen - a "composite hybrid wing".
In an unusual move, it was also decided around this time that industry and not governments would decide the workshare arrangements for the FLA and by mid-1995 these were set out, with Airbus Industrie taking a 30% share in the new Airbus Military Company. The 70% balance was to be divided between the five shareholders, with Alenia taking 20%, CASA 18%, BAe 15% and Aerospatiale and DASA around 9.5% each. Charles Champion, who would later lead the A380 effort, was named as temporary head.
Lockheed Martin, as it had by now become, meanwhile paid an unexpected visit at the end of 1995 when a team arrived to discuss possible collaboration on a turbofan-powered FLA as a C-141 replacement. The team later went home to the US empty handed, Airbus having suspected Lockheed Martin of playing the stalking horse game, and of merely attempting to add further delays to the FLA and leave the C-130J unchallenged.
Flush with confidence, the FLA partners began the final stages of setting up AMC and faced the new year with optimism until, in February 1996 disaster loomed when the French government decided to withdraw FLA funding from its defence budget. It was the biggest threat yet faced by the fledgling programme and AMC risked collapse before it had even started. Worse was to follow when, four months later, the German government followed suit with a similar statement. According to both only a "fully commercial approach" would make FLA affordable, and both struggled to find acceptable alternative approaches to funding.
On the flip side, the year saw progress, with Germany first to sign the ESR that specified the ability to carry a 25t load 3,880km (2,100nm) or a 16t load 5,800km.
But in February 1997 came another blow, when news leaked that the RAF was planning to slash its planned procurement of FLAs by half to just 25 aircraft, even though its official estimates remained between "40 and 50". The reduction threatened to take the entire production run below a viable threshold, originally expected to be in the region of 300 aircraft. Nonetheless, the following August the UK agreed to join the FLA policy group to help prepare the all-important request for proposals (RFP). This long-awaited document, it was hoped, would finally spark the FLA programme into life and was released to AMC in September.
German threat
Within months, however, yet another threat emerged. This time it came from Germany, where the country's defence minister, Volker Ruhe, stunned the FLA community by deciding the AntonovAn-70 should be considered for the German air force. Euroflag and later AMC members had earlier studied possible links with the An-70 and its Progress D-27 propfans, but all had come to nothing. The Westernised An-77 or An-7X, as it was variously dubbed, was widely considered to be an overt form of "Ostpolitik" - a way for Germany to forge industrial links with the east, and was largely opposed by DASA.
The fresh uncertainty encouraged Lockheed Martin to approach AMC and its members on collaborative studies around its proposed New Strategic Airlifter, but the real focus was on a series of often angry meetings on the Antonov option, which took place throughout Europe in early 1998. AMC was worried that the German move would set back FLA once again, particularly with responses to the RFP due in January 1999.
Despite these distractions, the building blocks continued to be put in place and in September 1998 the foundations for setting up a new pan-European procurement agency, OCCAR, were established at that year's Farnborough air show to handle the hoped-for FLA contracts.
AMC delivered its formal response to the RFP to the seven FLA nations on 29 January 1999 in the form of a 24-volume document. As if to muddy the waters further, Belgium, France, Spain and the UK all asked for competitive proposals from Lockheed Martin on the C-130J, Boeing on the C-17 and Antonov on the An-7X, while specific proposals covering the baseline An-70 were requested separately by France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Happily for the programme, renamed the A400M with the establishment of AMC that same month, none of them matched the ESR and in December 1999 the nations designated the aircraft as their future large military transport.
At the 2000 Farnborough air show, defence ministers from the seven European nations announced a procurement plan for 225 aircraft. However, the final numbers were already in flux, particularly when Italy announced in late 2001 that it was pulling out of the programme and taking its order for 16 aircraft with it. The drastic news meant a loss of around $1.4 billion worth of firm orders, but perhaps more awkwardly, left the remaining partners with an extra 7.5% share to divide up.
The Italian withdrawal, not entirely unexpected given its signing of successive orders for Boeing 767 tanker-transports, C-130Js and C-27Js, helped delay the programme further. Issues with the funding for the German order also added further hurdles, and it was not until 27 May 2003 that the final launch order was signed between Airbus and OCCAR.
The €20 billion effort covered the development, test and assembly of 180 A400Ms for delivery between 2009 and 2021. Germany ordered 60, France 50, Spain 27, UK 25, Turkey 10, Belgium seven and Luxembourg one. At last the programme was finally under way.
GUY NORRIS / TOULOUSE
Source: Flight International
