As Europe tries to convince the USA that lifting its arms embargo on China will not release sensitive technology, how could Chine benefit from seeing the ban removed?
Europe continues to reassure the USA and Japan that it will not flood China with advanced weaponry if it lifts its arms embargo. The European Union is also promising to tighten its controls on the export of sensitive technology. But Beijing may want dual-use equipment that is harder to control yet could help transform its military.
While opposition within Europe could prevent the ban being lifted by the EU's deadline of June, the strong backing of France and Germany is expected to ensure the embargo is abolished later this year or early next. Washington is threatening to retaliate by denying US technology and markets to companies and countries that sell weapons and defence-related equipment to China.
The original rationale for the embargo – to punish Beijing for its 1989 suppression of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square – is no longer valid, says the EU. The US government vehemently opposes any lifting of sanctions, concerned that China could eventually acquire European weaponry and defence-related technology that would raise its military capability.
The EU believes changes in China's human rights, its economic progress and growing international influence since 1989 mean Beijing should be given the respect of an equal partner. The embargo not only makes it difficult for China to obtain Western weapons and technologies, but is also an embarrassment to the Chinese leadership. Since its sanctions were never codified into law – unlike those imposed by the USA – the EU asserts that lifting them would be symbolic rather than of substantive value.
To allay US fears that sensitive military technology could find its way into Chinese hands, the EU has promised to tighten a code of conduct introduced in 1998 to provide stricter arms export controls. Interpretation of the code is at the discretion of individual European governments, which has led to differences in its application. As a result, the US government remains concerned that EU export controls lack sufficient rigour and could be exploited by Beijing.
While it seems likely the EU ban will be lifted, it is unlikely the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will rush to buy substantial quantities of European weapons. China can acquire aircraft and other platforms, such as Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, from Russia and elsewhere, and may look to Europe for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and dual-use technology to help address some of its deep-seated weaknesses.
Military weaknesses
There are several reasons for China's military weaknesses. The most obvious is its lack of access to Western defence technology. The PRC is benefiting selectively from the expertise of Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet states, but this tends to reinforce its existing operational model, rather than stimulate the radical changes needed to transform the PLA into a more mobile and flexible networked joint force.
Past experience with the former Soviet Union has also highlighted the drawbacks of buying foreign defence equipment. Although some level of co-operation with international partners will probably continue, China has long promoted an industry policy of self-reliance. This has led to technological weaknesses in many areas. For example, the US arms embargo has effectively prevented maintenance of equipment on army aviation Sikorsky S-70C-2 Black Hawk helicopters, notably the engines. Although the PLA has overcome the lack of spares and has reverse-engineered the General Electric T700 engines for other potential helicopter applications, the experience is a reminder that foreign weapon systems come with conditions attached that are often incompatible with Chinese plans for their use.
Assimilating new technology, whether through licensing arrangements or reverse engineering, has also posed enormous challenges. The net results are often translated into low production quantities; uneven manufacturing standards and poor quality assurance; deficient testing and evaluation and inflexible programme management. China's J-10, J-11, and JH-7 combat aircraft and Z-8, Z-9 and Z-11 helicopter programmes are examples.
China's selective military modernisation has been under way since the early 1990s, but it is the more recent wars fought by the USA that are influencing the scope and direction of PLA warfighting requirements. The 1999 Kosovo air war, for example, has shaped the PLA's new strategy to counter the superiority of US air power, known as the Three Attacks and Three Defenses.
The Three Attacks focuses on defeating stealthy aircraft, cruise missiles and helicopters, while the Three Defenses is aimed at countering an adversary's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, precision strike, and electronic warfare capabilities. But it is in these areas that the PLA has major weaknesses, and where European technology could prove valuable.
Although some limited reforms are being implemented by the Chinese military to improve its doctrine, force structure and command and control (C2), the Russian organisational model is incompatible with its ambition to develop an effective strategy for fighting a "limited war under high-technology conditions". The PLA is also acutely aware that Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom underlined the paramount importance of acquiring, manipulating and disseminating information.
This awareness could influence the types of weapons, equipment and technologies China may seek to acquire from Europe if and when the embargo is lifted. Because the USA is legally obligated to defend Taiwan in the event of a conflict with China, the PLA is placing substantial emphasis on developing and acquiring asymmetric and information-centric warfare capabilities. These would be aimed at degrading, confusing, neutralising and – where possible – overmatching US military capabilities long enough for Chinese forces to attain their objectives.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is likely to focus on technologies that would effectively transform older aircraft into more capable platforms, making them significant force multipliers. These include: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) ; electronic warfare; information warfare; and modelling and simulation.
Warfighting strategy
China continues to develop a joint battlespace management system, but much more advanced computer networks and secure communications systems will be needed to implement the PLA's warfighting strategy and "push" information to military units. Specific areas of interest include computers with higher speed and throughput, greater storage capacity and reduced power requirements, as well as secure communications, datalinks and networks to exercise rapid C2 and information operations. Many of the products under potential consideration by the PLA are commercial off-the-shelf systems that could be adapted.
US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq underlined the value of dedicated ISR platforms to the PLA. China has largely focused on local development, although some systems have been foreign-sourced. The emphasis has been on using a range of unmanned air vehicles to conduct ISR missions, but sensors and communications are likely to be deficient.
Among the aircraft that could benefit from commercially available technologies would be China's small fleet of airborne ISR platforms. These include several KJ-2000 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, probably equipped with electronically steered phased-array (ESA) radars, being used to develop both the technology and concept of operations. Others include: a Y-8 AEW&C platform equipped with an ESA radar; Tu-154M/D and HD-5 electronic-support and H-6 surveillance platforms; and DZ-9 electronic-attack helicopters.
To ensure secure airborne communications and enhance situational awareness, the PLAAF is particularly interested in advanced digital cryptographic systems to improve management of large, complex air operations. While it is unclear what type of data communications standard the air force employs, acquisition or development of a tactical datalink similar to the US Link 16 is of substantial interest.
Software radio
A related area where the PLA may be able to benefit from lifting of the embargo is in advanced communications, such as software-defined radio (SDR) technology. SDR holds real potential to overcome different communications protocols and to enhance joint interoperability between air, ground and naval forces. While digital radios represent a significant step forward, they cannot be reprogrammed in the field. In an SDR, however, all modes and applications can be configured and reconfigured by software, increasing the flexibility and utility of a radio.
PLAAF capabilities in electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic support continue to be limited. But with control of the electromagnetic spectrum critical to attain information dominance in the battlespace, major efforts are being made to improve the performance of China's airborne radars, to develop more effective waveforms and reduce sidelobes and vulnerabilities to adversary jamming.
The speed and complexity of modern warfare, combined with advances in radar technology, have made knowledge of the capabilities and operating parameters of adversary systems and the electronic order-of-battle of the enemy force imperative. As a result, China is also stressing the development of electronic support capabilities, for which it has obtained some help from the Ukraine. But given the sensitivity of electronic warfare technology, it is uncertain whether European companies would be willing – or allowed – to co-operate with China in these areas.
The importance of ISR and AEW&C has led the PLAAF to seek ESA radar technology to improve its airborne surveillance capabilities. While the precise state of Chinese ESA technology is unclear, it is likely to be deficient. For active ESA applications, solid-state transmit/receive modules are the critical elements, of which there may be 2,000-3,000 depending on the size of the array. Much of this technology is commercially available, and China is likely to continue to acquire related technologies that can advance its local capabilities.
Little can be said about the PLA's ability to conduct command and control warfare, although it is believed to have some level of offensive and defensive information-warfare (IW) capability. Chinese strategists recognise the asymmetric and disruptive potential of IW, but progress appears uneven, at best.
Nevertheless, the Chinese military will probably be able to upgrade its IW capabilities through foreign sourcing of faster computers and networks.
Contingency planning
The PLA has long been interested in modelling various scenarios for more effective contingency planning in the Taiwan Strait. Yet this is another area in which it is deficient. To address its shortcomings, the military is interested in developing software that can game or simulate the outcome of various conflict scenarios between its forces and those of Taiwan – both with and without the involvement of US and Japanese forces. But as is the case with other information-centric technology disciplines, China has significant difficulties developing its own software. Access to better modeling and simulation capabilities could help it address key weaknesses.
Although it looks likely the EU arms embargo will be lifted – now later rather than sooner – it remains difficult to see how the PLA could materially benefit from potential acquisitions and co-operation with European defence firms because of the sensitivity of the technologies it needs, particularly if tighter export controls are adopted by the EU.
For the EU, the real benefit of lifting the arms embargo may lie in negotiating substantial commercial contracts with China. However, there is little doubt the PLA will continue efforts to acquire, through overt and covert means, commercial and dual-use technologies that could significantly upgrade the performance of its weapon systems and computer networks.
LUKE COLTON/WASHINGTON DC
Source: Flight International
