US Air Force investigators blame crew error for a January crash that saw the destruction of a Boeing B-1B Lancer strategic bomber.
The January 2024 incident occurred during a training flight from the aircraft’s (85-0085) home station of Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota. While attempting to make a night landing during poor weather conditions, the aircraft undershot the runway forcing a rare quadruple ejection of the B-1B’s crew.
All four aviators survived, but the $450 million bomber was deemed a total loss after skidding across the airfield and catching fire.
The lead investigator in the accident probe now says many of the factors that led to the catastrophic mishap are likely to be repeated.
In a report, Colonel Erick Lord said the inquiry found that “many failures leading to this mishap were not a one-time occurrence or an aberration”.
The crew’s failure to conduct a composite crosscheck during the approach was seen as the primary cause of the accident.
“The mission crew did not follow the low-visibility approach to land communication and flying responsibilities,” the report states.
The mishap pilot apparently failed to brief the remaining crew on the expected vertical velocity during the approach, which prevented weapon systems officers from performing an adequate crosscheck. The pilot also descended below 200ft above ground level without approval from the onboard instructor pilot.
“The mishap pilot did not effectively crosscheck the airspeed, descent rate, and projected aircraft flight path leading up to the mishap,” investigators conclude.
“By failing to crosscheck using his instruments effectively, the mishap pilot did not recognise the [aircraft’s] deviations from the desired airspeed, descent rate and aircraft flight path.”
Deteriorating weather conditions during the winter training flight had forced the B-1B crew to cut the sortie short and attempt an instrument landing on a different runway than originally planned. The landing occurred during night hours with visibility even further reduced by dense fog in the local area, which investigators say exacerbated the Lancer crew’s deviation from established policy.
A ground-based flight supervisor also improperly directed the B-1B pilot to land on a runway that lacked adequate weather observation – violating a Notice to Airmen alert issued over the impaired visibility.
Investigators describe “undisciplined procedures” employed by the ground-based flight supervisors, including insufficient shift changeover and individual failure to review applicable airfield hazards, that resulted in the mishap B-1B making a dangerous and unauthorised approach.
As a result, the aircraft rapidly descended below its authorised altitude and impacted the ground before its intended landing zone.
While Lord notes that bad weather “substantially contributed” to the crash, he says a “culture of noncompliance and widespread deviation from established policy” among bomber crews within the B-1B squadron created the potential for such an incident.
“I find by a preponderance of the evidence that these leadership and climate issues directly contributed to the mishap,” he says in the investigation report.
He notes a failure by squadron leadership to conduct adequate supervision of flight operations and a lack of effective communication regarding airfield and weather conditions as examples of the poor safety culture at the 34th Bomb Squadron.
The investigation board also found an “unsatisfactory level of basic airmanship” within the Lancer squadron’s flight crews.
As further evidence of this, investigators note that the lead instructor pilot onboard the mishap aircraft apparently exceeded the maximum approved weight for the B-1B’s Collins Aerospace ACES II ejection seat, which is rated for 111kg (245lb) according to the USAF.
That individual apparently suffered more severe injuries during the ejection than the rest of the crew, according to the investigation report.
The B-1B ejection system is typically set so that an ejection initiated by one crew member triggers a rapidly sequenced firing of the remaining seats. This procedure is meant to prevent a collision between crew members.
