REPORTS OF Fokker's death may be somewhat exaggerated, but the company's descent into administrative protection does spell the end of two dreams: that the Netherlands Government could somehow sustain a full-competence national aircraft maker, and that Daimler-Benz could be the nucleus of a powerful third Euro-pean aerospace force.

Fokker is in difficulties not because of deficiencies in its products, nor because of its inability to sell its aircraft. It is in difficulties simply because it cannot sell its products for an economic price.

The charitable would suggest that a great deal of that is down to the weakness of the US dollar, and the strength of the currencies of Germany (where Fokker fuselages are made) and the Netherlands (where they are joined together) although, notably, not in the UK (where the wings and engines are made). Charity, however, does not count for all of the problems of Fokker and its regional-jet rivals.

There is another, more fundamental, problem for those in the regional-jet market: is there a market to be in? Thirty years ago there was certainly a demand for turbine-powered aircraft of the size of what are now called regional jets, with the ranges of what are now called regional jets. Aircraft such as the BAC One-Eleven, the Fokker F28, the Yakovlev Yak 40 and the McDonnell Douglas (MDC) DC-9-30 were not, however, regional jets in today's understanding of the term. They were mainstream airliners, taking over from the previous generation of propeller-driven aircraft, offering mainstream airlines increases in capacity and speed. Today's regional jets are not the spiritual successors of those aircraft, but of the Convair liners, Vickers Viscounts and even Douglas DC-3s which they had displaced into the fleets of the world's second-tier airlines.

Those regional airlines promised to create a strong and growing niche, for a discrete range of aircraft in the 70- to 120-seat range. The numbers have not materialised. The big three manufacturers have muscled in at the top - the Airbus A319, Boeing 737-600 and even MDC's MD-95 outsold the regional jets in 1995 - while 50-seaters from Canadair and Embraer have nibbled away at the bottom of the range.

The fundamental problem is that, although the regional airlines may well want to operate regional jets, few can afford to pay the full entry price. Even at $20 million, the aircraft would be expensive, let alone the $25-30 million which it costs Fokker and others to build them. Of course, not every regional-jet customer is an impecunious regional, but for every blue-chip, cash-buyer such as American, most regional manufacturers can count a string of small-time failures on their order-books.

Daimler's role in all this is another matter. It purchased a controlling stake in Fokker at the wrong time, and for the wrong motives. It bought when the industry was in a general recession which probably concealed from those outside the structural weakness within Fokker. When nobody is doing much business at all, it is difficult to tell which sort of business is good and which is bad.

It bought for the wrong motives - Daimler wanted to build an independent aerospace business of its own with critical mass at a time when most other companies had begun to accept that the only way forward in Europe was to co-operate with others. The charitable would suggest that Daimler needed that critical mass as an entrance ticket for the wider co-operative discussions just beginning. The practical would suggest that what European manufacturers are looking for in a prospective partner is not more size (most of them are over-sized for their performance already), but more efficiency.

By buying into Fokker for the wrong reasons at the wrong time, Daimler not only created a problem for itself by adding losses to an already loss-making aerospace venture. It exacerbated Fokker's problems by shielding it from the inevitable rationalisation, which an independent existence would have forced on it much earlier - perhaps early enough to save it.

Even if Fokker cannot be saved in its current form, it will not disappear overnight - hundreds of its aircraft alone will need some sort of support organisation for many years. Perhaps a buyer can be found for one or both major product lines, or even for the entire business - but that is probably one dream too many.

Source: Flight International