Analysis of open-source data suggests Russia lost over 100 attack helicopters during the first two years of the Ukraine war, a study carried out by a NATO agency has concluded.
However, changes to Russia’s doctrine and improvements to its fleet have slowed the rate of losses, Lieutenant Colonel Emilliano Pellegrini told Defence IQ’s International Military Helicopter 2025 conference on 26 February.
While not official NATO research, the analysis conducted by the alliance’s Joint Air Power Competence Centre provides an important snapshot of Russia’s losses and its ability to adapt to battlefield conditions.
During the first 12 months of the war, 59 attack helicopters – Kamov Ka-52s, and Mil Mi-28Ns and Mi-24s – were destroyed, the analysis suggests, representing almost 30% of the available operational fleet. Of these, 42 were shot down – one of which in a ‘friendly-fire’ incident – with 17 destroyed on the ground.
Ka-52s accounted for 62% of the total, followed by the Mi-24 (21%) and Mi-28N (17%). Man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADs) were responsible for 49% of the downings, followed by anti-aircraft artillery (22%), small arms (17%) and anti-tank weapons employed in direct-fire mode (12%), the analysis suggests.
In the last of those cases, the flight profile required to launch rockets – a sharp nose-up climb – “leaves the helicopter high in the sky with low speed becoming an easy target” for such munitions, Pellegrini says.
High levels of vibration inherent in the Ka-52 limited its long-range targeting capability, while a lack of co-ordination with other forces, outdated maps, poor self-protection systems and night-flying capability all contributed to the high losses during the first year of the war.
Additionally, Russia deployed assets badly, Pellegrini says, pointing to an outdated doctrinal approach. “It doesn’t seem to have adapted to new technologies; they were operating as a 20th century fighting force,” he says.
But Russia moved quickly to address its shortcomings, he says. During the second year of the war, up until 1 March 2024, shootdowns reduced by 52% to just 19, albeit while the number of aircraft damaged or destroyed on the ground rose by 40%, to 28.
Improvements to the targeting system of the Ka-52, plus the deployment of the long-range LMUR anti-tank missile has allowed targets to be engaged at distances of up to 14km (8.7 miles), taking the helicopter out of MANPAD-weapon range.
Pellegrini estimates the use of the long-range munition is responsible for around half of the improvement.
Self-protection systems have also been enhanced across all types, alongside modernisation of navigation and night-vision systems. Greater co-ordination with other assets, such as electronic warfare-roled helicopters or unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), has also improved survivability, he adds.
Changes in the way attack helicopters have been deployed is another factor. “The big problem of the use of helicopters from the Russian side was that they used the helicopters as they did in the last century.
“It is only a doctrinal problem. We know Russian helicopters are good helicopters.”
Early findings from the third year of the conflict suggest that losses have continued to decline, says Pellegrini, as Russia “learns how to use the helicopters [better]”.
However, the threat has also changed, with UAVs now capable of targeting rotorcraft in flight.
“They are now facing a new threat from the skies, we know that some helicopters have been downed by the use of UAVs.”
