The ultimate declaration of bankruptcy by Fokker will be greeted in various quarters with varying degrees of anger, regret and relief. The anger - from Fokker's employees - will be understandable. The regret - especially from Fokker's suppliers and customers - will be justifiable. The relief - from competitors - will be neither.
Fokker's employees have been through the traumas of cutbacks, as successive managements have tried to slim their company down, to ensure its survival. They have seen it embraced by an apparent saviour in Daimler-Benz Aerospace and then rejected. They have seen their Government refuse to supply more financing itself, but, at the same time, try to impose conditions on would-be rescuers which, in effect, guaranteed that there would be no rescue. None of them has a guarantee of a job, even should - as seems likely - parts of the Fokker business survive. For all that, there will be understandable anger.
Fokker's suppliers have seen the writing on the wall for a long time. They too have borne the cost, as Fokker has asked for reduced prices and delayed payments. Now they must face the costs and trauma of losing perhaps thousands of their own employees along with Fokker's business. For that, there will be justifiable regret.
Fokker's competitors - both existing, and those contemplating joining especially the regional-jet battle - might greet its demise with relief. A significant player in the market goes, leaving customers, which might or would have bought Fokker aircraft to be fought over. One fewer competitor should mean a greater slice of the cake for those remaining, with all the attendant promise of greater profitability for those left. For that, there can be no justification.
The collapse of Fokker, provides a graphic and further warning (if, indeed, such a warning was needed) of the underlying weakness in the regional-airliner market. Leaving aside areas of what is best described as artificial demand, where a state has virtually guaranteed a market for a new indigenous regional jet (such as in Indonesia and China), the market is characterised by too many manufacturers, offering too many expensive products to too many airlines, few of which can afford them.
Even in good times, the market for regional jets and turboprops has rarely been a profitable one for manufacturers, and it is unlikely to become so. Most of those manufacturers are based in high-wage economies in which it is almost impossible to assemble aircraft cheaply. The only alternatives available in those economies are automated production (itself expensive) or moving work offshore into low-wage economies.
Those arguments are sufficiently strong as to make it conceivable that there will never be another wholly new European turboprop, and that even starting new small jetliners beyond downward extensions of the current Airbus range could be almost impossible to justify. This latter point is complicated by the current manouevrings over the Chinese-led AE100 project: it would be difficult to see the Aero International (Regional) (AI(R)) marketing consortium being able to fund its own new regional jet as well, should it win the contest to be the Western partner in the project.
Beyond all this doom and gloom, however, there may be cause for some small optimism to flow from Fokker's unfortunate demise. It does serve as a timely reminder that the European aircraft manufacturers must achieve significant rationalisation of their business if they are to survive the battle against their American and Asian rivals. As a first small step in that direction, without the burden of Fokker Daimler-Benz may find it a little easier to throw in its lot with AI(R). Seeing Fokker's fate may, indeed, be enough to startle others into seriously considering the long-overdue process of cross-border merger and take-over. That will occasion a lot more anger and regret, with very little relief before it is accomplished, but, without it, there will be a great deal more of the former, and none of the latter.
Source: Flight International
