ONCE AGAIN, the Balkans are providing Europe and the USA with intractable problems, and it looks increasingly likely that, following the latest developments, NATO air units will soon be called upon to attack Bosnian Serb forces on the ground. Such operations, however, need to be portrayed within a larger military and political agenda, supported by both the European elements of NATO and the USA. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind, that air power alone, can not provide a solution, to the crisis.
A credible air-strike capability must be deployed in support of the United Nations operation in Bosnia and the surrounding region - that much is certain. Military and political leaders, must also be certain, however, that on its own, air power is no alternative to a credible, all-arms, military strategy in support of a politically coherent agenda. At the moment, the latter two elements of this triad are sadly lacking, and their absence is in danger of exposing the futility of the first.
Destroying Bosnian Serb armour or artillery by air is well within the capability of the air units deployed in the theatre, and at an acceptable loss rate. Taking it further, however, and destroying, or even nullifying, the Bosnian Serbs' will to fight is likely to prove beyond such a capability. This approach would require ground forces with a mandate considerably stronger than that now grudgingly given to those soldiering under the bedraggled UN banner.
Unfortunately, the campaign in the region can not be viewed in isolation, as the problems of utilising an air capability highlights a continuing, and much broader, debate within US military circles and NATO itself as to the future role and capacity of the air arm and its place in the wider arena.
On one level, Bosnia is the antithesis of the Iraqi air campaign. The Gulf War of 1991 can now be seen as the ideal conflict in which to show that tactical air power can have a strategic impact - the role of the ground forces being reduced to that of mopping up after a fragmented and shattered enemy. In the former Yugoslavia, however, the terrain, the opposition and a fragile political alliance, present considerably greater difficulties.
Bosnia is a long way from the kind of battle, which the NATO air forces now deployed in the theatre have trained for decades to fight. The conflict is an intense, hard-fought, but essentially local, civil war and, as such, it is one with which NATO is ill-prepared to deal, both in terms of tactics and political will.
Among some European nations, there is considerable support for increased military intervention in the region - support among the US population is considerably less solid. This may be why, so far, President Bill Clinton's Administration has yet to put forward a coherent framework within which the Allies can exercise the proper use of air power - beyond appearing to want to vent their frustrations by off-loading several tons of iron bombs.
Clinton is in danger of waving an inappropriate stick, and runs the risk of being seen as failing to deliver the goods in the form of a solution in Bosnia. An isolated wave of air strikes in support of the remaining "safe" areas presents a high-risk policy in that, as previously, the Bosnian Serbs may take the blow and carry on regardless.
The USA and its allies, if they are to retain any shred of political credibility, must be prepared to expand their role on the ground. Air power alone, however effective will not let the USA and the Western and Eastern European nations off the hook.
Source: Flight International
