Israel's main defence against ballistic-missile attack, the Arrow, is at a critical stage.
Arie Egozi/TEL AVIV
In Hebrew, the Israeli missile-defence organisation is called HOMA - meaning wall. Although it is the incidental result of Hebrew abbreviations, it has a special connotation to its main purpose - building some kind of invisible wall, to defend Israel from a ballistic-missile threat.
Israel was aware of the potential threat long before salvos of Iraqi Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv and other centres during the Gulf War in 1991. The potential implications of the threat had four years earlier led the Israelis to start developing the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic-missile system, largely funded by the US Government.
The programme, now entering its second, most critical, phase, is only part of a comprehensive system aimed at lowering the price Israel will have to pay if it has to deal with missile attacks again.
Uzi Rubin has the responsibility of co-ordinating the missile-defence effort until the Arrow batteries are operational. The Israeli missile-defence organisation which he heads is designing the architecture of a system which will eventually consist of land and satellite-based early-warning sensors and the Arrow.
Rubin, an aeronautical engineer, has worked in the past for Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and was previously the head of the Israeli liaison department at the US Strategic Defense Initiative Office. He has also been involved in many of Israel's most secret defence programmes.
A recent successful test launch has failed to quell local opposition to the missile on cost grounds. Rubin declares: "We have to continuously prove the affordability of the full system. Affordability is the name of the game. If at any stage my conclusion is that the Arrow system is too expensive, I'll be the first to recommend cancellation."
The first series of test launches was performed by prime contractor IAI, using the Arrow 1. The second series, scheduled to begin soon, will involve six launches of the Arrow 2, the smaller, lighter, version of the missile, which will be identical to the operational version.
The next launches will be performed from "...a land site and not the barge moored in the Mediterranean which has been used so far", reveals Rubin, who points to another difference: in the second series of tests, the target detection and fire control will be performed by the Elta dual-mode radar developed for this purpose.
Initially, the Israelis had considered purchasing a ground-based early-warning radar and integrating it into the system. Budget problems led to the abandonment of this idea and the "...development by Elta of its phased-array radar, which will detect incoming missiles from a great distance and supply fire control for the Arrow".
The Arrow programme began in 1988. The first phase was completed in 1992 at a cost of $191 million - 80% of which was funded by the US Government. The second phase began in 1992 and is scheduled to end in 1996, with the USA contributing 72% of the $324 million investment.
One major problem of developing and deploying a system such as the Arrow is that there is no way to test it against a simulated target with "real" characteristics. "We will never be able to simulate a full missile attack. But we have a way to simulate one incoming ballistic missile. I cannot be specific about it, but it will give us a very efficient simulation," says Rubin
In spite of the assurances about its efficiency, Rubin maintains the line adopted by other senior Israelis connected to the programme in refusing to discuss the level of protection which use of the Arrow will give to the Israelis.
While refusing to become embroiled in a public debate on effectiveness, he says: "The interception envelope of a missile like the Arrow is designed to answer the problem of nuclear and chemical warheads. The Arrow aims to minimise the collateral damage of the enemy's missile warhead." Rubin is referring probably to the range and altitude at which the weapon, with its proximity fuze, will intercept and destroy the incoming ballistic missile.
The missile is not the only arrow in the quiver when it comes to Israeli ballistic-missile defence. Recent studies funded by the Israeli Government and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation have shown that development of a unmanned air vehicle (UAV)-based boost-phase interceptor could also be feasible as part of a multi-layered defence. Studies on the concept continue.
The Israeli air force is not keen on either Arrow or the UAV concept, but sees a possible use for a long-range infra-red missile combined with a combat aircraft such as the McDonnell Douglas F-15E.
Israel will be the first country to have a national anti-tactical ballistic system, which could put IAI and other Israeli contractors involved in the work in a strong situation, as other countries, particularly in Europe, turn their attention to ballistic-missile defence against a growing threat from countries surrounding the continent.
Asked whether he can foresee Israel being able to export the system to other countries, he says: "Almost all the basic technologies in the Arrow are Israeli and we can export them."
Mindful of the controversy stirred by an earlier alleged Israeli sale to China of Raytheon Patriot missile technology and the debate surrounding the more recent sale of technology to Beijing for the development of a new fighter, he says: "The Arrow missile will be exported as part of a system only if the USA approves such a move."
Source: Flight International
