A lot will be written about the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) over the coming months: some of it will be true. The most expensive combat aircraft programme in history and the largest-ever US defence procurement, the Lockheed Martin
F-35 JSF has reached a crucial juncture.
The US Department of Defense is seeking funds to begin production before the first aircraft has even flown, and the eight international participants in the development programme are being asked to sign up for the production phase before they are ready to buy the fighter. This placing of the cart before the horse is necessary because advanced fighters take so long – sometimes decades – to develop. Defence planners do not have the luxury of waiting until the aircraft is fully tested before ordering it into production.
The USA’s rush to get the JSF line rolling is driven by its need to replace Lockheed F-16s and Boeing F/A-18s. Fielded during the 1980s, these workhorse fighters will reach retirement age en mass in the 2010s. To ensure there are sufficient aircraft for operational testing of not one, but three variants, and to enable deliveries to ramp up quickly after operational approval, the DoD wants to begin buying production JSFs in fiscal year 2007, the budget for which must be approved by Congress before the first F-35 has flown – a milestone now expected by October or November this year.
Beginning production of an aircraft while it is still being developed – concurrency in Pentagon-speak – is a pet hate of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional watchdog that is traditionally highly critical of the DoD’s acquisition practices. The GAO has been pushing hard for JSF production to be delayed until sufficient testing has been performed – and Congress seems to be listening. Although it is still early in Washington’s budget-writing process, key House and Senate panels have cut funding for procurement of the first production batches of JSFs, citing the need for more testing.
Congress has messed with military aircraft programmes many times before, usually with the effect of stretching schedules, cutting numbers and driving up costs. But this time the perturbations will be felt not just in the USA. In capitals from Oslo to Canberra, defence planners are trying to bring decision-making processes into formation with the USA.
In a significant move, Norway last week decided to stay in the F-35 development programme for another six months while evaluating options for its next fighter. The decision was taken by a new government that, while in opposition, was highly critical of the industrial returns offered by the JSF programme and followed the presentation by Lockheed of an improved industrial participation package.
But Norway’s decision is not quite the victory it might seem for Lockheed. At worst it is a six-month stay of execution, as Oslo intends to keep its new fighter options open until 2008.
This highlights the problem Lockheed and the US government face as they work to persuade the eight international JSF participants to sign up for the production, sustainment and follow-on development (PSFD) phase by the end of this year. Most simply are not ready to commit to buying any new fighter, let alone the F-35. Drafting of the single multinational memorandum of understanding (MoU) covering the entire PSFD phase ends this month, allowing the partners to begin the process of obtaining national political approval to sign the document. In most cases that will involve evaluating alternative fighters and associated industrial participation offers.
It is a risky time for the JSF, as Norway is illustrating. Dassault, Eurofighter and Gripen International are not about to allow any of the international partners to decide without there being an attractive alternative offer or two. More importantly, even signing the PSFD MoU might not be the ringing endorsement of the JSF it was once expected to be. Rather than requiring participating nations to commit to procuring F-35s, the USA may accept an indication of intent, and an idea of the number required so that Lockheed can plan production.
While any move by Congress to slow the JSF could give the partners more decision time, the impact on the programme would be enormous. Thousands of engineers at hundreds of companies working on the F-35 would be affected, and deliveries – already delayed to 2012 and beyond – would slip further, throwing into disarray the very force planning on which each nation’s decision-making is founded.
SEE defence p15
Source: Flight International
