Bombardier's spirit "Bombardier fleshes out design for new jet family" (Flight International, 1-7 February) is another prime example of the inherent dangers of a newly appointed breed of senior management leading a corporation down a path of almost certain financial hardship. Bombardier new commercial aircraft programme president Gary Scott's tendencies towards his US grassroots are reflected with considerations of "CSeries" assembly in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Regrettably, the only visible connection to the Canadian airframe manufacturer's family heritage in Albuquerque is the last three letters of the name – que, which are shared by Quebec, the home province of Armand and the legendary name. Bombardier is the pride of Quebec in Canadian aviation history. Montreal is the aviation capital of Canada. Industry has recognised the risk in developing a new airframe and powerplant simultaneously. The Challenger 600 programme in 1976 should be a case study. After much introspection, it was recognised as the first widebody business jet. The Bombardier interest in Canadair and Laurent Beaudoin's visionary accounting skills and demeanour created an unmatched standard of business aircraft. In 2005, the passion and personalities of people such as Bob Brown, John Lawson and John Holding are distant memories. Next-generation management has hired twenty-something-year old, blue-haired craftsmen building airframes and cabinets. Mr Beaudoin has eloquently returned to join forces with his son Pierre. In essence, he's taken the reins of salvation, as he did with Canadair. Canadians and Quebecers continue to hold faith in our hearts that lightning can strike twice. Name and address supplied
Autopilot deficiencies John Laming (Flight International, 1-7 February) makes a pertinent argument for non-standard manual go-around practice that is certainly as overdue in simulator sessions as unusual attitude recovery training was until relatively recently. I would be surprised to see an autopilot flown crosswind approach at or above the "non-limiting" demonstrated crosswind limit in a simulator or aircraft. Manually flying above that in a simulator is good for "test pilot" handling skills, however. A "straight sock" wind of that strength is capricious, certainly quicker than an autopilot can react. The lack of handling skills that Mr. Laming laments were brought into sharp focus on 30 August 2004 on a final approach to Hong Kong Chep Lap Kok's runway 25R by a Cathay Pacific Boeing 747-400 with 350 people on board. The aircraft, in-bound from London Heathrow, received a windshear warning. The crew elected to initiate an automatic go-around. They applied take-off/go-around to give reference thrust and flaps 20 for gradient. To intercept the autopilot's maximum continuous power missed approach altitude, lateral navigation was engaged above 400ft above ground level, to fly the northbound procedure in the flight management computer. Unfortunately, the autopilot had already been disengaged, upon receipt of windshear alert. Nonetheless, automation expectation prevailed to such an extent that the aircraft was allowed to drift left over the departure 25L on an intercept course for the 900m (3,000ft)-high Lantau peak with a pitch of 28° and an indicated airspeed of 130kt (240km/h) tickling the stick shaker Neither autoflight or its expectation ever made a skilful aviator. David Connolly Brussels, Belgium
Safety blaming the pilot is easy In air safety, the past is always the future, and blaming the pilot is easy. Witness that the Hong Kong accident review board has rejected China Airlines (CAL) windshear claim over the Boeing MD-11 fatal incident in 1999 (Flight International, 8-14 February). I am forced to ask why local authorities take such views of events in their own back yards. If we look at the Martinair McDonnell Douglas DC10-30 crash at Faro airport, Portugal on 21 December 1999, we see the official Portugese DGAC report cited the deviation from approach profile and subsequent structural overload on touchdown – one wing low at high descent rate (the China Airlines MD-11 accident was nearly identical). But the Netherlands Aviation Safety Board report said the probable cause should cite windshear and resultant lateral displacement and high descent rate. The parameters of these two crashes are similar, including late power applications to arrest uncommanded flight deviations in storms. At Hong Kong there was even a windshear warning extant. Yet once again the crew get it in the neck. Can it really be that simple? Lance Cole Swindon, Wiltshire, UK
Alarming future I viewed your cover story "Fly drive future" (Flight International, 8-14 February) with alarm. The concept is indeed the dream of a few entrepreneurs, but a few points appear to have been missed. It will be a regulatory and air traffic control nightmare. Personal air vehicles cannot be excluded from normal oversight and monitoring. Who will check the calibration of Mrs Flymore's tyre pressure gauge, or produce the repair scheme when she almost misses the garage door? Will the local service station be Part 145 approved? How much will the cost of a Corvette fuel pump escalate before it merits FAA approval? Will ATC or the police be responsible for pulling over a drunken driver? The questions are endless, and we haven't even looked at insurance yet. I can understand the glow of achievement to be obtained from technically proving the concept, but as an everyday reality it must always remain a dream. Neil Peterson Boroko, Papua New Guinea
Nothing personal On your cover (Flight International, 8-14 February), you ask: "Can the personal air vehicle dream become reality?" Having read the article in question ("Fly drive future") carefully, I remain convinced that the answer is: "No!" Brian Matthews Forres, Moray, UK
Source: Flight International
