Twenty months into one of the most controversial accident investigations of the decade, SilkAir has told the world that a pilot who apparently intended to kill himself and 103 others was "by the best standards of the industry-fit to fly".

To put it charitably, this demonstrates a disturbing readiness to ignore a mountain of information, both official and unofficial, which was available before and after flight MI185 plunged into the Musi river in Sumatra.

SilkAir's outgoing general manager, Mak Swee Wah, argues that, up to now, much of the information being circulated was "speculative". Indeed it was, thanks to the consistent efforts of the Indonesian Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission (AAIC) and other official bodies in Singapore and Indonesia to minimise the fuss over the tragedy by refusing to reveal the evidence at their disposal. But as the AAIC begins to yield, under pressure from numerous quarters, most of the "speculation" has so far proved to be remarkably accurate.

In the meantime, SilkAir has "comprehensively reviewed" its operations and procedures, patted itself on the back and declared that nothing needs to be changed. The airline, which previously had an exemplary safety record, is doing itself, and the industry as a whole, a disservice by adopting such a stance.

If it is true that a suicidal, homicidal, pilot met "the best standards of the industry", then the industry clearly needs to think anew about the rules governing psychological fitness to fly and the tests required to establish mental health. While the circumstances of the crash remain technically unproven - and probably will remain so, as suicide is notoriously difficult to prove in this type of case - surely the weight of evidence is sufficient to have warranted earlier action by the airline and the AAIC.

Contrast this case with Swissair's handling of its MD-11 accident on 2 September last year. Whatever the ultimate findings of the Canadian crash investigation, within two months of the crash the airline had switched off its in-flight entertainment systems on the scantest of evidence that there may have been a link between their use and the cockpit fire which brought the aircraft down. This has been followed by a string of airworthiness directives from the investigation, which has yet to isolate the ignition source. In this way, both the investigators and the airline show they are prepared to act pre-emptively to avoid further loss of life.

Clearly, it is easier to deactivate or remove an electrical system than to establish a foolproof test for suicidal tendencies. Indeed, the problem for the world's aviation authorities and their medical advisers is that spotting personality disorders, even with regular spot checks, is notoriously difficult. Partly for this reason, many countries have no specific psychological test during medical pilot examination. Countries like the UK believe that monitoring by crews or line captains provides a much better idea of a pilot's mental health. It is true that, despite of the lack of formal testing to discover such problems, psychiatric disorders are already the second largest cause of pilots losing their licences in Europe - although most of these cases are thought to involve drink and drug related issues.

Given the nature of psychiatric disorder, it may be beyond the industry at this time to devise sensible, acceptable tests. It would, of course, also create a legal minefield from which only the lawyers would be the ultimate beneficiaries. But given that at least two other fatal commercial aircraft crashes in the past 20 years have probably been caused by pilot suicide, or attempted suicide, then now would appear to be a good time to review psychological fitness requirements for the industry internationally.

Given the complexity of the issue, it may be that the burden for improving the situation may fall upon the airlines. Confidential reporting of apparent mental problems does take place within some, and it is the least the industry can do to educate staff about problems and make it easier to report them when they become apparent.

Source: Flight International