A little more than a year after the 19 May 2016 loss of an EgyptAir Airbus A320 over the Mediterranean Sea, Egyptian authorities have offered no data beyond some basic facts that came to light in the first few weeks. The Egyptian civil aviation authority says the technical investigation committee has referred the matter to the country's public prosecutor, following the suspicion that a criminal act was involved in the destruction of the aircraft, which was conducting flight MS804 from Paris Charles de Gaulle to Cairo. Forensic medicine specialists stated last September that examination of casualties recovered from the sea had revealed "traces" of explosive materials. The civil aviation authority has not elaborated on this since, and French forensic analysis has not corroborated the claim. It has restated the evidence from the cockpit voice recorder in which the word “fire” was spoken, and that ACARS had communicated messages about smoke in the lavatory and avionics bay. None of the 66 occupants survived.
Air Canada Airbus A320, Halifax, Canada, March 2015
Poor visibility, runway lighting issues and deficiencies in Air Canada's operating procedures caused the 29 March 2015 crash of an Airbus A320 (C-FTJP) at Halifax Stanfield International airport, according to Canada's Transportation Safety Board (TSB). The crash, which occurred on a night approach in a snowstorm, injured 25 of the 138 passengers and crew on Air Canada flight 624 from Toronto. On its cleared localiser-only approach to runway 05 the crew was using the flight path angle mode of the flight management system to control the descent profile. But because of a strong crosswind from the left, the aircraft drifted below the intended descent profile relative to the runway and the crew did not notice that the aircraft was getting low too soon. Eventually it struck power lines and then runway approach lights short of the runway threshold. The TSB's final accident report, released on 18 May, attributes the accident partly to Air Canada's standard operating procedures, which did not require pilots to monitor altitude and distance from the runway when the aircraft was beyond the final approach fix and using the flight path angle guidance mode.
Air Canada A320 drifted below descent profile and struck power lines and approach lights
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In this mode the crew selects the angle of descent in degrees, but if wind variation or turbulence causes the aircraft’s glidepath to drop beneath the intended one relative to the runway threshold, the autopilot just continues to fly the same descent angle. In addition, despite a request from the crew, airport control tower staff were preoccupied with other airport movements and did not set the approach lights to maximum, the TSB report adds. The pilots saw lights at the minimum descent altitude, but not sufficient visual cues to make a landing decision, and continued the approach, expecting the lights to become clearer, then realised too late that they were low. The TSB says: "Although they initiated a go-around immediately, the aircraft struck terrain short of the runway." Passengers evacuated the damaged aircraft via slides.
WestJet Boeing 737-600, Montreal, Canada, June 2015
A wet runway coupled with errors by the flight crew caused a WestJet Boeing 737-600 to overrun the 9,600ft runway 24L at Montreal Trudeau International airport on 5 June 2015, a new Canadian Transportation Safety Board investigation report concludes. But because there was a good runway end safety area (RESA), no passengers suffered injuries, and the aircraft escaped damage despite the fact that it left the runway at 39kt and stopped about 75m into the grass. This aircraft landed during a microburst that dumped about 2.5cm (0.98in) of rain within 15min as the WestJet flight crew approached for landing, the report says. A wind speed calculation error caused the crew to approach about 15kt faster than the recommended speed. A soft tailwind and a “slightly high flare” then caused the crew to overshoot the normal touchdown zone. Finally, the pilot stowed the speedbrakes after touchdown at 103kt, despite a rule in the flight manual to keep them deployed until 80kt. Believing they still had enough runway to avoid an overrun, the crew also waited to command maximum reverse thrust until the aircraft was at 85kt with 2,270 feet of runway left.
Virgin Australia ATR 72-600, near Sydney, Australia, February 2014
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) called on manufacturer ATR to carry out an engineering assessment of the pitch control system in the ATR 42 and 72 series, amid concerns that a design flaw may be present. The recommendation was made in the bureau's second interim report on a 20 February 2014 incident in which the crew of a Virgin Australia ATR 72-600 (VH-FVR) made strong opposite inputs to the pitch controls, leading to a “pitch disconnect”, which uncoupled the left and right controls to the elevators. This resulted in potentially catastrophic damage to the aircraft's horizontal stabiliser, while a cabin crew member was seriously injured by the aerodynamic loads generated during the event. However, the stabiliser damage was not detected for five days, after which the aircraft was grounded for several months before returning to service. In the earlier phases of its investigation, the ATSB identified "transient elevator deflections during a pitch disconnect event that could lead to aerodynamic loads that could exceed the strength of the aircraft structure”. The ATSB's second report follows greater analysis of ATR's design for the pitch control mechanisms and their performance during a pitch disconnect event. In December last year, ATR undertook an assessment of the short-term risks with the system. This concluded that the system was safe, as the ultimate loads could not be exceeded through the control column, and that the probability of a similar event happening was low. Nonetheless ATR plans to update the operating manuals of its aircraft to warn pilots of the risks involved in making large flight control inputs.
Shaheen Air Boeing 737-400, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, September 2015
Investigators report that a Shaheen Air Boeing 737-400 crew failed to pay sufficient attention to their taxi route before the aircraft inadvertently departed from a taxiway at Sharjah. The aircraft (AP-BJR) had been bound for Bacha Khan in Pakistan on 24 September 2015, and had been cleared to runway 30, but it took off from the runway’s parallel taxiway in the darkness.
True Aviation Antonov An-26, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, March 2016
A True Aviation Antonov An-26 suffered an initial loss of power at 43kt (80km/h) during its 9 March 2016 take-off roll from Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, and investigators believe the freighter's crew should have rejected take-off at that point. After becoming airborne, the aircraft fatally stalled during attempts to return to the departure airport. Ukrainian analysts assisting the probe found the left engine suffered a loss of oil pressure, but the take-off on runway 35 continued and the aircraft lifted off, at about 105-108kt, before the oil-pressure reduction continued and the engine was feathered and shut down. The aircraft (S2-AGZ) initially attempted a return to the reciprocal runway 17, according to the navigator, the only survivor among the four crew members. Unable to align with runway 17, the An-26 flew downwind at a height of about 1,000ft and a speed of some 162kt. Bangladesh's Aircraft Accident Investigation Group indicates the aircraft then tried to land on runway 25 and says the aircraft was fully configured for landing and "stable" at 3.5nm. The captain, however, elected to execute a go-around at 1.2nm for "reasons unknown", the inquiry says.
MyCargo Airlines Boeing 747-400F, Bishkek, Kyrgystan, January 2017
Pilots of the MyCargo Airlines Boeing 747-400F which crashed at Bishkek on 16 January 2017 were given several warnings that the aircraft was not following the correct approach path before it overshot the airport and hit terrain during a late go-around attempt, according to Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK). The glideslope deviation indicator was showing the “full down” position, MAK states, indicating that the jet was “significantly” above the descent path. But the approach, conducted in darkness and fog, remained uncorrected. The 747 was still in level flight at 3,400ft when it passed the outer marker, which should have been overflown at 2,800ft according to the approach chart. Although the aircraft began to descend shortly after crossing the outer marker, this was the result of an inadvertent capture of the false 9° glideslope “reflection” from the ILS. The aircraft then passed over the middle marker (MM) – situated 0.6nm before the runway threshold – and, again, this was signalled on the pilots’ displays. The MM was supposed to be overflown at an altitude of 2,290ft above sea level – or 235ft above airfield elevation – but it was passing 3,300ft at that point. The late descent meant the aircraft overflew the entire length of the 4,200m runway. The glideslope deviation indicator was “fluctuating” by four dots either side of neutral, MAK says. It adds that, after the false glideslope capture, the aircraft issued a series of cautionary alerts. Some 20s before impact the EGPWS was triggered five times, issuing alerts on glideslope deviation. Although the crew attempted a missed approach after failing to sight the runway at decision height, belated execution of the go-around resulted in the 747’s striking rising ground beyond the end of the landing runway.
Dana Air Boeing MD-83, Lagos, Nigeria, June 2012
Despite a five-year investigation into the 3 June 2012 Dana Air Boeing MD-83 (5N-RAM) crash, the precise reason for the engine thrust reduction that triggered the accident sequence cannot be proved. The aircraft came down on final approach to Lagos airport after the crew failed to deal effectively with a lack of response to commanded thrust from its Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines, a fault that had been evident earlier in the flight but which the captain failed to take seriously. Nigeria’s Accident Investigation Bureau has been able to highlight similarities in symptoms to an incident involving another Dana MD-83 crew shortly after take-off from Port Harcourt. The Port Harcourt flight – conducted some 17 months after the Lagos crash – had been climbing through 14,000ft when its left-hand engine suffered a loss of power, staying at idle thrust and failing to respond to throttle movement. Slow spool-up of the engine had been observed on previous sectors, the inquiry says. It says the engine had been overhauled six months earlier, at US-based Millennium Engine Associates, and after the incident the engine underwent technical examination at a different maintenance station, FJ Turbine Power, which found that one of the two fuel manifolds had been improperly installed.
A loss of engine thrust and poor airmanship contributed to the Dana Air crash at Lagos
EPA/REX/Shutterstock
Fuel inlet-tube fatigue had been addressed by a service bulletin – issued in 2003 – which was designed to provide a more robust tube material, but the modification work had not been carried out on the failed engine from the Port Harcourt aircraft (5N-SAI). While fuel-line fractures had been found on the Port Harcourt jet, the inquiry says it has been “unable to confirm” any leaks or restrictions to the fuel supply to either engine in the crashed Lagos aircraft, owing to the crush and fracture damage of the fuel feed lines to the manifold. It has not been able to find “incontrovertible” evidence as to why the crashed aircraft should have suffered inadequate fuel flow. The inquiry did not have access to flight-data recorder information, and an audio-spectrum analysis by Pratt & Whitney proved inconclusive. Poor airmanship from the crew of a Dana Air Boeing MD-83 contributed to its fatal crash, claim investigators, who uncovered substantial weaknesses in the carrier’s hiring and training procedures. The aircraft suffered a loss of thrust in both engines on short final and crashed in a built-up area, killing all 153 people on board and six on the ground.
Singapore Airlines Boeing 777-300ER, Singapore, June 2016
Singapore’s Transport Safety Investigation Bureau reports that a cracked fuel/oil heat exchanger in the General Electric GE90 engine was the cause of a wing fire on a Singapore Airlines Boeing 777-300ER on 27 June 2016. Two hours into a flight from Singapore to Milan, the crew observed a low oil indication for the right engine of the aircraft (9V-SWB), which was shortly followed by vibrations in the control column and the cockpit floor. The crew decided to return to Singapore. Upon landing, the right wing burst into flames. The engine was severely damaged by the fire, and it was determined that a fault in the main fuel/oil heat exchanger had caused the accident. Separate flows of oil and fuel pass through the unit, the oil warming the fuel, which cools the oil. Examination showed that an internal leak had occurred between the two paths, owing to a “cracked and displaced” fuel flow tube. At the request of fire services, which took several minutes to fully extinguish the blaze, the crew did not order an evacuation using the emergency slides. After the fire was put out, all aboard exited via air stairs. None of the aircraft’s 241 passengers was injured.
Sun Way IIyushin II-76TD, Karachi, Pakistan, November 2010
Investigators probing the 27 November 2010 fatal crash of a Sun Way Ilyushin Il-76TD heavy freighter (4L-GNI) in Karachi have determined that the aircraft had been operating beyond its approved service life when it suffered an uncontained engine failure at take-off. Analysis of the Georgian-registered aircraft’s dynamics, using flight-data recorder information, indicates it had taken off with a weight of 195t, in excess of the 190t recommended in the flight crew operations manual. The outboard right-hand Soloviev D-30 engine sustained a second-stage low-pressure compressor disk failure after the jet took off from runway 25L. The Pakistan Safety Investigation Board’s examination of the control inputs suggest the aircraft must have sustained extensive damage during the engine explosion and subsequent fuel fire. The inquiry believes the Il-76 received damage to its flaps, and lost lift on the outer half of the wing. The aircraft banked 71° to the right, despite full deflection of ailerons and strong rudder input, and struck the ground about 1min after lifting off. None of the eight occupants of the freighter survived the crash, and the fatalities also included three people on the ground. The lack of airline maintenance records has led the inquiry to conclude that all four engines were being operated “beyond the service life” established by the powerplant manufacturer, and that the manufacturer had “not approved” a life extension.
Aerosucre Colombia Boeing 727-200F, Puerto Carreno, Colombia, December 2016
Colombian investigators have determined that the crew of an Aerosucre Colombia Boeing 727-200 freighter (HK-4544) departed Puerto Carreño – operating as an uncontrolled aerodrome at the time – with a tailwind. The aircraft overran the runway, striking a perimeter fence, then became airborne despite suffering damage, and then the crew lost control and the aircraft crashed in a field. The inquiry into the 20 December 2016 accident states that the crew was apparently “unaware” of the wind velocity. Colombian accident investigation authority GRIAA says meteorological data showed the wind from 010° at 8kt, which would have favoured a take-off from 07 but the 727 headed instead to runway 25. The temperature was 31C, airport elevation is 54m and it has a runway length of 1,800m. Investigators state that the aircraft’s V1 and rotation speeds were 127kt. Video images show the aircraft overran the runway end, hit a perimeter fence and struck a small structure and a tree which sheared off the right main landing-gear and the starboard inboard flap. Cockpit-voice recorder information shows the crew realised the starboard engine had lost thrust and hydraulic pressure. The 727 managed to climb to 790ft but entered a slow turn to the right, with its bank angle increasing to 60°. It remained airborne for about 2min but its airspeed bled away, and it struck the ground about 4nm from the threshold of runway 07. One of the six occupants of the freighter survived the crash.
Download the full accidents and incidents January-June 2017 listing here
Source: FlightGlobal.com
