If Germany refuses to change its stance on programmes such as the A400M, it may find itself left out of international projects
Germany's long struggle to meet its partners' requirements to join the Airbus Military Company A400M development programme may effectively end this week, for good or for ill. Industry and the eight participating governments are at least hopeful that a solution will be found, and that 1 February will see the start of the transport aircraft's development programme. If this does not happen, 1 February will enter the annals of aviation history as the day Europe's attempt to build a large transport aircraft finally fell apart.
Berlin is establishing a poor reputation as an international collaborative partner, with its serial funding problems - Eurofighter (with Italy, Spain and the UK), the Medium Extended Air Defence System (Italy and the USA), the German/Italian replacement maritime patrol aircraft, the production go-ahead for the NH Industries NH90 (France, Italy, the Netherlands) - and other political machinations.
The requirement to fund the A400M is not the result of a sudden change in programme schedules: as one exasperated member of the industry team says: "It's not exactly a surprise - they've been talking for 15 years."
While every country has a responsibility to spend its taxpayers' money wisely, Germany has made a habit of making its partners' lives difficult. It is clear that one element of the problem is the German government's desire to ensure that the money it spends on defence has maximum impact on employment levels and industrial base.
Unfortunately, this complicates the approvals process, and leads to criticism from partners and competitors alike that these programmes have no relevance to Germany's real defence needs.
The A400M is a good example. While every partner - with the possible exception of France - has probably been guilty of overstating the requirement at some stage to secure workshare, Germany has been accused of maintaining this stance even after the participants firmed up their needs in 2000.
There are plenty of industry observers who believe the reason for funding only 40 A400Ms is that this is the required number of transports. Like Germany, France and Turkey are intending to replace Transall C-160s with the A400M.France, which has significant overseas commitments, has 66 C-160s (and 14 Lockheed MartinC-130 Hercules) and has ordered 50 A400Ms. Turkey has 20 examples of the elderly twin turboprop transport and wants 10 A400Ms. Germany has 83 Transalls, and wants almost as many A400Ms.
As well as irritating its partners, joining programmes on the basis of workshare lends some credence to US claims that the A400M and other European defence projects are make-work schemes and back-door subsidies for the continent's aerospace manufacturers. This position is clearly aimed at securing sales for US-built products and maintaining the US workforce - but it does have the makings of a persuasive argument.
Perhaps someone in Berlin should also consider the impact on German manufacturers. Is the government's position doing more harm than good? EADS, the French/German/ Spanish aerospace giant, is looking to secure deals with many other companies. Are there discussions in the boardrooms of potential partners questioning why the German government feels the need to ensure the survival of its national industry?
Germany has a well-respected and highly efficient aerospace industry that is more than capable of competing for work in international programmes off its own bat. There is no reason why German companies should not follow the lead of those in the UK which have been selected for the US-led Joint Strike Fighter programme on their own merits. As a result, UK companies have around 15% of the JSF programme, though the UK government's contribution to the funding is only 8%.
When Italy withdrew from the A400M, one of the charges levelled at Rome was that it was not a "good European". But surely being a good European is about more than sustaining national jobs - it is about ensuring truly competitive, uncompromised equipments capable of being measured against the best that the rest of the world can produce.
If Germany continues in the same vein, then it is very possible that it will no longer be invited to participate in international programmes, and this could mean that potential partners no longer consider German companies as potential team-mates. And if that happens, Berlin may well find it impossible to sustain industrial capability and jobs.
Source: Flight International
