When governments make defence cuts they ought to consider the side effects. Realistically, however, they do not, even though the full impact of their decisions can decimate and reorientate a complex organisation, throwing it out of balance. In practice they declare the cuts, then trust the military leadership to pick up the pieces and make the weakened defence machine work.
One of the casualties of change, especially cuts in personnel or equipment - or of continually deferring decisions to replace obsolete equipment - can be military flight safety. Failure to consider this can cost money in lost aircraft and the lives of expensively trained aircrew. And that is only the most obvious effect. A report by the US Navy Office of Information on the USN's aviation cutbacks crystallises the less immediately visible problems caused by economising: "The cost of doing business, as one squadron commander puts it," says the report, "is not working our people until they drop, but rather working them until they leave in frustration." This includes engineers as much as aircrew.
The macho, "can do" attitude of servicemen and women is a part of their personality. It is part of the reason why they were chosen for their jobs, and it is a part of the culture which gives the services their sense of identity. But only a part.
Service morale is a delicate thing. A battering from an enemy can be used, by a good military leader of well-trained soldiers, sailors or airmen, to increase the determination of the troops. A battering from the country you serve - or more precisely its government - can have a devastating effect on morale. It feels like betrayal, especially if the battering consists of a series of seemingly never-ending cuts. Experienced personnel give up and leave, taking their training with them and diluting the experience levels of the remaining units, increasing safety risks.
Source: Flight International