When will the phoney war end for Raytheon and Matra BAe in the fight for the RAF's active radar guided missile? Douglas Barrie/LONDON
Transatlantic battle has yet to be fully engaged between the major US and European air to air missile houses - Raytheon and Matra BAe Dynamics - for the Royal Air Force's £850 million ($1.4 billion) requirement for a next generation medium range weapon for the Eurofighter EF2000.
Part of the reason for their relatively low-key approach is the uncertainty surrounding the UK Ministry of Defence's Staff Requirement (Air) 1239 for the purchase of a successor to the British Aerospace Dynamics Skyflash weapon arming the Panavia Tornado F3.
BIG MISSILE BUSINESS
That it is worth the European team engaging in battle is beyond question. The medium range missile market is estimated by US consultancy house Teal Group to be worth $9.6 billion over the next 10 years. While there is no doubt that the EF2000 will be equipped with an active radar-guided, beyond visual range air to air missile (BVRAAM), there is concern that the UK Government's strategic defence review (SDR) could have a negative impact on the project. Sources close to the project are worried that the programme could be put back.
The initial in-service date given for the BVRAAM in 1995 was 2003. In just three years, that has slipped back four years to 2007. There are stage whispers that the project could be further delayed, at least as far as fulfilling the entire requirement is concerned.
Another concern is that the SDR could effectively recommend putting an end to the competitive procurement approach favoured by the previous government and opt to move to a "no acceptable price, no contract" (NAPNOC) position. This would effectively see a choice between either the Raytheon-led team, offering variants of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), or Matra BAe Dynamics' Meteor, without recourse to a full-blown competitive process.
Industry insiders believe that if a NAPNOC approach was adopted it would favour Raytheon, since such a move would be driven primarily by development cost concerns.
Underpinning this is believed to be a revised analysis of what was euphemistically known as the "Red threat".
In the late 1980s, Vympel, the Soviet Union's premiere air to air missile house, was in the final stages of developing the active radar-guided R-77 (AA-12 Adder). It was also working on extended range derivatives of the missile, using combined rocket/ramjet propulsion. The basic R-77 is credited with a maximum engagement range of around 90km (50nm), with a rocket/ramjet variant offering an extended range of 160km. Had the R-77 followed a traditional Soviet procurement path, the baseline missile would by now have been in widespread service, with the rocket/ramjet variant at least nearing service entry. As it is, even the basic R-77 has yet to be confirmed as having entered series production and, while test firings of the rocket/ramjet configuration have been carried out, its immediate future remains unclear.
Not surprisingly, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the concomitant collapse of Vympel's order book, production plan, et al.
THE ADDER EFFECT
Vympel, and the Russian air force, were faced with either having their primary radar guided AAM manufactured offshore - production of the R-77 was destined for Kiev in Ukraine - or uprooting the production line to within Russian territory. It chose the latter, with the result that Vympel struggled to establish a production capability in Moscow. To compound the problem of having to shift the production line some 750km, Vympel was faced with having to do this with little, if any, money from the defence ministry. As a result, the R-77's projected in-service date has slipped significantly, as has that of its extended range derivative.
As the threat posed by R-77 is the primary motive behind the RAF's BVRAAM, the trials and tribulations of the former have inevitably had an impact on the latter.
The R-77, however, is expected to make its service debut before the end of the century, though perhaps not with the Russian air force. Regional sources suggest that the Royal Malaysian Air Force will take delivery of production R-77s for its MIGMAPOMiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircraft no later than 1999. Russian industry sources, meanwhile, claim that the R-77 will be delivered to China by 2000.
The re-evaluation of the R-77's in-service date, as well as that of the rocket/ramjet missile, has led to a re-examination of the basic requirements enshrined in SR(A)1239. Raytheon and Matra BAe were awarded project definition and risk reduction (PDRR) study contracts in 1997. These have turned out to be moving targets, as the MoD reconsidered the timescale and technical specification for the BVRAAM.
Both teams are now working towards submitting revised PDRR best and final offers by the end of May. Some in the MoD are leaning towards a "graduated response" to meeting the full original requirement. This is in part driven by expediency, given the need to address the disparity between expectations that the RAF's first EF2000 squadron will be declared operational by 2004, while the BVRAAMmight not enter service until 2007. It is inconceivable that the RAFwould deploy the EF2000 in the air superiority role armed only with the imaging infra-red guided Matra BAe Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile, and not an active radar-guided BVRweapon.
The MoD must either attempt to expedite the full SR(A)1239 programme to meet the 2004 in-service date or, more likely, opt for the interim solution of fielding the EF2000 with the AIM-120B until the BVRAAM - whatever it may be - is ready to enter service.
Although the MoD may be forced into an interim solution, it remains committed - budget allowing - to meeting the full SR(A)1239 requirement eventually.
One of the most challenging aspects of SR(A)1239 is the kinematic requirement of the end-game engagement. Project sources say that computer-simulated engagements, coupled with mock AIM-120 battles during Red Flag air combat exercises in the USA, have highlighted the need for enhanced missile performance in run-down engagements.
The run-down scenario can be typified by a BVR engagement, where both aircraft are within BVR missile launch range, but at the outer edge of the missile performance envelope, with the "red" aircraft rapidly escaping immediately after launching an R-77 class missile. This leaves the AMRAAM having to close on a rapidly retreating target. With an AIM-120B- type missile, sources suggest that the target aircraft may successfully outrun the AAM because the missile lacks sufficient energy to prosecute the terminal phase of the engagement.
While a single shot miss, given that all things are equal between the "red" and "blue" aircraft, is of no great consequence, other real-world factors militate against this. Not least of these is the substantial combat persistence of aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker.
The EF2000 is normally illustrated as carrying four BVRAAMs, semi-recessed on its fuselage stations. In comparison, the Su-27M can carry eight BVR-class weapons on the inboard wing and fuselage stations. Using an engage/disengage/re-engage tactic, the Su-27 pilot would deplete the EF2000's BVR missile warload well before the Su-27's potential stock of R-77s. Providing the EF2000 with a BVR missile that had a run-down capability much greater than the AMRAAM would preclude this kind of tactic.
Threat analysis of the R-77 continues to play a key role in determining the shape of SR(A)1239. This analysis, however, is complicated by the potential for SR(A)1239 to evolve into a multi-national programme.
Germany, Italy and Sweden also need a next generation medium range AAM. There are continuing attempts to build a European programme using the RAF requirement as the cornerstone. In some quarters, a European procurement programme is also viewed as a means to further restructure guided weapons manufacturers. Preaching the rhetoric of European consolidation is easy: the reality of pan-European procurement more difficult.
EYES ON, HANDS OFF
One procurement source suggests the UK MoD is pursuing an "eyes on, hands off approach about potential European partners for SR(A)1239". While the UK wants a financial commitment from partner nations on a BVRAAM procurement, it is apparently unwilling to allow for its requirement to be altered, or its independent selection to be challenged.
Not surprisingly, this has led to friction with potential partners. Germany, Sweden and Italy are keen to pursue a European programme built around Matra BAe, Daimler-Benz Aerospace's missile arm LFK (now part owned by Matra BAe) and Saab. They are disinclined to hand their future BVR weapon requirements to the USA, unless this is unavoidable.
Before joining what became christened the Meteor team, LFK was working on its own active radar guided rocket/ramjet missile, dubbed the A3M. There are indications that, despite joining the Matra BAe-led team, the company continues to shadow the Meteor programme through at least keeping the A3M design ticking over. It remains to be determined whether LFK is merely looking to leverage the best possible deal out of Matra BAe, or if the A3M constitutes a fallback position should the UK MoD decision go against the Meteor.
Some European sources suggest that the A3M design would be revived should the UK opt for an AMRAAM-based answer to SR(A)1239. Germany, Italy and Sweden could push ahead with a collaborative European programme, irrespective of the UK's position. Such a scenario can hold little comfort for Matra BAe.
One of the arguments of European advocates is that the Eurofighter partner nations do not want to be in the thrall of the USA for the aircraft's primary air to air weapon, given that competition between the EF2000 and US combat aircraft in the export arena is certain.
HOSTAGE TO FORTUNE
Proponents of this line were gifted a further arrow for their quivers in February when the US State Department blocked British Aerospace and Saab's efforts to sell the JAS39 Gripen light fighter to South Africa. The USA has a restriction order on South Africa's Armscor as a consequence of the latter's embargo breaking activities during the apartheid era. As the Gripen is powered by a General Electric engine manufactured under licence, the US Government has the ability to shackle BAe and Saab's export efforts.
The USA at the beginning of March lifted its embargo, once again clearing the way for the JAS39 to be offered. It also opens the door, however, to both Lockheed Martin and Boeing to push their respective fighter offerings in the shape of the F-16 and the F/A-18.
Advocates of the Meteor solution for SR(A)1239 maintain that purchasing an AIM-120, or a derivative of it, for the EF2000 would leave partner nations vulnerable to the vagaries of US foreign policy.
They point to Sweden's attempts to sell the JAS39 to Finland, maintaining that its efforts were hampered by difficulties in offering the AIM-120 as part of the weapons package. The Finnish air force purchased the F/A-18.
US sources counter that the issue is not about trying to cripple European export efforts, but protecting the US Department of Defense's (DoD) investment in AMRAAM development. Seeker development costs alone ran to $1 billion, involving over 90 test shots of prototype weapons.
Within the Meteor team, GEC-Marconi has the lead on active-radar seeker development. GEC's agreement with Matra BAe is described by sources as "exclusive", though it comes under occasional scrutiny for renewal. Should it become apparent that the UK MoD is leaning toward Raytheon, there will be both internal and external pressure for GEC to shift its allegiance. GEC involvement would also significantly improve the price credibility of UK-made Raytheon missiles.
US sources maintain that the UK, and Europe should it wish, is effectively being offered a leg-up in terms of active radar-guided missile technology. One source says: "In developmental terms, the USA is a decade ahead, so the UK and Europe can either spend money simply catching up, or we can collaborate, allowing them to catch up cheaper."
Given the budgetary pressures on UK defence expenditure, the attractions of cashing in on a US programme, rather than funding a European project from a standing start, should not be underestimated. In terms of procurement numbers, it is almost beyond argument that the RAF would be able to buy more rounds of an AIM-120-based missile than that of a Meteor.
These same sources also maintain that there is a continuing transatlantic dialogue about the potential for a collaborative US/UK programme to address the RAF's requirements and the needs of the US Air Force and Navy for a weapon with a greater kinematic capability than that of the AIM-120B/C.
While the USAF has no open requirement for an extended range AMRAAM derivative, the reasons for this are couched in terms of protecting the future of the Lockheed Martin/ Boeing F-22A Raptor air superiority fighter.
With the F-22A vulnerable to the vagaries of Congressional funding whims, the USAF is shy of openly pushing for funding for a programme to enhance the F-22's air to air capabilities, having originally sold the aircraft on the basis of its air supremacy characteristics when armed with the AIM-120C.
The USAF has presented the F-22 as having a "first look, first shot, first kill" capability with the AIM-120C, but the service does not want to test Congress' patience by pushing for a more capable missile than the AIM-120C before the Raptor enters service.
The US Navy lacks a low observable combat aircraft in the class of the F-22, so potentially it needs a weapon with a greater capability than the AMRAAM. It appears, however, to have ceded the long range air superiority mission to the USAF. Given this operational emphasis, pushing through an extended range AMRAAM procurement may not be high on the wish list.
USAF OPTIONS
The USAF, however, will, like its naval counterpart, retain in its inventory well into the next century combat aircraft which have not been designed from the outset with low observable characteristics in mind. Aircraft such as the Boeing F-15C and the Lockheed Martin F-16C are prime candidates to be equipped with an expanded envelope AIM-120. Passing off such a development programme in the guise of a USA/UK collaboration (or more optimistically, USA/Europe) has clear attractions.
While a US/UK development programme built around the AIM-120 has obvious political benefits, there are disadvantages to such an approach at industrial level which need to be considered.
A transatlantic collaboration would effectively cede dominance of the Western medium range AAM market to Raytheon, with elements of the UK industry hanging on its coat-tail. Teal Group estimates that the AIM-120 will capture nearly 60% of medium range AAM production over the 10 years. Russian AAMs will take the next largest slice, at nearly 16%, while Matra BAe's Mica will capture 5.6% of the market.
The pressure to consolidate the European missile sector was clearly evinced in one recent UK guided weapons procurement. The RAF's conventionally armed stand-off missile programme was awarded to Matra BAe Dynamics in 1996, in part as a benediction on the nascent joint venture.
The French Government threatened that, without the UK selecting the Matra BAe Storm Shadow stand-off missile, it would not approve the marriage. Its gamble paid off, with the UK apparently unwilling to call its bluff. The Storm Shadow was selected, despite it not coming top in the evaluation process.
A further complication is the position of the UK's main guided weapons house, Matra BAe. The European company has a business relationship with Hughes, since being acquired by Raytheon, on its Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM). The ASRAAM, or AIM-132, and AIM-120 formed two elements of the abortive NATO Family of Weapons memorandum of understanding (MoU).
Under this MoU, thrashed out in the early 1980s, the US was to develop an active radar-guided BVR missile, the AIM-120, while the UK and Germany would develop the imaging infra-red guided AIM-132.
The aim of the Family of Weapons programme, as it was referred to, was intended to "avoid duplication of development." The execution of the project left much to be desired, however. The MoU unravelled in the late 1980s amid recriminations over bad faith.
Despite this, even in the final throes of ironing out the joint venture with Matra, BAe continued to consider the alternative of a full transatlantic missile partnership with Hughes. While the US DoD would have little difficulty in allowing the BAe element of Matra BAe access to any AIM-120 development project to meet SR(A)1239, Washington sources claim there is considerably greater reticence when it comes to the Matra element.
Putting it bluntly, there appears to be a lack of trust, justifiable or not, on the Pentagon's part when it comes to dealing with Matra.
Should SR(A)1239 proceed, while it is perfectly conceivable Raytheon will be selected, or that a US/UK joint programme will emerge, a programme without Matra BAe involvement is harder to imagine.
The UK's previous Conservative Government may have been willing to brazen out the clamour following a US missile purchase, resting on the defence of competitive procurement. The Labour Government may be less inclined to follow this path. It is also making more appeasing noises toward collaboration on a European procurement approach. If a Raytheon solution is preferable, there will inevitably be political pressure to find some role for Matra BAe.
With the UK MoD pushing to announce the results of the SDR before Parliament's July recess, the phoney war between Raytheon and Matra BAe is liable to turn hot later this year. That is assuming, of course, that the requirement emerges relatively intact from the review.
Source: Flight International
