There is no denying the enforcement of international aviation safety standards has become fragmented. But amid concern that Icao member states have allowed a policy vacuum to develop, the US has been cast into the uncomfortable role of a global police force. The European Union and individual states, such as Australia, are close behind with their own programmes.
The industry agrees that such duplication is wasteful and that a coordinated approach, through Icao, is needed to maintain and improve international safety standards. Icao has convened a conference on the subject in November. This could be the largest test so far of the organisation's credibility. 'We will eliminate the need for one state to assess another,' says Assad Kotaite, president of the Icao Council.
Icao's Safety Oversight Programme (SOP), launched in 1994, is widely viewed as weak owing to a lack of resources, its reliance on voluntary assessment by member states and the non-disclosure of results. 'You don't need a neighbourhood watch system if you can trust the police,' says Claude Probste, aviation safety overseer at the European Commission. 'At the moment the US and the EU feel they have to do something to protect their own citizens. It's not just a question of money but of changing Icao to make it a watchdog.'
As a result Icao's position as the international arbiter of safety standards has been overtaken by the US. The FAA's International Aviation Safety Assessment Programme (Iasa), also launched in 1994, has become the public face of airline safety oversight, partly due to the vocal protests by a number of Latin American states that they had been victimised.'The assessment programme is not something the FAA wanted to get into,' says Tom Stuckey, acting director for flight safety services at the agency. '[But] as others do more we'll do less.'
Stuckey says the FAA approached Icao in 1992 to carry out a global audit after its own survey of states operating services into the US found that only two thirds met minimum Icao safety standards. Icao said no. 'We were all staggered to discover that [these] countries surveyed didn't meet the Icao standards. It was much more than anyone believed,'adds Ron Ashford, former head of the European Joint Aviation Authority and an independent safety consultant.
By mid August 1997 the FAA had assessed the oversight regime and infrastructure of 103 of the 104 states operating services into the US (India is still under review). The FAA system evaluates the safety oversight system of each country, rather than the safety of individual airlines.
The methodology is simple: those which meet Icao standards are classed as Category 1 and allowed to operate freely under their bilateral. Those which receive a conditional acceptance (Category 2) have to work with the FAA to rectify any shortcomings during which time capacity is frozen. Those countries which fail to meet Icao minimum standards are classed as Category 3 and cannot operate to the US (see table).
The category system has attracted criticism. 'If we'd done it again I wish we had not come up with categories. A CAA either meets Icao standards or it does not,' admits a senior FAA official. 'Category 2 has become in some people's eyes something of a sanction,' he adds. Stuckey concedes there is a problem which he says stems from a misunderstanding that the FAA is trying to present a sliding scale of safety. The category system is likely to be dropped as a result of the current review of Iasa.
As a professional diplomat Kotaite is all too sensitive to charges of inaction levelled at the agency's member states. He rejects suggestions that the November conference has been convened in response to the perceived success of the FAA. 'This is not a consequence of the FAA action,' he says. 'It's not a question of competition [between agencies] though we welcome any activity that can improve safety.' Privately Icao staffers concede that the outcome of the November meeting will test the credibility of the organisation as an enforcement agency.
Kotaite has strong support for enhancing the SOP from the US, the EU and a number of other states. 'What the FAA wants to do is help support Icao to do more and make the process more meaningful,' says Stuckey. 'I am optimistic we can get there.' However, there is still a yawning gap between what Icao and its supporters would like to achieve and what can be squeezed through the diplomatic logjam that is the Icao Council.
The third international programme currently operated is the EU's Safety Assessment of Foreign Airlines (Safa) initiative run by Ecac. Safa started out in 1994 as a European effort to support the SOP rather than as an independent measure. However perceptions that Icao was not moving quickly enough and the high profile of the Birgenair accident in 1996 led to a revamp.
Unlike the US and Icao programmes, Safa is based on assessments of airlines and aircraft operating into the EU rather than scrutiny of national authorities.The latter was viewed as contrary to the Chicago Convention and considered likely to undermine the future progress of the SOP.
Safa is conducted on a voluntary basis by the 33 Ecac members, which will conduct ramp checks when there is evidence or a suspicion that a carrier is failing to meet Icao standards. In June the Commission submitted a draft directive proposing a coordinated approach to the monitoring of aircraft operating into the EU and a database of 'problem' aircraft, airlines and countries to be available to all Ecac members.
The development of safety oversight policy in Europe has also been subject to some of the bureaucratic inertia experienced at Icao. The Commission's stance was outlined in a June 1996 paper entitled Defining a Community Aviation Safety Improvement Strategy. 'Since then the Council has not really worked on it,' concedes Claude Probste. The Commission also proposed targets for states to provide resources, oversight and information but this was rejected by the Council last June. The Council also rejected the concept of joint action, including sanctions, by member states against countries which failed assessments, and said any action should be decided by member states alone.
The joint action proposal will be debated by the European parliament in November and Commission officials hope the sensitive public profile of aviation safety will lead to the parliament reviving the plans for joint action. The Commission also proposes to oversee EU-registered aircraft by creating a pan-European aviation safety authority through the JAA, equivalent to the US National Transportation Safety Board.
Despite the apparent widespread support for the concept of an enhanced SOP, with monitoring and enforcement at an Icao level, confidence that this can be pushed through the Icao Council (and properly researched) is not widespread. Hence Europe and the US continue to refine their own programmes. While this could contribute to an improved global initiative it also leaves them with the independent capability to meet their own concerns.
The central aim of the conference is to establish a co-ordinated strategy which combines the best features of existing oversight programmes. But Icao will have to face the reluctance of some member states to concede sovereignty over aviation safety.
By August 1997 Icao had received requests for assessment from 67 of its 185 members and carried out 40 assessments. Kotaite says the remaining 27 should be completed by the end of the year. However the limitations of the voluntary code were illustrated by the 21 states which specifically requested that no assessment be conducted. Of these only 14 have been accepted as Category 1 by the FAA.
Kotaite has had to tread a delicate diplomatic line in setting up the conference, which will focus on licensing, technical operations and airworthiness. He denies that international oversight is becoming fragmented and says Icao has reached agreement with Ecac to support an enhanced SOP despite the advance of Safa.
As well as strengthening the SOP, Icao's executive proposes to extend the programme to cover air traffic control and associated services and facilities, including airport operators. The third initiative, says Kotaite, is the creation of a global database of accidents, flight operations and other data.
Unlike Iasa, Icao does not disclose its results to protect member states' sovereignty, though information is made available on a selective basis. Kotaite says it is difficult to foresee member states agreeing to the public distribution of audit information but adds: 'We should find ways to make the information [more] available.' For the FAA this is viewed as a prerequisite to reducing its public role. 'It should be a mandatory programme and the information should be available to all,' says Stuckey.
The SOP currently relies on a mix of voluntary support in cash and kind as well an allocation from the regular budget. Kotaite would like to see more formal funding in addition to the voluntary aid.
Though states are bound to notify Icao if they fail to meet minimum standards, their failure to do so is still noted from other sources - such as airlines and pilots. 'The Commission thinks that Icao should develop monitoring and enforcement capabilities and the capacity to deal with states that don't comply,' comments Probste.
The final area of debate involves implementation. The main deficiencies found by Icao and the FAA fall into three categories: the lack of a basic air law in some jurisdictions, the policing of the regulations by national authorities, and the Icao requirements themselves. 'There should be a model requirement available picking the best features from each [safety programme] which are most appropriate to each state,' says Ron Ashford.
'It is clear that the Chicago Convention is a bit weak,' adds Claude Probste. We need to develop a better interpretation of what the Convention means in terms of safety oversight. If the basis for enforcement is not the Convention then we should try to squeeze provisions in ASAs.' Kotaite supports the inclusion of 'a model of safety oversight' in international bilateral agreements. 'I don't think there is a lack of political will for this,' he says.
With limited Icao resources the momentum will have to come from the private sector. The European Commission is promoting the creation of Eurosafe, a joint venture between CAA International of the UK, France's Bureau Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd. The Dutch-based venture aims to pool resources of trained inspectors and propose appropriate regulatory frameworks and has signed contracts with India, the Philippines and Mexico. However even Eurosafe sees itself in competition with the 'model civil aviation authority' promoted by the FAA to countries striving for Category 1 status.
Airlines are suffering the brunt of the fragmented approach due to a confusion in customers' eyes between the assessment of an authority and that of the carrier itself: 'There is concern that there appears to be a spread of governments beginning to place their own safety oversight on foreign carriers,' says Robert Peel, technical director at the Asia-Pacific Airline Association.'There is slight bewilderment that one country will carry out an Icao-based assessment and then another will do the same.'
In addition to the three international initiatives, Australia and Germany have also launched their own aircraft-based assessment programmes. Australia's Civil Aviation Authority launched a system of ramp checks for all carriers operating into the country and by August had assessed 38 airlines.
Germany has been the most active promoter of Safa but instituted its own ramp check system of all 'suspect' aircraft due to political pressure after the Birgenair crash. The aircraft had been chartered by a German company and most of the fatalities were German citizens.
Ashok Poduval, assistant director of safety services at Iata, says the association has yet to be invited to give any input to the Icao conference and notes the possibility of confusion being created by a multiple agency approach. However Iata supports the strengthening of Icao's role.
Manufacturers are also being drawn increasingly into the debate. 'This is not our core business but we are being forced into thinking along these lines,' says Wolfgang Didzuhn, vice-president product integrity at Airbus. 'We cannot afford to have an accident as responsibility always falls back to the manufacturer [no matter the cause]. It is always a Boeing or an Airbus crash.'
He supports the integration of the three programmes under Icao auspices but using Safa guidelines. Airbus, like Boeing, is supporting the creation of regional training centres to improve international oversight resources, as well as common documentation to make evaluation less complex.
Icao is promoting its November conference as a watershed in the development of a coordinated global approach to maintaining and improving technical and operating standards. There remains a suspicion that, despite its undoubted commitment to reform and extension of the SOP, some member states will continue to stall progress.
'I don't think the idea of assessment is going to go away,' says one regulator. 'It started in the US and the goal has to be Category 1 for all.' Airlines could yet face the prospect of random inspections in multiple jurisdictions. Passengers may, just for once, be happy to wait.
FAA Category 2 nations:
* Bolivia
* Colombia
* Cote d'Ivoire
* Ecuador
* Guatemala
* Indonesia
* Jamaica
* Kuwait
* Morocco
* Nauru
* Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
* Pakistan
* Philippines
* Trinidad and Tobago
* Turks and Caicos
* Venezuela
FAA Category 3 nations:
* Belize
* Dominican Republic
* Gambia
* Haiti
* Honduras
* Kiribati
* Malta
* Nicaragua
* Paraguay
* Surinam
* Swaziland
* Uruguay
* Zaire
* Zimbabwe
Latin America has had the fiercest debates over FAA assessments but the placement of some fast-growing Asia-Pacific countries in Category 2, preventing expansion, is also stirring discontent. China is believed to have received an unofficial Category 2 rating.
Source: Airline Business
