Andrzej Jeziorski/SEOUL
Korean Air (KAL) executives speaking to the press these days face an unusual dilemma: how can an airline confirm, and simultaneously deny, that it has a problem with its safety culture?
There remains a perceptible reluctance to admit that problems exist within the airline, even while it embarks on reforms targeting these same problems. This echoes the attitude which led the airline to respond to the unauthorised leak of a scathing internal report on its Boeing 747-200 operations earlier this year (Flight International, 14-20 April), by saying the report was "overly critical", "non-constructive", and "too forceful in its insistence and language".
A week afterwards, KAL suffered the latest in a long series of accidents. On 15 April, a Boeing MD-11F freighter crashed after take-off from Shanghai, killing all three crew and other people on the ground.
While still concerned about the effect on employee morale and the airline's image, KAL can no longer avoid admitting that it has a problem. It has suffered 12 serious accidents since 1990, including an unprecedented four hull losses in the 20 months following a 747-300 crash at Guam in August 1997, which killed 229 people.
Within two months last year, KAL suffered seven landing incidents. The airline has been called a national embarrassment by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, slapped with government sanctions, and three major partners - Air Canada, Air France and Delta Air Lines - suspended codeshares after the Shanghai crash.
Chorus of criticism
KAL's top managers defend their flightcrews against a chorus of international criticism that cites an overly hierarchical cockpit culture and a tradition where pilots are reluctant to carry out a missed approach for fear of losing face. Ex-air force pilots in particular are frequently criticised for bringing a military culture of unassailable seniority into KAL cockpits. They are reputed to have trouble delegating responsibility to first officers.
Korean Air's senior pilots are angry at the criticisms. Senior managers - especially the airline's new president Shim Yi-taek - are aware of the risk of morale plunging as a result. "I found that employee morale is one of the most important factors [in engineering a turnaround]," says Shim.
Bill Hardy, KAL vice-president for special projects, says: "I think this cultural thing is really, really overused [by the press]." A Canadian Boeing 747-400 captain who formerly flew with Canadian Airlines and Singapore Airlines, Hardy says there is no reason why KAL's flight operations department should not achieve the same high standards as the best Western airlines. He adds that KAL's cockpit culture today is roughly equivalent to that found in Western airlines 35 years ago.
While Shim insists that Korean captains are no less skillful than their expatriate colleagues, he has placed a high priority on hiring about 200 additional non-Korean captains among the policies he is implementing to turn the airline around.
Shim is implementing a $200 million reform programme, focusing on safety improvements to restore KAL's credibility. The 27-year KAL veteran was brought in from heading KAL's aerospace division in the management upheaval which followed April's MD-11 disaster and a demand from Kim Dae-jung to bring in a "professional" management team to reform the company.
Changes at the top
Shim replaced Cho Yang-ho, who was promoted to chairman, succeeding his father, KAL founder Cho Choong-hoon, who resigned. The changes at the top are supposed to herald a new era in KAL's 30-year history. The Chos were known to run the company in an authoritarian manner and lower-ranking employees reputedly trembled in their presence. Now Shim is trying to bring a friendlier face to the helm of the airline, having introduced the practice of touring departments to speak to staff personally. He says the chairman leaves management decisions entirely to him.
The new president says his management policies are angled at making safety the airline's number one priority. "We fully understand the need for us to regain the confidence of the world's travelling community and our alliance partners," he says. If the airline fails to improve, Shim admits that it will be left "isolated in the airline industry, unable to survive".
"As the industry changes we have to upgrade everything, not only safety but management and everything, to the standards of the world's leading carriers," says Shim.
Part of this approach is the airline's five-year $30 million contract with FlightSafety Boeing, which represents the most extensive outsourcing of flight training ever by any major international carrier. FlightSafety Boeing instructors are checking cockpit crew proficiency every six months, conduct all simulator training and pilot evaluations, assess emergency training procedures and perform all flight training and check rides on newly promoted captains.
Nearly 100 FlightSafety Boeing personnel are being assigned to the KAL contract, which includes a "walk-away" clause after two years. "What I have in mind is that after two years we may put our instructors forward to take [training] over gradually," says Shim.
Before bringing in FlightSafety Boeing, KAL had a $15 million safety consulting deal with its partner Delta, dating back to May 1998. Initially, the US carrier worked to identify areas needing improvement. This became a closer partnership in September, with Delta formally contracted to help develop an operational control centre, improve flight operations and safety training for cabin crews. The University of Texas' Aircrew Research Center is also helping out, shaping a new cockpit resource management (CRM)programme for the airline.
All these partners have their parts to play in Shim's revamp of KAL, which places a clear focus on the cockpit.
From the beginning of July, KAL implemented a new simulator training programme, and doubled the amount of training required "for all Korean Air pilots". This will include courses in decision-making, situational awareness, communication skills and CRM.
CRM is being handled by the Korean Air Human Factors Team, working together with the University of Texas staff. "Cockpit communication and consensus is a key area of training for all KAL flight personnel," says the airline. The Human Factors Team has grown from a staff of two a year ago to 25 today and is adding an error management course to the CRM programme early next year.
KAL first officers will now require 4,000h experience to be eligible for promotion to captain, instead of the previous standard of 3,000h.
The execution of go-arounds on bad weather approaches is being encouraged, in an attempt to erase the procedure's shameful associations in the minds of some of KAL's pilots. Bad weather landing limits have also been tightened, and as a further precaution, enhanced ground proximity warning systems are being installed throughout the fleet.
Poor english skills
The airline is responding to criticisms of KAL pilots' poor English skills by implementing a new English-language training programme for all Korean pilots. Yet some senior airline officials still deny that there is a problem.
Then there is the new recruitment programme, aiming to "nearly triple" the number of expatriate captains at KAL, which employs 115 non-Korean captains. Hardy says that the expatriates will bring with them the benefit of "experience" of Westernised thinking in flight training. "We are not replacing Korean captains with foreign captains," stresses Hardy.
But the recruitment drive has necessitated that Hardy carry out unusual diplomatic visits to other airlines in the region, from whom KAL might be perceived to be trying to poach experienced flightcrews, to maintain good relations. "I think we could see a fairly massive recruitment programme in south-east Asia-[and] we want the airlines to be able to call us and say if it hurts," says Hardy.
Another recruitment policy change has been a move away from the much-criticised ex-military pilots culture. "KAL grew at a remarkable rate during the 1980s and 90s and because of this it had to rely primarily on the Korean military to provide its pilot base. [KAL's] total recruitment of new pilots is now approximately 75% non-military," says the airline.
"Some 10 or 20 years ago we had many military personnel. That was the old story, but it's changed," says Shim. "It is more difficult for older captains to adapt to a new system, but a person who has a more flexible way of thinking can easily adapt to changes," he adds.
In October, KAL will introduce new restrictions on flying hours, meeting US regulations. Pilots will be limited to flying 1,000h a year, and never more than 100h a month.
One of the first measures by Shim was a morale booster for all KAL staff: restoring wages and allowances which were cut by 10% after the Asian economic crisis in 1997.
But to publicise and embark on a reform programme is insufficient to restore confidence in KAL and establish it as a safe airline. The airline has, after all done similar things - albeit not so far reaching - before. A good indicator of success would be the full restoration of its codeshares, because no airline wants a dangerous codeshare partner.
Shim says the agreements with Air France and Delta could be reinstated by the beginning of next year, after the airline assess KAL's progress and a withdrawal of the US Department of Defense ban on its personnel flying with KAL, due for review this month.
Source: Flight International
