AARON KARP / WASHINGTON DC
The USA has been unflagging in its efforts to improve aviation security since 11 September 2001. But is it paying enough attention to freight?
The USA has spent billions of dollars revamping aviation security since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, federalising passenger screeners and mandating that all checked baggage be screened for explosives. But there are growing fears that a large loophole remains - cargo security.
"Almost 22% of all air cargo travels on commercial passenger flights. Virtually none of it is inspected," says US senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, who has led an unsuccessful effort in the US Congress to pass legislation to strengthen cargo screening.
The Airports Council International - North America adds: "The number one challenge for our members and for all airports with any cargo movements continues to be security."
Closing the cargo security gap will not be easy, say officials familiar with the problem. Searching all cargo for explosives would be an enormously expensive and, logistically, a near impossible task. The air cargo industry's viability hinges on the rapid movement of goods throughout the world - a comprehensive explosives screening regime, even if it could be financed, would inevitably slow the system.
The US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has focused its cargo security efforts on what it calls the "known shipper" programme. Under this initiative, any company or freight forwarder wishing to ship cargo by air must have a minimum of two years of shipping history with at least 24 shipments made, or pass an inspection by the TSA.
"Known shipments are considered screened," says the TSA. "Air cargo only comes from companies and forwarders which are regular customers and are familiar to carriers. We have invested heavily in computer programs that monitor and track cargo."
The TSA says it regularly uses undercover agents to attempt to convince carriers to carry goods that do not come from known shippers. It says that 99% of these agents have been turned away. But the known shipper programme is far from foolproof, say critics.
Congressional investigators from the US General Accounting Office (GAO) report: "TSA inspectors have identified vulnerabilities in the security procedures of some air carriers and freight forwarders. Further vulnerabilities have been identified by the aviation industry and government agencies, including possible tampering with freight at various hand-offs that occur from the point when it leaves a shipper to the point when it is loaded on to an aircraft."
After cargo leaves a known shipper or manufacturer, it is almost always transported by one or more trucks and often goes through a freight forwarder's consolidation centre before it reaches an airport sorting facility. At the largest of these facilities, such as United Parcel Service's (UPS) main hub in Louisville, Kentucky, about a million packages a day pass through numerous conveyor belts before being loaded on to aircraft.
Critics say that this leaves multiple opportunities for tampering once the cargo is out of the hands of the known shipper. The GAO points out that the large amount of cargo stolen annually demonstrates how vulnerable the system is to foul play.
The National Cargo Security Council estimates that cargo theft among all modes of transport accounts for more than $10 billion in merchandise losses each year. According to the GAO, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates that most cargo theft in the USA "occurs in cargo terminals, transfer facilities and cargo consolidation areas".
Congressional investigators add: "The Department of Transportation has reported that thefts are often committed by employees or with employee co-operation."
Cargo carriers such as UPS and FedEx hire private firms to provide security for their cargo facilities, and the TSA insists it is taking measures to ensure airport cargo sorting centres are not at risk.
"We don't want anyone to sneak in," says the TSA. "We're on guard for that, let's just put it that way."
But the US air security agency is reluctant to provide details of its cargo security procedures, even in the face of criticism. "We don't want it to even be a perception problem," says the TSA. "But it's a Catch-22 situation because we can't go into details of what we do. Let's just say the known shipper programme is working."
Double standards
Lawmakers such as Hutchinson are not comforted. She claims that identification cards used by cargo workers "are generally not secured by fingerprints or other biometric identifiers, making them easier to counterfeit". She adds: "There is no point in asking travellers to wait in long security lines if we let cargo on to the very same flight with no precautions whatsoever."
The Senate has passed a Hutchinson-sponsored bill that aims to improve cargo security, but the legislation has stalled in the US House of Representatives. The bill would direct cargo handlers to develop security-training programmes and make it more difficult for shippers and freight forwarders to gain certification as known shippers.
It would also require all-cargo carriers to develop an approved security plan for their facilities, operations, cargo and personnel. Carriers would have to conduct stringent, government-cleared background checks for all employees with access to operations.
One way to ensure explosives-laded cargo would not destroy aircraft is to carry it in blast-resistant containers. The TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration are conducting tests on such containers, produced by Telair International, but have not yet devised any plan for procuring and installing the equipment.
The FAA certified Telair's Hardened Unit Load Device a year ago, following a series of blast tests. But US airlines, losing money and complaining of high security costs imposed by the government, have been reluctant to purchase the equipment.
The government could conceivably purchase the containers, and the FAA is overseeing a practical assessment of them. Containers have been placed randomly on passenger aircraft to determine whether they are "compatible with existing containers" and are consistent with the operations of airlines.
Telair president Axel Hauner says: "Telair and Teleflex have committed considerable man hours and funding in the effort to design and manufacture a blast-resistant container capable of meeting the FAA test protocol and worthy of consideration by the world's air carriers."
Another concern, particularly of pilots, is that terrorists could hijack an all-cargo aircraft and use it to conduct an attack. Uppermost in pilots' minds is an incident in April 1994 when a FedEx McDonnell Douglas DC-10 was nearly commandeered by an off-duty flight engineer who hid on the aircraft, armed with a hammer.
He attacked the flightcrew, but was eventually overpowered by the pilots. The perpetrator was arrested and convicted of attempted air piracy, but the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) warns that a similar occurrence could happen again if the TSA continues to focus a disproportionate amount of attention on passenger security.
"As you know, terrorists, like water, will seek the least path of resistance," ALPA president Duane Woerth wrote in a letter to the TSA. "Cargo is the current path of least resistance."
ALPA says many airports used by all-cargo aircraft do not have passenger services and therefore have little or no security. The government has mandated that cargo aircraft be fitted with reinforced cockpit doors by 9 April, along with passenger aircraft, but cargo pilots complain that the level of security for all-cargo aircraft is far below that of passenger aircraft.
The TSA concedes security is not perfect. "We're working very diligently to address any weaknesses we have found," says the agency. "We're always improving our system. We are never, never comfortable with sitting back and resting on our laurels."
Source: Flight International
