Bombardier's CSeries has stuttered since its unveiling a year ago. The manufacturer now needs to convince the critics
Writing off the backfiring Bombardier CSeries project less than a year after its unveiling is tempting, but is it a mistake? After all, this is the company that sparked the regional jet revolution of the 1990s to the surprise of virtually all, including Bombardier. But this time the industry is owed a more convincing sales pitch than has been offered so far, and the time to make it begins at the Paris air show.
It may be just as well Bombardier has had to back off from plans to launch the CSeries in Paris. The kick-off has been rescheduled for September. Even with this delay there may still not be enough time for Bombardier to reinforce the CSeries business case for an investor and supplier community that has reason to think twice about committing resources to such an unproven concept.
Consider the ongoing and troubling saga of selecting the CSeries engine supplier. A powerplant is normally the foundation of a new aircraft programme, but for the CSeries it has been a month-by-month game of musical chairs. Negotiations are now focused on a new variant of the Pratt & Whitney PW6000, an odd choice because its high-cycle heritage was deemed a poor match for the CSeries's low-cycle design goals when it was disqualified about a year ago. Since then, three other potential engine suppliers have quit the project with unusually public disavowals.
Bombardier should begin a comprehensive re-education on the CSeries concept by explaining how it has come to focus on an engine that seems to be less optimised for its planned task. This discussion also should cover why Bombardier's original performance objectives should be believed, since they were based on the development of a new engine that would reduce overall operating costs by 15%.
Next, Bombardier's efforts might be helped by clarifying how the market needs a successful CSeries more than Bombardier itself does. The company's 50-seat jet orders are dwindling. It has a strong orderbook for 70-seaters, but is widely expected to lose ground to Embraer over time. Its 90-seater has yet to make its mark. Now Bombardier is seeking to introduce a US transcontinental-range, 110-seat jet. For this, it must sell to a mainline customer base with which it has few direct ties, and compete against rival manufacturers that far exceed its strength.
Perhaps the best that can be hoped is that Bombardier will arrive first to market with a narrowbody replacement in 2010, or two years before the earliest Airbus and Boeing plan to deliver their replacements for the A320 and 737, respectively. Bombardier has yet to make this a key theme of its marketing.
With the introduction of the 50-seat CRJ, Bombardier was venturing into an untested market. There was no precedent to show that a 50-seat jet could be operated more profitably than the turboprops already doing the job. Bombardier figured on selling 400-600 aircraft in the first 10 years – for once, a manufacturer miscalculating to its advantage, with more than 1,000 sold already.
But it is different with the CSeries. Almost every market expert agrees with Bombardier's claims that the 100- to 150-seat market is underserved. But in fact, a dedicated jet design in that category that can balance passenger comfort and airline efficiency demands has not yet been invented, despite many attempts to do so. It is time for Bombardier to explain why the CSeries is different than the records of its predecessors. There should be no shortage of belief in the Bombardier vision, not after the rise of its regional jet and business jet ventures. The company has shown it can identify new markets and reach them ahead of everyone else.
Tom Appleton, now chief executive of Piaggio Aero North America, can testify to that. He was hired by Bombardier in 1991 to spearhead the CRJ programme. Industry friends told him he was crazy for taking a job managing a regional jet programme, which of course had no future. Bombardier won its first big customer with Comair in 1992, but it was not until two years later that the Cincinnati-based carrier's surprising financial performance started having an impact. "I wouldn't bet against Bombardier," says Appleton.
Fair enough, if the distant past is any guide. But the more recent past offers less assurance that Bombardier's successes of the 1990s are repeatable. Perhaps we will know better in Paris.
Source: Flight International
