Concorde's operators must decide whether to start work on expensive fixes that pre-empt the crash investigators' recommendations

David Learmount/LONDON Julian Moxon/PARIS

Despite repeated public statements by the French authorities that they intend to see the grounded Concorde fleet returned to commercial service, there is little doubt that it is becoming increasingly hard to make a business case for doing so.

Nevertheless, there is unprecedented government-to-government activity to review the accident investigation's progress. The most recent of the fortnightly bilateral meetings was in Paris on 7 September, when delegates included representatives from the respective transport ministries, senior members of the Direction Gènèral de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC) and the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). The objective, say the UK authorities, is to determine if, on the basis of the Bureau Enquêtes Accidents' (BEA) preliminary accident report, the airlines and industry can usefully start to work on proposed modifications.

In a statement immediately after the Paris meeting, the DGAC said that, "given the shortage of information at present about the chain of events", discussions centred on the destruction of the tyres, the fuel leak following fuel tank damage, and what could have ignited the fire. The CAA warns, however, that the investigators "have to come up with precise recommendations" before any modifications could be considered for approval by the aviation authorities.

There is a risk that additional information discovered late in the investigation could bring changes or additions to any provisional list of recommendations. At this early stage, many crucial questions remain unanswered but, the UK authorities warn, the meetings will also have to confront the ultimate possibility: what action should be taken if the full inquiry fails to establish all the accident causes?

This lack of information and of specific recommendations leaves the airlines and manufacturers with the dilemma of whether to start work on a fix that might turn out to be unnecessary or inadequate. The preliminary report, published on 31 August, gave no basic information beyond that announced when the certificates of airworthiness (C of A) were withdrawn on 16 August, but it put in the public domain some of the detail, such as the cockpit voice recorder transcript, and the exact points in the short flight at which critical events that had led to the grounding decision occurred.

Meanwhile, at the commercial level, Air France director-general Pierre-Henry Gourgeon has placed several conditions on returning Concorde to flight status:

Definition and costing by the manufacturers of the work needed for the C of A to be restored; Ground and flight testing to validate the improvements must be complete; Delivery of the certificate of airworthiness restoring the aircraft's commercial flight category.

He has also made it clear that the costs associated with any modifications "must be reasonable". In other words, Concorde will not fly again if the business case is not convincing - although that will probably differ depending on which side of the English Channel you sit. Because of the shortage of precise information at this stage, no one will comment officially on how much upgrades to the 12 serviceable aircraft still available might cost. One industry source comments: "It is impossible to imagine that the repairs needed to make this aircraft safe are going to be insignificant."

Air France says its Concorde business is worth about Fr700 million ($93 million) a year - or 1% of total sales - and Fr100 million of that is for charter work. It has already arranged replacement subsonic flights to New York aimed at giving business passengers a full day in the capital (albeit after an eight-hour flight), using an Airbus A340 or Boeing 777.

British Airways, for all its keenness to see the aircraft back in service, admits: "There is no guidance we can give about the options available at this point." The UK airline has more to lose than its French counterpart, however, with its scheduled and charter services together contributing what BA calls "a small but significant profit" which it refuses to disclose but is believed to be about £20 million ($29 million) a year. To try to retain its Concorde passengers, BA is adding 32 new Club World seats on two daily 747-400s to New York.

The BEA preliminary report reinforces the original statement issued when Concorde was grounded: "The reason the C of A was taken away was because the condition that no single failure should lead to a catastrophic accident, has been shown to be invalid."

In the recommendations, it adds: "Service experience has shown that the destruction of a tyre during roll-out, take-off and landing is not an improbable event on Concorde and that it usually results in damage to the structure and systems of the aircraft."

In mid-August, French transport minister Jean-Claude Gayssot said that despite the longevity of the aircraft's career to date, the small number of Concordes and the consequently limited experience of operating the type mean that it is "less developed than any other aircraft".

This hints at the central question surrounding the Concorde issue: can it be made safe at reasonable cost? If British Airways and Air France decide that the answer is no, then Concorde's career as the world's only commercial supersonic transport will have come to an untimely end.

Source: Flight International