The US FAA and Europe's JAA provide the benchmarks for regulatory decision making. When they cannot agree, confusion threatens
It is axiomatic that whatever the USA does in a particular sphere affects the rest of the world. So when two entities as influential as the USA and Europe seem set to diverge in important aviation policy areas, the issues need scrutiny.
The commercial air transport policies under the spotlight this week are the proposed update for regulations governing extended twin-engine operations (ETOPS), and the approaching deadline for International Civil Aviation Organisation recommended practices on flight data monitoring (FDM)- which the US Federal Aviation Administration calls flight operations quality assurance (FOQA). On ETOPS, if the FAA's notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) were to become a regulation, the FAA and the European Joint Aviation Authorities will be light years apart. Meanwhile both Europe and the USA are in favour of FDM/FOQA, but while Europe is fast-tracking regulation to mandate FDM for large commercial aircraft (above 27,000kg/59,500lb), the USA favours a voluntary approach on the grounds that US large carriers are adopting it anyway.
Taking FDM/FOQA first, the problem with the USA's approach is twofold: lack of a declared policy to mandate FOQA is a statement that the USA is not going to strive to meet the 1 January 2005 ICAO deadline for adopting a compliant FDM programme; and in the meantime, the US carriers setting up their individual FOQA programmes do not have guidance on acceptable means of compliance, which the FAA already admits is presenting it with data-handling problems. Also, the FAA is a role model for many states all over the world that use its regulations as a base for their own, so if the FAA does not appear to be taking ICAO FDM recommendations seriously, it increases the risk that the states which most need to encourage their airlines to implement FDM will not do so.
In reality the FAA is thoroughly in favour of FDM/FOQA, it just wants airlines to adopt it voluntarily because of its fear - despite the legal confidentiality the agency has won for flight data collected for safety monitoring purposes - that the US industry will be wary of a compulsory system. But because of this US approach, airlines in countries where criminal prosecution is normal for mistakes leading to incidents - which means most of the world - are that much more likely to take the attitude that possession of data might incriminate them. Last year's accident figures again confirmed the established truth that the safe are getting safer and the rest are staying where they were. Failure by the less-safe countries and airlines to mandate the fitment of their aircraft with terrain awareness and warning systems was one of the most obvious safety-negative differences, and the failure to mandate FDM would be another. This matters, because those airlines that have used FDM/FOQA for years can testify not only to its effectiveness in managing operational standards, but to its ability to reduce users' maintenance and fuel costs.
Updating ETOPS regulations is an issue that aviation people get emotive about. Differing views divide Europe and the USA, the major manufacturers, airlines, airline associations and pilot associations.
No-one disputes that, with constantly improving technology, the ETOPS rules should continue to be reviewed. The FAA argues engine reliability has increased to the point where the existing rules for all ETOPS-equipped modern twin jets - not just the Boeing 777 - should allow them to fly much further than the current 180min single engine flying time from a usable diversion. It quotes figures for reliability that have not convinced the JAA, which claims that the arguments are not supported by sufficient data. The JAA contends the FAA does not take into account the increased exposure to ETOPS incidents that extended range routes and longer diversion times would bring, nor consider in detail the provision of sufficient bleed air and electric power in twinjets. At the same time the FAA argues that the limitations applied to twins should be applied to existing as well as new trijets and quads, but it does not provide the historical data to show that existing types would have suffered fewer ETOPS-related safety incidents if that were so.
For all its carefully positioned arguments and calls for improved aircraft systems redundancy, the one area the FAA continues to avoid is the issue of power unit redundancy in twinjets in conditions that would make the need for it mathematically more compelling. The public docket containing comment from all over the world is a testimony to the stern challenge the FAA faces in creating credible regulations.
Source: Flight International
