The termination of BAE Systems' RJX programme, ending decades of production of indigenous UK commercial jet designs, is but one example of the progressive withdrawal of the UK from the forefront of aerospace developments.
Mindful of the need to present itself on share flotation day as lean and unencumbered, QinetiQ, the privatised commercial part arising from the split of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency is helping by systematically discarding some of the UK's prime research facilities.
Wind tunnels, along with the other highly specialised facilities you need if you are a major player, don't fit QinetiQ's technology park image and certainly don't fit the management ethos of going for quick commercial returns and making a few people rich. Neither are there any effective safeguards to ensure QinetiQ's freedom to exploit any market niche it fancies is not at the expense of its historical commitment towards UK aerospace and defence procurement.
Last year, work began on turning half of the Tunnel Site estate in Bedford into a refugee centre which, it was said, would help subsidise site overheads. However,the 4 x 3m (13 x 9ft) low speed tunnel, though it had work, conveniently fell on the wrong side of the divide and was soon sold off cheaply. Today, less than two years later, the 2.5m supersonic tunnel - wherein Concorde's high speed configuration was validated - and the high supersonic 1 x 1.2m tunnel, are closing due to "lack of demand".
So how does the Aircraft Research Assocation's transonic tunnel (incidentally a complementary design to the 2.5m) a few miles down the road survive so well in this supposedly barren climate? For "lack of demand" read "lack of demand at QinetiQ's rates". The other argument, that computational fluid dynamic (CFD) advances are making tunnels redundant, is not convincing. Even the most ardent protagonist would agree that tunnels and CFD will be complementary for a long time. Boeing's euphoric relief over the initial tunnel results for its Sonic Cruiser says a lot.
Yes, the tunnels are labour intensive, having suffered from a lack of investment over many years, but in terms of quality of results they match the very best in the world. While QinetiQ cannot be blamed for inheriting high site overheads, attempts by local management to find new business and to make the facilities more viable have been systematically vetoed by higher authority. So insistent is this "get rid" mentality that the 5m tunnel at Farnborough was mothballed precipitantly in 1999, only to reopen under pressure from an influential customer, since when it has enjoyed a continuing programme of work. The problem created in manning it, after disposal of key support staff, is another issue.
While the Ministry of Defence's research budget is so tight that it cannot afford to identify these tunnels as strategic facilities, surely a nation which purports to be at the forefront of technical innovation cannot afford to lose these assets. Given that the 2.5m has been nominated as the reserve tunnel for extensive Joint Strike Fighter work, and bearing in mind that the prime (US) tunnel is unserviceable, it is not surprising that our competitors can only wonder at the ruthless efficiency of the UK's national self-destruct mechanism.
Name and address withheldSource: Flight International
