Maintenance is a vulnerable point in the fight against terrorism and those in charge of overhaul companies need to address the issue
It may be a truism that there is no such thing as infallible aviation security, but that does not excuse any sector of the industry from being realistic about its vulnerability.
There are many points at which terrorists – or others with a personal or political agenda – could try to breach aviation security with some likelihood of success, provided they do basic research, reconnaissance, and use medium-term planning. Penetrating the system as a passenger is the most obvious option, but there are other routes: penetrating airport secure areas via unauthorised points (eg the airport perimeter fence or internal circumvention of security points); accessing the airside of airports as an employee with an airside pass; and accessing aircraft or their critical components via points outside main airports, such as major maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) bases that do not operate in an airport restricted zone, or manufacturing plants that overhaul major components.
To those outside the industry, passenger screening is the most visible security provision. Industry cynics – and some travellers – say passenger screening is more for political show than for safety. That is certainly true of a worryingly high proportion of the world’s airports, but it is an unfair criticism of those airports and airlines that actually run a good passenger screening system.
Freight is, in practice, the biggest security “grey area” in the industry, because of its sheer volume. And the bulk of air cargo is carried in the belly holds of passenger aircraft. In most of the world the system depends for its security on a network of known or trusted shipping agents that provide some shipment checking and screening, but there are many points downstream of the agent, including airport cargo terminals, at which cargo could be tampered with. Robberies at airports have almost always involved collusion by employees; if cargo theft can be organised, so could other unlawful activities.
Speaking at the security-focused Safety of Flight conference in Windsor, UK last week, the US Allied Pilots Association stated that its members are concerned that the security risk posed by belly-hold cargo is not taken seriously enough. Patrick Gallagher, Qantas’s manager of group security intelligence and risk, added that it is a myth that total cargo screening, including explosives trace detection, is too expensive. Qantas screens all of its international cargo, he says, and it costs “only a couple of cents per kilo”. That seems a small price to pay for the safety of a widebody aircraft and its passengers.
After the cargo risk, the next most significant security grey area – and perhaps the most easily forgotten – is maintenance. Not maintenance on the line or at turnaround, which all happens in an airport restricted zone, but the work in hangars outside airport restricted zones, or at MROs that use aerodromes that do not handle commercial flights.
A person in a set of company overalls carrying a tool box and repair manual or laptop is quite unlikely to be challenged in a hangar. Part of the reason for this is the high percentage of contract labour used by airlines and MROs. Other mechanics are accustomed to seeing people they don’t recognise on shift. This may be less true of manufacturers to which engines may be sent for overhaul, but it is still an area for which there are no security guidelines or regulations.
The UK industry is trying to self-regulate by setting up a register of contractors. The plan is to carry out qualification and background checks on those who register, and if all MROs co-operate and only take on registered contractors who are granted an identity card that can be traced, this would at least address a part of the risk. The remaining controllable risk could be addressed by creating a restricted zone around all maintenance hangars. But in the final analysis, in every single sector where terrorists could theoretically penetrate the system, human vigilance is the critical part of the total control mechanism. Without it, the screening technology is useless.
Qantas’s Gallagher says his airline’s analysis of worldwide risks to aircraft from illegal interference events since 9/11 indicate that hijacking – actual or attempted – is still the highest risk to airlines, and shoulder-launched missiles the lowest. But at no point in the industry does any service sector or manufacturer have the luxury of believing that their organisation does not have to play its part in defending the air transport business.
Source: Flight International
