Peter La Franchi/CANBERRA After eight years of development, a 20-month long Parliamentary inquiry into delays, and at a cost of more than A$1.7 billion ($1.06 billion), Australia's Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) is scheduled to come on line progressively over the next 30 months. A fully functioning system is expected in the first half of 2002.
The JORN system, regarded as probably the most ambitious high-frequency (HF), over-the-horizon sensors developed, will form a key element of Australian Defence Force plans for a high-level surveillance capability over the sea-air gap separating Australia from South-East Asia. The radar is also likely to play a wider role in monitoring aircraft and shipping movements across most of the East Asian region.
The planned range of the operational radar is generally described by Australian Defence Force officials as being in the order of 2,000-3,000km (1,080-1,600nm). Researchers with the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) acknowledge, however, that the existing Australian testbed radar is capable of watching the atmospheric effects of the Aurora Borealis and tracking movement of individual icebergs in the northern Pacific Ocean, events taking place 10,000km away. The testbed, one DSTO researcher says, can detect and track commercial airline and shipping traffic between Australia and Japan.
The testbed, designated 1 Radar Surveillance Unit (1RSU), is operated by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and is near Alice Springs in central Australia. It was set up in 1976 as a staring beam, aligned with the Sydney to Singapore air corridor. An enhanced array, developed with the assistance of the USA, was installed in 1982 providing a coverage footprint of 60í.
Further upgrades began in 1986 before the transfer of the system to RAAF control in 1992. The Frequency Management System for the array was updated by British Aerospace Australia last year under a project known as JP2046. The system is believed to support a surveillance footprint of above 90í.
The main limitation of 1RSU, DSTO acknowledges, is its ability to measure just one component of a target object's velocity. Once the full JORN system comes on line, however, full velocity vectors are expected to be generated in near real time, using arrays at the opposite ends of Australia.
Unlike conventional radar, which uses signals directly reflected from a radar target, over-the-horizon radars bounce high frequency signals off the ionosphere with data generated through the use of software algorithms, to interpret returns against the prevailing HF environment in the area of interest. The technology suffers from degraded performance at dawn and dusk, because of ionospheric disruptions, as well as from local area interruptions, whether man-made or naturally occurring.
Australian interest in the potential of over the horizon systems dates back to the 1950s. Experimental arrays were built during the 1960s and 1970s by Australian defence researchers seeking to prove the concept. In 1974, the Australian Government approved the establishment of the Alice Springs radar by DSTO to verify the application of the technology as a long-range surveillance system. This was followed in 1986 by a decision to develop a three-array operational network. The plan was later scaled back to a two-array network, but with the option of a replacement for the Alice Springs radar subject to government funding approvals.
In May 1989, a restricted tender was released to Telecom Australia, a government-owned telecommunications carrier (now Telstra), BHP Engineering and Raytheon and the former AWA Defence Industries with General Electric. Telecom, teamed with the then GEC-Marconi and Lockheed Missiles and Space, was awarded a A$685.5 million contract to undertake the project in June 1991.
Unlike the analogue-based 1RSU system, the JORN contract called for the development of a wholly digital processing architecture. This would be linked with new radar transmission and receive sites at Longreach, in western Queensland, and Laverton, in the Great Victoria Desert region of Western Australia, and a JORN Coordination Centre at RAAF Base Edinburgh in South Australia.
The remote inland sites for the transmission and receiving systems were chosen so as to allow sufficient range for the transmitted HF signals to return to the earth's surface providing a coverage envelope that begins close to the Australian coastline. The Laverton site is the larger of the two arrays, covering a footprint of 180í, while the Longreach radar will operate over an arc of 90°.
The original project schedule called for Telecom to complete the design of the operational radar network by 1994 with equipment and software development finished by 1995. Development of the radar sites was to be completed in 1996 with full system capability to be available from June 1997. Slow progress saw the schedule renegotiated in 1994 to support delivery in 1999, although that has been put back to 2000. The project value also increased, up to A$814 million.
In August 1995, the Australian National Audit Office began examining the delays, releasing a scathing report in June 1996. The Australian Department of Defence, the Audit Office revealed, had paid 80% of the available project funds to the prime contractor, yet only 20% of the configuration items had at that stage passed critical design review. The net effect, the report warned, was that the project would run out of funds in mid-1997 with at least two more years of work still to be undertaken.
The audit report prompted the establishment of a follow-on inquiry by the Australian Parliaments Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, with this examining the project for nearly two years.
In similar timeframes, Telstra began to move to distance itself from the project with internal provisions for a major loss being factored into its annual report to Australian corporate regulators. In September 1996, the company began discussions with the then Transfield Defence Systems (now Tenix), and Lockheed Martin on a possible restructuring of management arrangements, or takeover of the project.
In February 1997, Transfield and Lockheed Martin announced they had agreed to take over management of the project through a joint venture company known as RLM Holdings, and were evaluating a possible buy-out.
The arrangements finalised midway through 1997 involved Telstra paying RLM A$660 million to complete the project by December 2001. This was in addition to the money already paid by the Australian Department of Defence. The deal required Telstra to remain as the project prime contractor. Current plans call for the prime contract to be transferred from Telstra to RLM at the end of this year.
In March 1998, the Joint Parliamentary Committee inquiry into JORN released a report which said that poor project management was the main cause of delays. The problems, the report said, were directly contributed to by a poor relationship between Telstra and its prime subcontractor, GEC-Marconi.
The radar's technical feasibility, the committee report said, appeared to be sound. It warned that the highest technical risks facing the project were likely in the final systems integration stages, "-heightened by many of JORN's performance specifications being at or beyond current state-of-the-art".
The total cost of the development aspects of the project, the report revealed, had been cost-capped by the Australian Department of Defence at A$902 million, including the A$660 million payment to RLM. Telstra was liable for funding above that cap.
The Australian Department of Defence had to meet support and payroll costs associated with the project, taking its own costs up to A$1.1 billion. With Telstra still in majority Australian Government ownership, the total spending of public funds on the project has reached A$1.7 billion.
Marconi's involvement in the project originally called for it to undertake the design and development of the radar surveillance segment under a subcontract valued at A$410 million by the beginning of 1999. The subcontract included responsibility for the transmit and receive system, the frequency management system, command and control systems, and all associated hardware and software. The agreement with Telstra also called for it to act as the design authority for the surveillance segment, a role Telstra resumed in 1996.
The joint committee report strongly criticised the role played by GEC-Marconi. It said that evidence presented showed that that the company's "inability to deliver transmitters and receivers and associated drivers to quality, performance and time requirements had a critical impact on the project's cost and schedule."
The report also indicated that ongoing delays in software being developed by the company could drag into the middle of 1998. That target then shifted to the middle of June this year.
Last October, however, RLM moved to negotiate the take-over of all software development responsibility from the company, with a deal being concluded at the end of January at a cost to Marconi of at least A$50 million.
Planning for finalisation of JORN is expected to see the Longreach radar providing an initial operational capability well ahead of the 2002 delivery window.
According to Defence's project director, Air Cdr Dick Hedges, the Longreach radar will be providing a "significant operational capability before December 2001".
Hardware installation was completed at the site midway through last year, with software deliveries sufficiently advanced by October to support a basic transmission capability which could be detected by the 1RSU array.
Since then, Hedges says, the Longreach array has began receiving its own transmissions, with this including what is claimed to have been the first detection of a potential target.
"Progressively," Hedges says, "they will be refining the beam steering and the beam forming and target detection."
Hardware installation at the Laverton array was completed at the end of last year, with integration beginning now.
According to Hedges, the slippage into 2002 from the December 2001 target for final acceptance is a "minor" issue compared to where the project has been. He is adamant, however, that there can be no further movement in the project schedule. He says he has "insisted" on the delivery target, "-and RLM are fully aware of what my position is on this".
Source: Flight International
