Although work on a follow-on to the Panavia Tornado began more than two decades ago, today's Eurofighter programme is considered to be little more than five years old.
It was in January 1994 that the air forces of the four partner nations endorsed a revised requirement for the aircraft, after several years of painful re-examination following the abrupt and unexpected end of the Cold War.
The original development contract had been signed in November 1988. Within months, the Berlin Wall had fallen and the Warsaw Pact threat that the Eurofighter had been designed to counter had disintegrated.
The political turbulence that followed the fall of the Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany substantially delayed the programme, but ultimately served to reaffirm the validity of the Eurofighter concept.
"All four nations reassessed the aircraft, which is a large part of its legitimacy today," says Brian Phillipson, Eurofighter managing director. Thanks to the "reorientation" of 1994-5, the company can claim that the Typhoon has been judged the best answer to the post-Cold War threat faced by the partner nations.
"Reorientation was largely a reaffirmation," he says. "The official specification dates from 1994, but the original 1985 specification was very good. The UK always wanted a multi-role aircraft needing very little support, for out-of-area operations. It turned out to be what was most needed post-Cold War."
"Reorientation was a complete reassessment of the requirement in the post-Cold War reality," recalls Christian Biener, NETMA deputy general manager. "But the concept stayed the same. The nations got proof that the design was still valid for the new threat."
Although the Eurofighter concept survived essentially unmodified, reorientation resulted in some significant changes. The air-to-ground mission, originally a secondary role, was made equal in importance to air-to-air, enhancing the aircraft's multi-role capability. "The original aircraft had more air-to-air, and fewer air-to-ground, capabilities," says Biener. "Now they are equal, but we will certificate air-to-air first, then air-to-ground."
At the same time, the partner companies were forced to reduce the Eurofighter's price by 30%. "We had developed the aircraft, but could not afford it," says Biener. The price reduction was negotiated without reducing the quality of the aircraft, he says. In return, the nations put in more money to cover the requirement changes and programme slippage.
The reorientation was agreed in 1995, by which time entry into service had slipped by five years, to 2002. But, for the first time in several years, the programme was back on firmer ground. Now the companies had to face up to the reality of producing the aircraft.
"The political uncertainty clearly had an impact on the programme," says Phillipson. "Overtly, there was reorientation, and the studies of EFALite and EF2000, but the covert story was that we got used to the uncertainty. There was a lack of sharpness in timing and pace, which continued until about two years ago when we began to face production."
Signature of the four-nation memorandum of understanding on production investment, production and logistic support in December 1997 - and the associated "umbrella" contract between Eurofighter and NETMA in January 1998 - was preceded by an informal production readiness review. "We had to demonstrate the programme's maturity to the four nations - and our shareholders," Phillipson says.
A formal review followed in April 1998. "This was a very rigorous series of tests to see if things were in place for production," he says. "We got a very good view of the programme's status, and it was acceptable, so we were allowed to sign the fixed-price Supplement 2 contract." Whereas the umbrella contract specified a maximum price for 620 aircraft, Supplement 2 - signed in September 1998 - set a fixed price for the first tranche of 148 aircraft.
"Negotiating the production contract was extremely difficult," says Phillipson. "The partners wanted to sell a build standard, which the nations did not want to buy because we were only part way through development. Industry had no choice but to accept a production contract to a performance standard-It was only really possible to sign after a very good production readiness review," he says.
"We had to take a long, hard look at maturity. A lot of development has focused on establishing maturity," he says. "We set out to make sure that the air vehicle did the job, that the engine met its basic performance and that the radar and avionics met their basic performance, but not necessarily all the functions."
The Eurofighter's capability will be developed in two phases. Deliveries will begin in 2002 in the initial operational capability (IOC) air-defence configuration. After the first 40 aircraft, in 2003, deliveries are scheduled to shift to the full operational capability (FOC) multi-role configuration. The cost of upgrading IOC aircraft to FOC standard is included in the fixed-price Supplement 2 contract.
"It is a very demanding contract," admits Phillipson. "There are penalties for late delivery and for failing to meet the IOC, FOC or upgrade standards." Industry's risk will be compounded if work has to be carried over from the development phase. "Schedule adherence is not good enough," he admits. "So we have to aim high and try to deliver more than IOC capability with the first aircraft."
Although the changes from IOC to FOC standard are substantial, they mostly involve software, says Eurofighter. The company plans to deliver aircraft from the outset with the hardware provisions for full operational capability. These will be in the five instrumented production aircraft (IPAs) Eurofighter is building to complete development flight testing. "The IPAs will be fully representative of the production aircraft. They will fly a year before first delivery, and will be flown hard to clear the IOC standard," he says.
"The IPAs will have to prove that the aircraft will fulfil 100% of the specification, or the contractors will get less money - or they will have to spend more to get to 100%," says Biener, who describes the contract as "fair, reasonable and balanced". Phillipson responds: "We have no doubts about meeting the [IOC] specification and cost is fixed-price, so we will be on budget, but the schedule is sporty and there are areas of development that are sporty."
Tight control of the programme in the transition from development to production will be essential. "We have beefed up Eurofighter as a management group and we have got a grip on the partners," he says. "Development has been very demanding, but the customer will get the aircraft as advertised."
Source: Flight International
