The US debate about passenger profiling shows that people have forgotten that secrecy is crucial to any security system
Now the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has thrown its weight behind passenger profiling for security purposes. This is a subject which, in the US airline industry and the press, has generated heated argument.
The sheer volume of debate has been motivated by the understandable frustration that US air travellers feel at the time taken for security checks at airports. Before 11 September, they had minimum hassle, "stepping on a bus" domestic air travel. The situation they face now has them yearning for the old days.
Adding to the frustration is the personal indignity that the checks often impose, according to the thousands of passionate complaints and anecdotes. Finally, providing the ironic touch that always makes frustration turn to desperation, there is a general belief that despite the hassle and heartache, the system does not succeed in its vital job.
John Heimlich, director of economics at the USAir Transport Association, reflects this when he says: "We'll never be able to stop the weapons, so we have to go after the people."
No-one argues with the concept that passengers should be profiled using intelligence information or certain universally agreed identifiers - like the passenger who buys a one-way ticket using cash. Anyone identified by the intelligence system as a suspect individual, or a passenger fitting a high-risk profile definition, can naturally expect to get particularly concentrated checking from security.
It is easy to see that, having isolated those that fit a "negative" profile, the rest must fit a "positive" profile, or at least a relatively positive one. Where the heat enters the argument is whether there is a category of passenger that is "more positive" than the others. To paraphrase George Orwell's Animal Farm: "All passengers are equal but some are more equal than others." The unofficial term "trusted passenger" has been coined to describe a concept - the passenger who can safely be fast-tracked through the security system with a minimal level of checking. IATA's director general Pierre Jeanniot, desperate as so many in the industry are to do whatever makes sense to stop applying unnecessary security to those who do not need it and to concentrate resources on those who do, talks of the necessity for a safe system of "positive profiling" to speed the whole system up.
The trouble is that any so-called "trusted traveller" system could so easily be perverted by motivations such as the understandable airline desire to attract back the high-yield frequent flier. There are many reasons why the member of an airline's frequent-flier club should fit a low-risk profile. At least there were before the events of 11 September revealed that there are no longer any boundaries to what some people will do to achieve terrorist ends. That could include doing what it takes to qualify to join a frequent-flier club, as well as doing what Jeanniot recommends, which is to register for some form of biometric positive identification scheme.
The fundamental weakness of any form of known preferential security system is that knowledge of the way it works can enable the ruthless to exploit its weaknesses. The oldest principle of any security system is that the "enemy" shall not know what to expect, or how the system works, and shall certainly not be informed of any "weakness" in the system which could be exploited. It follows, then, that no passenger should know that he or she has gained a preferential status that wins a lower level of security scrutiny. All passengers must be seen to be subject to the same basic security checks, with those identified as high risk receiving even closer scrutiny.
There is a way for frequent fliers, who often pay more for travel privileges, to obtain an upgrade to fast-track security without actually winning the privilege of less careful screening. The airlines can employ some of the extra revenue from the higher fares to buy more screening equipment and pay for more security staff per head for those prepared to pay for it. The argument used against this in the USA is that, now security is federally administered, there is no place for favouritism, especially if it is won with money. That argument is redolent of early 20th century socialism and even communism - it has no place in the USA. There is, however, a simple truth that, while the USA is still in the process of redefining and ramping up its security system, security personnel and resources will remain in short supply and buying a fast-track security privilege is bound to be unpopular with those in the longer queues. That it is unpopular does not mean it is wrong.
Source: Flight International
