The Columbia Shuttle disaster was a symptom of the USA's lack of a clear vision for the future of human spaceflight
Space Shuttle Columbia's fiery disintegration over Texas on 1 February should be the nadir in the long fall of the US space programme from its zenith on 20 July 1969 when a man first stepped on to the moon. But whether US ambitions for human spaceflight remain grounded is now in the hands of the American people, placed there by the final report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB).
This is no ordinary accident report. The 13-member CAIB, led by retired US Navy admiral Hal Gehman, has conducted itself with diligence and dignity that has set it apart from previous blame-seeking investigations of failures by government organisations. NASA's management culture and decision making is uncompromisingly criticised, but with the positive intent of preventing a repeat of the Columbia accident - which was in many ways a repeat of the Challenger disaster in 1986.
The report goes beyond simply identifying causes and recommending fixes for the technical and organisational failures that led to the accident. Because it took investigators months to prove indisputably that a suitcase-sized chunk of lightweight foam could indeed crack open the reinforced carbon-carbon leading edge of the orbiter's wing, the board had time to look into the accident's wider historical context.
The board is convinced that the environment in which NASA has operated since the end of the Apollo programme is as much to blame for Columbia's destruction, and the loss of seven crew, as the chain of events that led NASA to decide that debris striking the orbiter was not a safety of flight issue. If there is a root cause of both the Columbia and Challenger disasters, it lies in the technical and operational compromises NASA has made over many years.
With the end of the space race and the loss of public interest in spaceflight, and in the absence of a clear national vision for human spaceflight, NASA struggled to create a viable post-Apollo programme. The result was the Space Shuttle, but its design was a compromise and its mission far from clear. Today the ageing Shuttle is essential to the assembly of the International Space Station (ISS), but not ideally suited to its primary role as a crew and cargo transport. The CAIB notes with criticism that, 22 years after the Shuttle first flew, there is no replacement on the drawing board.
Having developed the Shuttle, NASA moved on to the ISS - the other half of its post-Apollo vision for a permanent human presence in low- Earth orbit. But the ISS consumed so much of NASA's budget in the 1990s that the Shuttle's budget and workforce was cut by 40%. The CAIB says NASA mischaracterised the Shuttle as an operational vehicle and handed its operation over to a private contractor in a move to reduce costs. This was a mistake, the report makes clear. The Shuttle is still a developmental vehicle - and an ageing one at that.
While NASA cannot be criticised for compromises made in trying to create a viable programme in the vacuum created by the lack of a national vision for spaceflight, CAIB chairman Gehman does hold the agency responsible for "over-marketing, over-promising and underestimating the cost". As a result, the USA is left owning space programmes "that are extraordinarily expensive, and never achieve the goals or costs originally set", he says.
And it is still happening. NASA steadfastly stuck to woefully underestimated costs and schedules for its Space Shuttle replacement programme, the Space Launch Initiative, before being forced to admit last year that a next-generation reusable launch vehicle was, for now, beyond its means. Its successor, the Orbital Space Plane, is far more modest - possibly little more than an Apollo-like capsule whose only role is to serve the ISS - but already cost estimates are creeping upwards.
The CAIB report suggests a way forward for human spaceflight. Gehman hopes the report's closing chapter will stimulate a "vigorous public policy debate" on what to do next: how soon to replace the Shuttle; what the US vision is for human spaceflight; and whether it is willing to resource that vision. And he makes clear: "This stuff is not cheap".
The report is remarkable for the breadth of its scope and the fairness of its criticism. Any blame-seeking will likely come from those with oversight of NASA seeking scapegoats for flawed decision-making in a stressful environment they helped to create. Once heads have rolled it is to be hoped that those who craft, request, examine and approve NASA's plans and budgets take heed of the CAIB's closing comments and engage in an open and honest debate on what the USA should be doing in space, and how much it will cost.
Source: Flight International
