European safety regulators are examining criteria for low-fuel warning systems on aircraft with a view to potentially requiring that such systems be made independent of fuel-quantity indicators.
It follows recommendations made by UK, Irish and Italian investigation agencies after inquiries into three serious incidents during which crews were unaware of impending fuel exhaustion.
Two of these incidents involved ATR turboprops. One engine on an Aer Arann ATR 42 stopped during a service from London Luton to Galway in August 2003 after a refuelling error left one wing tank practically empty. This went unnoticed by the crew who thought the fuel gauge was not functioning correctly.
Almost exactly two years later, an ATR 72 operated by Tuninter crashed into the sea off Sicily after being erroneously fitted with a fuel gauge from a smaller ATR 42 aircraft. The fuel gauge incorrectly indicated sufficient fuel on board, and this prevented a low-fuel warning sounding.
Six months before the Tuninter crash, in February 2005, a Virgin Atlantic Airways Airbus A340-600 operating between Hong Kong and London Heathrow suffered a fuel-control computer failure, which stopped the automatic transfer of fuel. One engine subsequently stopped and another began to lose power but system logic resulted in low-fuel warnings not being presented to the crew.
In its final report into the Virgin A340 event, the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch says the European Aviation Safety Agency "agrees" with the broadly similar safety recommendations put forward by the investigators in each case, which state that fuel-warning systems should be independent of fuel-quantity indicators.
It says that EASA, through a working group, is aiming to publish a notice of proposed amendment by the end of this year with a view to adapting certification specifications by the first quarter of 2009.
Source: Flight International
