The Netherlands air force's knowledge of the airspace over the former Yugoslavia was a tactical advantage
Stewart Penney/THE HAGUE
Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) commander in chief Lt Gen Ben Droste (left) says Operation Allied Force showed that his service is "ready and available" to be used as an instrument of the politicians will. The suitability of the RNLAF for international action is primary and we have succeeded in terms of equipment, training and organisation."
During the Kosovo campaign, the RNLAF flew 1,315 missions, delivered more than 850 air-to-ground weapons, and one of its Lockheed Martin F-16s shot down a MAPO MiG-29 Fulcrum during the first night of hostilities, he says.
Kosovo and similar operations have highlighted air power's greatest strength - its ability to escalate and de-escalate a conflict speedily, he says. Last year, for example, NATO rapidly expanded in-theatre assets to force Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic to accept observers in Kosovo. Once he backed down, aircraft numbers were quickly reduced.
Operation Allied Force highlighted the blending of tactical implications with strategic issues - the blend being in the cockpit, where a pilot is the final part of the decision loop. Droste says: "Every young pilot has responsibility - the yes/no decision to attack."
The reason for the RNLAF's success is its pilots' awareness of the issues as a result of operating over Yugoslavia and rotating through forward-operating locations in Italy for many years, he says. They know the area, the airspace and its pitfalls.
Collateral damage
Collateral damage "put a terrible strain on the cohesiveness of NATO. It was Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic's best weapon", Droste says. The Serbs, therefore, employed dummy targets and made capital of such damage. An error - such as when a train was hit crossing a bridge under attack - could have broken the alliance's cohesiveness. "It didn't, but it came close," he says, warning: "It's an issue that will not go away. We have to live with that fact."
At the operational/tactical level, the F-16's swing role within the RNLAF was proven. Droste says: "Every pilot should be operationally trained in air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. We've proved it can be done." He says swing-role training must be varied. "There are no short cuts and no substitute for the highest quality training programme."
RNLAF pilots used the Lockheed Martin LANTIRN targeting pod from single-seat aircraft at night. "Pilots who performed the missions tell me it is possible to use LANTIRN at night with a well-organised cockpit, which we have with the MLU [mid-life update] aircraft," Droste says.
Pilots have queried the division of responsibilities in a two-seat F-16, but Droste admits the RNLAF may be biased, as it has no two-seat fighters. He acknowledges that Yugoslav operations were at medium and high altitude. Low level flying would be more difficult with single-seaters, he believes.
He warns against cutting flying hours to save money. "It's a slippery slope. You don't know where it ends." He says that some air forces give pilots 120h a year, but adds: "I think that is too low by far." RNLAF pilots get 180h a year. Droste says air forces should be at a high state of readiness, able to react quickly and not deploy to a war zone before working up crucial capabilities. "We've seen it in the last 10 years and it doesn't work. Air forces cannot permit themselves 30 to 60-day work-ups."
The updated F-16 opens up the night, says Droste. Additional night training means that "we will have to prioritise somewhere. It's probably impossible to be 100% swing." Some pilots will be more experienced with the LANTIRN, AGM-65 Maverick air-to-air missile or other weapons.
Experience with PGMs
Unlike some Allied Force participants, the RNLAF is experienced with precision-guided munitions (PGMs): GBU-10/12 laser-guided bombs entered its inventory in the late 1980s. Initially, the service relied on third-party targeting, but experience during Operation Deliberate Force over Bosnia in 1995 proved the need for its own capability. "The combination needs to be within a single flight."
LANTIRN was ordered, but will not be delivered until next year. For Kosovo, the US Air Force lent the RNLAF three LANTIRN pods, which were operated by pilots with experience from exchange postings.
Droste warns against underestimating the enemy. The Serbs have a mixture of high and low technology capabilities, creating a "difficult threat". He says: "On the one hand, the Serbs failed by not using their radar in the way they should. No radar means no proper fighting system. On the other hand, we were never sure we had gained air superiority."
The RNLAF emerged from the Cold War with nine F-16 squadrons, but now has six. In policy planning for a forthcoming white paper, a further cutback of one squadron was proposed. Droste will not comment on political discussions, but in relation to the successful RNLAF participation in Allied Force, he argues that the operation has shown that air power is a useful tool for the politicians and therefore "good value for money".
Source: Flight International
