Gulf focus - Bridging the Gulf

Differing priorities among Gulf states have made defence integration difficult

Gerald Butt/NICOSIA

Despite some improvements, co-ordination of defence policies among the six Arab states that make up the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) remains hampered by the same intra-regional differences that prevented the countries achieving full economic integration.

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) formed the GCC in 1981 as a direct response to fears of threats to regional security. The Iran-Iraq war had begun the previous year, and the Tehran authorities were talking about exporting the Islamic revolution to the Arab Gulf states. But the GCC's failure to develop an effective joint defence strategy in its first decade was painfully exposed in August 1990 when Saddam Hussein ordered his army to invade and occupy Kuwait.

One of the GCC's original goals was the creation of Peninsula Shield, a battle-ready ground force of 7,000 men - to be increased to 20,000 at a later date, with air and naval divisions added - drawn from all the member states.

Under a joint command, this force - stationed at Hafr al-Batin in Saudi Arabia - was to be ready to go into action to help a member state when needed. But differences over the funding and composition of the force meant that its number never rose above 3,000 men, so the Gulf states were caught totally unprepared when Iraq invaded Kuwait as Peninsula Shield could not be mobilised in time.

While GCC countries contributed forces to the US-led Allied coalition that liberated Kuwait in 1991 and defeated the Iraqi army, they rely today on the US and UK forces stationed in the Gulf for their first and last lines of defence - a situation which is unlikely to change in the near future.

The reluctance of GCC governments to commit troops to Peninsula Shield has been matched by a preference for developing their own military. Individual agendas on defence and most other matters continue to take priority over those affecting the Gulf as a whole.

"Every Gulf state," an Arab diplomat says, "pays lip service to the GCC. But every one has its own set of priorities, and these can differ enormously." For example, Kuwait's preoccupation is with developing a strong defensive shield against another attack from Iraq. States further south, in assessing any danger from Iraq, are more interested in long-range early warning systems. Saudi Arabia, for example, is interested in expanding its fleet of five Boeing E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft.

At the southern end of the Gulf, the UAE sees more potential threat from Iran than Iraq, as the Iranian armed forces occupy three small islands claimed by the UAE. At the same time, Bahrain and Qatar are locked into a long-running border dispute (over the Hawar Islands) which is awaiting adjudication from the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, the largest by far of the Gulf states, has borders with Yemen in the south and Iraq and Jordan in the north - in other words, plenty to concern it, even before it considers what the regimes in Baghdad and Tehran might be planning.

Developing closer ties

Despite the range of differing priorities among the Gulf states, and the failure of Peninsula Shield to form the nucleus of a joint GCC land, air and sea force, the GCC states have taken some steps towards greater consultation and co-ordination. The forces from the individual states hold frequent military exercises together. Last January, 40 combat aircraft from the six Gulf states took part in Operation Gulf Falcon, and another operation, Initial Link, is set for April. "On the question of joint exercises," a Western diplomatic in the Gulf says, "they do rather well. They have managed to develop a much better regime of training exercises, with individual forces taking part, rather than operating under a permanent single command - as was originally envisaged."

But the concept of differently equipped and trained forces coming together for exercises has inherent difficulties. Some of these have been overcome. In the early days of the GCC, exercises, according to a senior officer in one of the Gulf armies, "were little short of farcical. The states were using different sorts of radio systems and we found we couldn't even communicate with each other."

Today, most of these basic problems have been overcome. At the end of February, military commanders from the GCC states, meeting in Kuwait, launched the first phase of a $158 million early warning radar system to link their command and control systems. Under the first phase, set up by Ericsson of Sweden at a cost of $70 million, the six member states have been connected to a fibre-optic link extending from Kuwait in the north to Oman in the south.

The second phase involves the creation of a system to track potential targets and co-ordinate defence responses.

Despite this progress, the biggest obstacle to greater defence co-ordination and integration is the states' failure to agree on a joint purchasing strategy. "The rationale behind the ordering of aircraft and other defence equipment is personal gain," says an Arab diplomat. "As much as anything it's a question of who's going to offer the best commission. So you get a range of different planes, different weapons," he adds. This in turn creates problems.

"As the past has shown," a Western military attaché in one Gulf state says, "there are complications if you are trying to move ground forces or air forces to operate in another location and you find when you get there that there are different spares, different ammunition, and so on. This is bound to set a limitation on how far the Gulf states can create a joint military force that is both powerful and flexible."

But as defence analyst Andrew Brookes of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London points out, neither Europe nor the USA's military arms have attained full interoperability. But Brookes also notes that the Gulf states must take geography into account when working toward interoperability. "What they can't buy is warning time," he says. "They can't buy some of the warning distances that only geography will give them. If they haven't got the geography on their side, they've got to align with somebody who has that geography to offer."

With different states buying different equipment, the GCC finds itself unable to achieve another of its goals - that of establishing its own regional military training establishments. Taking part in the Gulf Falcon exercise, for example, were Saudi Boeing F-15 Eagles, Omani Sepecat Jaguars, Dassault Mirage 2000s from Qatar and the UAE, Lockheed Martin F-16s from Bahrain and Boeing F/A-18 Hornets from Kuwait. An increasing number of GCC combat aircraft are flown by Gulf Arabs - but they are trained in countries outside the region. The air forces of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar are manned exclusively by nationals of those countries. Only the UAE, a vast purchaser of military jets with a small indigenous population, looks set to rely on expatriate combat pilots for many years to come.

Higher standards

The IISS's Andrew Brookes contends that training standards are increasing in the Gulf, thanks to factors such as the growth of the internet, increasing pressure for high-technology expertise and more travel by the forces' leaders beyond their own borders to "swap notes" with their peers. In the Gulf, there is also the matter of pride: keeping up with the neighbours - some of whom, including Jordan, Oman and Egypt, have highly credible forces.

Another problem when trying to establish a joint force is identifying a common enemy. "The question you have to ask," says a Western defence analyst, "is whether GCC states or the GCC itself have a clear doctrine. Do they have a clear visualisation of whom they are defending themselves against?" The answer given by governments in the Gulf, is that a threat could come at any time either from Iran or Iraq. "We can't tell what might happen in Iraq after Saddam, or who will win the power struggle in Iran," a Qatari government official says.

The USA and UK, in general, agree with this assessment. The Clinton Administration urged the GCC not only to increase the potential of Peninsula Shield and develop further intra-Gulf military co-operation, but also to co-operate with a US-led integrated air defence system, linking up with Egypt and Jordan.

At a time of increased tension in the Middle East and in the wake of a tide of anti-US feeling, Gulf governments are reluctant to express public interest in the scheme. But the new Bush Administration, with its clearly stated intention of refocusing the attention of the USA on Iraq, is likely to press for its adoption.

IISS assistant director Terence Taylor suggests that the Gulf states' public expressions of concern over the US-UK's recent bombings of Iraq may be only that: "I'm not so certain that underneath they feel the same way and [actually] favour a robust line as far as Iraq is concerned because a re-armed Iraq is bad news for any of the Gulf states and that worries them a lot - whatever they may say in public."

In the immediate future, all the Gulf states are expected to increase defence expenditure, after a period of restraint, encouraged by a period of higher-than-average spending. And at their last summit in Bahrain in December, after years of procrastination, GCC leaders signed a common joint defence pact, paving the way for the creation of a joint command with integrated strategic planning and procurement policies.

But, say diplomats in the region, this opportunity will probably be missed, and individual states will go on buying expensive military hardware to suit their own agendas and to cash in on the highest commissions on offer.

"They are worried about their security, and they are worried by Iraq and developments in Iran. So defence will always be near the top of their agenda anyway," says Taylor. "It has always been a difficult neighbourhood and remains so."

Source: Flight International