In sharp contrast to his two Spanish predecessors, who split the tenure of the transport portfolio during the last European Commission, Kinnock's arrival in Brussels was noticed, and not just by the member states he lambasted for talking 'open skies' with the US.
His high profile intervention in Washington's approach to the so-called G9 countries, which include six members of the European Union, followed hard on the heels of a number of public pronouncements about Iberia's request for a second state aid package, which left little doubt over his view of state aid.
Kinnock's apparent rejection of state intervention may surprise those who remember him as the leader of the socialist Labour party in the UK, a post he held between 1983 and 1992. But this seeming contradiction may well be explained away by the eloquent Welshman's innate sense of fairness which appears to have overridden any political dogma.
A common label used by UK voters when asked to describe Kinnock the politician is 'honest' - a term rarely associated with that particular field of endeavour but one that may help to explain why he failed twice to steer his party to victory in the polls.
Sharp-witted, affable and outspoken, Kinnock appears to have absorbed the aviation side of his wide-ranging brief, which also covers road, rail and maritime policy, extremely rapidly. But when you're thrown in the deep end, you do tend to learn to swim quickly. His unprecedented attack on the six member states - commissioners normally goad national governments, not threaten them with legal action - has his critics pointing to his track record in British politics, where his loquacity earned him the nickname of 'Welsh windbag'. But in his own defence, Kinnock is quite clear that he is merely fulfilling his legal obligations as a Commissioner.
In this interview with Airline Business, Kinnock's direct attack on the UK government for rejecting any negotiating mandate for Brussels to negotiate air services agreements is outspoken by European Commission standards, but is perhaps more of a sign that he still clings to his mantle of opposition to Britain's Conservative government.
Closer questioning on state aid issues produces an understandable reticence to express an opinion on any ongoing case because of legal implications, yet Kinnnock is still prepared to express his doubts about the validity of Iberia's request. Similarly, he avoids giving a straight answer to whether he sees the approval of Aer Lingus' second tranche of state aid after breaking a key condition as precedent setting, but the animation in his face gives away more than his seemingly dead-pan answer: 'I know my view of state aid, full stop.'
He has also developed an abstraction on the 'no comment' theme, which he delivers with a telling glint in his eyes. 'These matters are under continual consideration' and 'thorough and continual consideration is taking place' inspire little reaction on page, but these phrases are delivered with a passion not normally reserved for a bland refusal to impart any further information.
Kinnock, like his predecessors, will undoubtedly run up against national political self-interests aimed at neutralising the Commission's powers. With 15 transport ministers from the member states sitting over him in the Council of the European Union he will have little choice other than to bow to expediency, but it won't be for want of trying.
INTERVIEW TEXT: Airline Business: How do you react to criticism that your high profile intervention in the US open skies talks with nine European countries has handed Washington an unforeseen negotiating tool to prise open the internal market?
I don't think anybody in the US administration would seriously suggest that they've got enhanced negotiating strength as a consequence of my intervention and I'll offer two reasons for that. One is that the US government's initiative last November was, in part, made out of frustration with their failure to get a single European partner to negotiate with. In some ways, therefore, they could understand that I'm trying to make a realistic response to the need which they identified for having a proper transatlantic structure for negotiations.
Secondly, of course, they understand very well that if we do get a mandate to negotiate with the US, it will be a collective mandate. There will be no question of the Commission setting aside the concerns of European airlines. In fact, the mandate will only be effective if the Commission is acting authentically and with the support of the European airline industry. As I've said repeatedly, we want open skies and we want open skies for all and on both sides of the Atlantic. That's a reasonable demand.
I cannot emphasise too strongly - underline it 50 times - that the purpose in all this is not to secure some additional power for the Commission. This isn't latter day Brussels imperialism - the opposite in fact - it is in order to try to ensure that the sum of the parts is greater than the whole, that the European [Union] punches its weight in world trade relationships. The need to do that and the justification for doing that in other areas of commerce is already recognised. There is no need for it not to be recognised in this most international of commercial spheres - the airline business.
Secondly, inside the third package there is a continual and progressive provision for liberalisation. But it's of necessity balanced with transitional periods with economic and social obligations, which you expect in a continent which has got a lot of islands and peripheral areas, and also of course with very firm requirements on removal of state aids.
That package was hard won; it required a lot of negotiation and it required people to make compromises. I'm not prepared to see that scrapped and replaced by some sort of commercial osmosis in a very unorganised way by the US form of deregulation.
It isn't a change of strategy or tactics in the way that you suggest; it's the reinforcement of what I think is an intelligent approach to securing a desirable market outcome but doing it in a way that minimises risks and maximises opportunities.
Let me emphasise this too: the Commission isn't afraid and the airlines aren't afraid of a competitive challenge. All the time we are looking for fair competition, and that's why we're seeking to get a common mandate in which we try to get the best deal for the combined interests of European air carriers. We certainly wouldn't lock the Yanks out - anything but.
At the Transport Council [in March] there were 14 member states out of the 15 who were prepared to acknowledge the advantages of getting a common position if one could satisfactorily be achieved. So among 14 member states, at least, there is a will to get combined strength on a mutually acceptable basis. The eccentric member state may - I can only speculate on this - base its reservations more on political sensitivities than on the merits of the argument.
We also have to include in the law very firm guarantees relating to security and safety in ground handling and, obviously, we've got to take into account capacity and space limitations which are a matter of fact. It would be nice to able to ignore them but they can't be ignored, which is why there's going in any case to be a transitional period, and in addition there may have to be some exemptions that are based entirely on the realistic appraisal of space and capacity limitations.
Source: Airline Business