Rebuilding the Iraqi air force after two Gulf wars and years of decline is proving a challenge for the interim Iraqi government and the coalition forces
The Iraqi air force became airborne again on 18 August 2004, but after a 15-month hiatus, it was perhaps an inauspicious moment. The same force that for two decades challenged Iranian and allied coalition aircraft had finally resumed operations, but was reduced to an active inventory of just two Seabird Aviation Jordan SB7L-360 Seekers – two-seat observation aircraft used to patrol oil pipelines in the country’s south.
There are now about 38 aircraft in the Iraqi air force inventory – but the precise number is never quite certain. Even by the limited objectives of the resurrection plan – which, initially, is to forge a small, self-sufficient force of light reconnaissance aircraft, airlifters and utility helicopters – the process has moved forward, but is spluttering.
These are some of the principal findings of a US Air Force assessment team despatched to tour Iraqi air bases in mid-October.
The mix of old and newly acquired or donated aircraft on Iraqi air force runways includes two relatively effective types – the Seeker and a fleet of three ex-USAF Lockheed Martin C-130E Hercules. But the two-strong Seeker’s utility is severely limited by the aircraft’s flight envelope.
Many of the other aircraft types, which include used Aerocomp Comp Air 7SLs, Bell UH-1 Hueys and 206 JetRangers “gifted” by the United Arab Emirates, are now deemed either too unsafe to fly or unsuitable for Iraq’s environmental conditions.
The new Iraqi air force has inherited no aircraft and only a few hundred aircrews from its former incarnation, and almost all of them must serve in secrecy because of the threat of insurgent attacks on themselves or their families.
Clock ticking
As the Iraqi air force returns to the drawing board, the clock is ticking on the coalition’s patience. Iraqi ground forces are being increasingly deployed in the fight against insurgents, but it could be several years before they are supported by an organic air power capability.
Iraq’s goal to create a force capable of supporting and operating a nationwide air-assault mission with combat helicopters is unlikely to become reality in the next three years.
Air power to support Iraqi ground troops in close contact with enemy forces is also likely to come only from US and coalition fighter and attack aircraft for several years. Light attack fighters that can perform a close air-support or limited strike role may not be added to the Iraqi inventory for some time.
“Air power brings a lot to bear when you’re dealing with an insurgency,” says Lt Col Wesley Long, a member of the USAF site assessment team.
An Iraqi air superiority capability to defend its borders from external attack is not even envisioned within the seven-year planning cycle. That capability is also complicated by the geo-political situation.
Most urgently, the Iraqi air force wants to bolster its surveillance and reconnaissance capability, as well as stand up a VIP airlift fleet for senior Iraqi leaders and visiting dignitaries. The USAF is preparing recommendations to support this and is seeking to identify aircraft that can fulfil both roles. Gulfstream special mission aircraft are thought suitable for the requirement. Unmanned aircraft have been considered for the reconnaissance missions, but are unlikely to be recommended because they do not improve the force’s recruiting strategy.
“Unmanned aircraft don’t give you that ‘be an Iraqi AF pilot and fly and fight for the country’ feeling,” says Long.
Another near-term requirement is to tackle Iraq’s non-existent logistics and spares system. Initially, this role is likely to be contracted out to an aircraft services company, say USAF officials, but it is possible the Iraqi air force may develop its own capability in due course.
The USAF’s current involvement in the Iraqi air force’s long-term procurement plans goes far beyond the need for reconnaissance and VIP aircraft, however. It has decided to compile a comprehensive plan to accelerate the rebuilding of the Iraqi air force.
Until two years after major combat operations ceased, USAF officials had little or no input into the formation and organisation of the new Iraqi service. But the plight of the struggling rebuilding effort became evident on 30 May 2005.
On that day, the crash of an Iraqi Comp Air 7SL – one of about 12 such utility and light surveillance aircraft donated to Iraq by the UAE last year – finally prompted the USAF to get involved. One Iraqi airman and four USAF crew died in the crash. The Comp Air fleet has been effectively grounded since then because of airworthiness concerns.
Memorial service
A memorial service for the US servicemen was held in Washington DC in August, which set the stage for a meeting between the then USAF chief of staff Gen John Jumper and his Iraqi counterpart, Maj Gen Kamal.
“The crash is what brought the two generals together,” says Col Michael Byrne, who leads the assessment team. “Kamal came over for the memorial service.”
Until that moment, the focus of the Iraqi military rebuilding effort had been on standing up a large, effective army. The air force had largely been left to make its own decisions, but had almost no institutional infrastructure, and despite receiving three C-130s, and few resources or planners. Kamal made these points in his meeting with Jumper.
The Iraqi air commanders “were very interested in our input in how to help them in the way ahead”, says Long, a combat operations planner at US Central Air Forces Command (CENTAF) and member of the site assessment team.
Jumper directed the headquarters staff at CENTAF – based at Shaw AFB in South Carolina, USA – to organise a team to assess the status of the Iraqi air force and come up with a plan to accelerate its development.
Since late August, the team has completed a mission analysis, a concept of operations study and an eye-opening on-site assessment of bases in Iraq. The team contacted the 6th Special Operations Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Florida, for advice. The unit trains foreign air crews on tactics, techniques and procedures, but lacks models for standing up a new air force from scratch.
The CENTAF assessment team has looked to other insurgent-fighting air forces in the world, such as Colombia’s, to glean ideas.
The results of this process are feeding into a sweeping planning document that is essentially a blueprint for developing a limited modern air force from scratch. The document is due to be presented to the team’s “board of directors” – a group of three-star generals representing all the major USAF commands – by the end of November. After it is endorsed, it will be submitted to Kamal’s staff in Baghdad.
The USAF assessment team is aware that the document will reflect a US view of air power theory and operations. Half-jokingly, Long says: “We expect 50% of the plan to survive first contact with the Iraqi air force.”
Cultural challenges
But turning the plan into action will throw up more challenges than cultural and operational differences of opinion. The Iraqi air force may seek to implement some of the USAF’s recommendations, but it is unclear what authority and resources will be available to execute its decisions. One of the assessment team’s fundamental assumptions is that no more aircraft will be donated to Iraq.
Buying new aircraft remains a problem while the Iraqi air force is under the control of a provisional government. US laws on foreign military sales do not normally permit the sale of US military equipment to provisional governments, although a rare exception was made to approve the C-130 transfer.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi air force has no overarching national security policy from which to match strategic priorities to weapons requirements and funding. But Iraq’s air commanders are keen to have a starting point from which to rebuild, albeit slowly.
The assessment team says it understands the interim Iraqi parliament has earmarked tens of millions of dollars in 2006 to fund what both the USAF assessment team and Iraqi air commanders agree is the number one priority – buying a new fleet of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.
The aircraft’s principal missions are to airlift cargo and distinguished visitors and perform light surveillance of borders and national infrastructure, such as oil pipelines.
Currently, the crown jewel of the Iraqi air force is its squadron of three C-130s. The so-called 23 Squadron is now co-located with the USAF’s 777th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron at Ali airbase in southern Iraq, but the desire of both Iraqi and US officials is to make the unit self-sufficient as quickly as possible.
Squadron move
Operation Independent Action, launched in October, aims to airlift all the squadron’s personnel and equipment to its future home at New Al Muthana airbase at Baghdad international airport. The goal is to transfer the entire unit to the base by January 2006. A squadron, to eventually total 10 Seekers, is to be stationed in Basra.
The recruitment of new Iraqi airmen has already fallen behind schedule. In 2004, coalition and Iraqi military officials set a target of recruiting 500 new personnel by the end of the year, followed by yearly increases of 400. But today the air force numbers about 360 personnel, and recruitment remains difficult and dangerous as the insurgency continues. The commander of the Iraqi air force and his family live in the protected Green Zone to help ensure their safety. Aircrews go on duty for two or three weeks at a time, but their true jobs are kept as secret as possible from their neighbours.
The delays are not only recruitment driven, but institutional too. Perhaps fearing its power, Saddam Hussein had allowed the Iraqi air force to decline during the 12 years between Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The pre-war Iraqi air force hired and trained new pilots for the last time in 1992, creating a huge age gap in the current emerging force.
STEPHEN TRIMBLE/SHAW AFB,SOUTH CAROLINA
Source: Flight International
