Should the aviation industry worry about global positioning system spoofing?
Perhaps. Straightforward GPS jamming has always been a known and understood risk. That is one of the reasons why it is not designated as a sole means of navigation, and never should be.
But the risk to aviation of GPS jamming increases when it is used as the primary - even if not the sole - means of navigation. Global navigation satellite systems will become the universal primary means of navigation as they will provide the most accurate guidance available, especially when GPS and Glonass are backed up by Galileo, Indian and Japanese systems and maybe more.
But a basic network of terrestrial navigation aids must always be maintained as it's not worth it for terrorists to jam GPS signals when crews can shift effortlessly to an alternative.
GPS jamming, then, is not much of a problem for aviation, as long as the industry maintains its awareness of the risk, and providing jamming is obvious to crews when it happens. But if the interference is not obvious to crews, then safety, rather than mere operational inconvenience, is threatened.
That's where the threat of spoofing comes in. If just the altitude is tampered with, or if spoof signals provide incorrect guidance, that's a worry. Presumably someone, sometime, will try it.
Source: Flight International
