For arguments sake, let's say Lockheed Martin's predictions about the F-35's future come true. So the company makes up for a virtually wasted test schedule in fiscal year 2009, and still completes the system demonstration and development (SDD) phase on time. Lockheed also produces more aircraft than the Department of Defense orders in FY2011, avoiding the so-called defence acquisition death spiral that starts when production cuts lead to even higher unit costs.
Okay, but let's say something else goes wrong. Perhaps a major design problem is revealed during flight test, if it hasn't already. Remember the side-of-body design problem that cost a six-month delay for the Boeing 787 programme? Then what happens to F-35?
It is not as if the programme has an unblemished record. Lockheed has already delayed the programme three years to trim 2,270kg (5,000lb) out of the baseline design, doubling costs of the development phase. Lockheed still has a very immature aircraft, having flown only 140 times in more than three years, with most flights notched up by a non-weight optimised version.
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Nor does Lockheed face a simple task. The F-22 faced its infamous "cockpit howling" problem in flight test. Boeing confronted a wing drop problem with the F/A-18E/F. In the F-35, Lockheed has three variants built on a common design. If flight characteristics do not prove to be so common, the flight-test phase could be extended months to complete unique testing.
Now we learn from a leaked test report that - despite a $5 billion annual development budget - the F-35 somehow accomplished so much less than planned in FY2009. The only two jets that are currently flyable - of nine already "delivered" - recorded only 16 sorties during the whole year. Software is behind schedule, mission systems are late, production is lagging, etc.
Adding even more pressure, the US Navy loudly leaked a document the week before expressing grave concerns about affordability, suggesting the only customer for the carrier variant may be pulling out of port.
Lockheed's public optimism stands against an overwhelming tide of contrary evidence. To accept Lockheed's statements as credible, one is forced to ignore the siren example of almost every major defence acquisition that has walked this perilous road before.
It is time for Lockheed to level with the public about the reality of challenges facing the F-35 programme. Every assessment of the F-35's health not authored by Lockheed or the programme office seems to take a far more negative stance than the company's statements. We can't all be wrong.
Source: Flight International
