The UK's scrapping of its Sea Harrier fleet underlines the difficulty of equipping the armed forces and paying for overseas deployments
In 2006 the UK Royal Navy will retire its BAE Systems Sea Harrier FA2s and leave the fleet without a fixed wing air defence capability for the second time in 30 years.
True, Joint Force Harrier (JFH), the "purple" command for the RN's Sea Harrier and Royal Air Force BAE/Boeing Harrier GR7 squadrons, will transition to an upgraded strike aircraft, but the fleet will be without a fighter equipped with radar and a long-range missile. As a government minister said about the FA2/GR7 last year: "Each complements the other so that JFH has a rounded operational capability."
The rationale behind the decision, says the Ministry of Defence, is that it will prepare JFH for the Joint Strike Fighter, which is due to enter UK service from 2012. An all-Harrier GR force also maximises investment in a single aircraft type, it says. Maintaining two types is undoubtedly more expensive - one of the few areas of commonality between the FA2 and the GR7 is the Harrier name. The FA2 is a first generation Harrier, the GR7 is a brother to the US Marine Corps' Boeing/BAEAV-8B, is larger, goes further, carries more, and has a glass cockpit and modern systems. The FA2 does have, however, the BAE Blue Vixen - generally reckoned to be one of NATO's best fighter radars - and a long-range air-to-air missile, Raytheon's AIM-120 AMRAAM. In fact until recent weeks, the MoD regularly sang the FA2's praises.
That said, the Sea Harrier is not perfect. It is underpowered and re-engining plans have been dropped, probably due to cost, but officially because it is not technically possible. Bad weather has prevented operations from the UK's small carriers, and use of precision strike munitions has been hampered by the lack of integration of a targeting pod.
The MoD argues that today's operations make an air defence fighter less crucial. This smacks of the biggest mistake of every general/admiral/air marshal, planning for the last war, not the next. This echoes 1981 when the then government slashed the RN's surface ship fleet, stating that future operations would not need assault ships, aircraft carriers nor the number of frigates and destroyers then flying the White Ensign. The following year Argentina invaded the Falklands and every decision taken in 1981 was hastily reversed. What happens if the next war is with an enemy with a major fighter capability?
The MoD argues that today the RN is engaged in littoral - or coastal - and not blue water operations and that the UK participates as part of a coalition. But that begs the question: if the navy needs land-based assets, why does it require aircraft carriers and why proceed with the CVF Future Carrier? Does this mean that in future the UK will only deploy forces under the USA's protective umbrella?
Another MoD argument is that the fleet's air defence is a layered system and its new Type 45 destroyer with its long-range radar and missile systems provide extended coverage. But even if the Type 45 joins the fleet on schedule, it will not enter service until 2007.
Converting JFH to the GR9 will provide another, less obvious cost saving from the disbanding of an RAF GR squadron and the combining of two training units. Also fewer squadrons will mean aircrew shortages are less of an issue.
The decision is really a hint at a wider problem, and one that is common worldwide - budget shortfalls. In the UK the defence budget is hampered by one factor that is not a big issue in most other countries - paying for overseas operations. In recent years, the UK has participated in numerous conflicts - including Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Southern Iraq. As a result the British Army, RAF and RN are over-stretched, suffer from low morale, and, as the Treasury does not reimburse the MoD in-full for operations, are facing financial shortfalls.
As UK finance minister Gordon Brown is fond of saying, fiscal "prudence" is good, but as the UK government wants to be a major player on the world stage, then it has to be ready to pay the price. An excess of fiscal prudence makes it impossible to train and retain personnel, maintain in-service systems, procure new equipment and capabilities, and pay for overseas deployments.
Salami slicing defence and reducing the size and scope of the UK's armed forces is not the answer. The UK government has to decide soon to either pay for international deployments from central funding and not the defence budget, or stop volunteering for every conflict and accept that the UK is not the USA and will sometimes have to take a back seat.
Source: Flight International
