Improved decision-making tools are vital if we are not to waste the advantages offered by today's sophisticated network-centric systems
The capabilities gathered for the assault on Iraq promise much compared with the force assembled in the Middle East for the first Gulf War in 1991. On the face of it, today's force comprises smarter weapons, vastly superior intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition capabilities and much greater integration of aircraft, ships, sensors and weapons - network-centric warfare version 1.0.
Potentially the on-going operations could see the use of new smart weapons, with better accuracy and a choice of GPS or laser guidance allowing employment to be matched with conditions. We may see the debut of a number of new capabilities, including the first use of electromagnetic weapons that can disable the electronic circuits at the heart of just about every military system - from truck ignitions to ballistic missile guidance systems - but leave the operators unharmed.
Net-centric warfare V1.0 integrates data from around the battlefield, from subsurface, surface, airborne and space assets. At the tactical level, this information will be used to show the ground commander what is over the next hill or to guide the fighter pilot precisely to the target. It will also provides situation awareness and the strategic picture up the chain of command, all the way to the White House.
All this information should ensure that each target is dealt with systematically, with no examples of navy Boeing F/A-18s appearing just as air force Lockheed Martin F-16s pull off the target. The level of information integration and munition precision should mean that fewer aircraft can achieve more and that collateral damage is reduced, perhaps with individuals targeted rather than entire buildings. But whether all this capability works as advertised, and can be proved to have done so, lies in the future, and much will remain unknown until long after the conflict is over.
And despite all the high-tech systems arrayed against Iraq this time round, the opening strike of the war was with the same weapons that launched the action 12 years ago - the Raytheon Tomahawk cruise missile and the Lockheed F-117A stealth fighter. What the "decapitation" strike that opened this war suggests is an improvement in the sensor-to-shooter chain.
In any military operation the time between identifying a target and placing weapons on that target is key. The bulk of initial strikes may well have been against fixed targets that have not moved in the last 12 years, but it is the mobile targets that pop up which need to be eliminated. The reason dictators never sleep in the same bed two nights running and Scud missiles are fired from mobile launchers is that it increases the chances of survival.
If a target is mobile, it is unlikely to hang around awaiting a visit from a 500lb bomb, Sensor-to-shooter time is absolutely critical. The first strike on Baghdad was against just such a "target of opportunity". But the attack appears to have been debated in Washington DC for nearly 4h before it was launched. Ethical, humanitarian, political and other factors must be taken into account, but military action stands a better chance of success if it is quick.
In the Second World War the sensor-to-shooter time issue was solved with the "cab-rank" system, flights of orbiting ground-attack fighters in direct contact with the front line, called in at a moment's notice and guided by nothing more sophisticated than coloured smoke. Such a system worked in a war where collateral damage was not an issue and where the weaponry was limited to cannon and unguided rockets. Today's requirements and munitions impose very different limitations.
The US military, in particular, has done much to improve its intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting capabilities in the last decade or so. It has also made strenuous attempts to amalgamate the data into useful information - and sensor-to-shooter timespans appear to have been reduced. The solution would appear to lie with the second stage of net-centric systems development - improved decision-making tools.
Every war highlights new capabilities. In the 1991 Gulf War it was precision targeting; operations in the Balkans in the mid-1990s ushered in the GPS-guided weapon, while more recently Afghanistan saw the debut of the armed unmanned air vehicle.
Perhaps the second Gulf War will introduce the world to network-centric warfare. It may also introduce sophisticated decision-making loops or conversely highlight the need for advanced decision-aiding systems. We will not be able to make that assessment until long after the current hostilities have ended.
Source: Flight International
