David Learmount/LONDON
A damning indictment of pilot training standards in the world's air-transport industry is revealed in the official accident report on the fatal 6 February Birgenair Boeing 757 accident near Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic. The investigators say that basic internationally accepted requirements for pilot-training standards have fallen behind developments in aircraft and the air-transport industry.
The report, by the Air Accident Investigation branch of the Dominican Republic's Civil Aviation Directorate, blames the crash on the pilots' failure to cope with the results of a single pilot-tube (airspeed-sensor) blockage, their lack of basic flying skills, and poor knowledge of flight procedures, aircraft avionics and systems.
The report, however, acknowledges that the airline provided pilot training, which, technically, met national and international standards. It concludes: "The investigators are of the opinion that this accident is an indication that the international requirements for aircrew training have not been kept up to date with the changes and modernisation of the air-transport industry and the development of aircraft. They also believe that aviation authorities should revise the training requirements to focus more on the maximum efficiency of crew operation."
The aircraft, having taken off from Puerto Plata bound for Germany, stalled and dived into the sea, because the pilots became confused by the reaction of the autopilot systems to a disparity in indicated-airspeed readings. The crew had been aware of the disparity between the captain's and co-pilot's airspeed indicators since the 80kt (150km/h) check during take-off. A blocked pilot/static tube on the captain's side was the cause.
The report says that the direct cause of the accident (Flight International, 27 March-2 April, P13), in which all 13 crew and 176 passengers died, was "the crew's failure to recognise the activation of the stickshaker, as a warning of imminent entrance to the stall, and the failure of the crew to execute the procedures for recovery from the onset of loss of control".
The inquiry team says that, before the stickshaker warning, "-there was confusion among the crew caused by erroneous indications of increased airspeed and an overspeed alert."
The investigators also criticise Boeing for not providing a warning on its engine-indicating and crew-alerting-system display about pilot/static sensor disparity.
See Human Factors feature, P30
Source: Flight International
