Sir - Like Steve Kirby, in his letter "Engines should be treated separately" (Flight International, 14-20 August, P40), I was reminded of the US National Transportation Safety Board accident report on the 5 May, 1983, Lockheed L-1011 TriStar oil-loss incident. There were lessons to be learned from that near-accident, which was not the first of that nature. Those lessons went far beyond the immediate maintenance deficiencies. In my (several decades' worth) of experience, the aviation industry does generally make full note of all incidents and accidents.
While the general public seems to be happy for any safety deficiencies to be treated through the courts, it is less ready to use that experience in their own lives. Motorists even take pride in never checking under the bonnet and wonder why the brakes inexplicably fail, or a fire develops. Few consider a fire extinguisher or a first-aid kit to be vital onboard equipment, but would be the first to complain about lapses in airline-safety standards.
Even when massive loss of life occurs, its relevance to other transport operators is not detected. In 1973, an aircraft crashed in a French forest because the captain was unaware that a critical baggage-door was insecure and, minutes after take-off, its failure resulted in a massive inrush of air, with catastrophic results.
Some 15 years later, a cross-channel ferry capsized because the captain was unaware that a critical part of the structure was insecure, causing a sudden inrush of water. Warning systems have long been required to warn pilots of hazardous configurations, but not, seemingly, in maritime applications. There are numerous cases where the inability to learn from the experience of others has led to unnecessary and tragic loss of life in what are euphemistically called "accidents".
ANTHONY PHILLIPS
Salisbury, Wiltshire, UK
Source: Flight International
