Samsung of South Korea, it seems, is close to signing two deals, which would propel it into the front ranks of Asian aerospace companies. If it does end up buying the Fokker Jetline programme, and agreeing the joint development with Lockheed Martin of the KTX-II advanced military trainer it will also end up in a significant position in world aerospace. It would thus become the perfect prototype for the emerging Asian aerospace companies - and perhaps the perfect bogeyman, for the established Western aerospace industry.

There can be no doubt that the emerging aerospace industries of the Asia-Pacific region have ambitions, which, if realised, would wreak a fundamental change on the world industry. Logic would, of course, dictate that not all ambitions (for instance, South Korea, China, Indonesia and Japan, all building regional jets) can be realised. There is no proof yet that there is a genuine market which could support, more than perhaps three regional-jet manufacturers - but there are nearly a dozen out there with designs on that largely unproven market.

Equally, logic is not the controlling parameter on entry into such a business. Many of today's projects exist as much for reasons of national pride, national interest or strategic business placement as they do for straight commercial gain. It remains questionable whether any of these aspiring manufacturers can satisfy any of those ambitions in aerospace - and by how much could that satisfaction would damage the Western companies and industries.

The "tiger" economies of Asia, such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, have established enviable reputations in other fields of manufacture and have in many cases come close to wiping out the established Western manufacturing industries. Only in recent years, as rising labour costs have slowed the Asians down (in some cases, making it cheaper for even them to shift manufacturing to lower-cost developed countries), have Western manufacturers been able to fight back. Those earlier Asian successes usually came about through the exploitation of low labour costs, advanced manufacturing and product technology, or both. Labour costs in many Western countries are now little different from those in the more advanced Asian economies. Technically, Western aerospace products are highly advanced, and even in manufacturing terms the Western industry has learned much. The situation in aerospace is very different from that which existed in a consumer market like cars in the 1960s.

Now, a new entrant must be able to match or beat the West in both manufacturing cost and product technology - meaning learning and investment curves far steeper than before. That does not mean that the new Asian entrants cannot compete - it will just be more difficult for them.

In that context, the moves by some of the significant Asian players may seem a little odd. Whatever the virtues (and they are many) of the Fokker 70/100 Jetliner family, economy of manufacture and leading-edge-product technology have not been among them so far. No matter what the attractions of Lockheed Martin as a joint-venture partner in the KTX-II project may be (and they would be many) it is difficult to see what the incorporation of the 25-year-old basic technology of the F-16 fighter could do to make a late-1990s advanced trainer more affordable.

The same problems face most of the other current Asian aerospace ventures. With few exceptions (such as, perhaps, IPTN's use of fly-by-wire technology in a turboprop) they seem to offer little promise in the way of technical advance over existing Western products.

None of that guarantees that Western manufacturers will have an easy ride in retaining their markets - especially as an increasing number of orders now come from Asia. Few Westerners have lost their jobs through over- estimating the threat of a determined Asian rival.

Source: Flight International